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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress 
to enact “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies.”
1
  A modern 
definition of the word uniform is “always the same, as in character 
and degree” and “unvarying,”
2
 while a dictionary closer to the time of 
the Framers defined the word as “not variable” and “consistent with 
itself.”
3
  Yet the rights and remedies of debtors and creditors in a 
bankruptcy case can vary significantly depending upon the state and 
 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 2 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1881 (4th ed. 
2000). 
 3 NOAH WEBSTER, 2 AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New 
York, S. Converse 1828). 
AUSTIN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2012  5:40 PM 
2012] MYTH OF “UNIFORM LAWS” 1083 
federal jurisdiction in which the case is filed.  The result is that bank-
ruptcy in the United States is not, in fact, uniform. 
There are three reasons for the lack of uniformity in bankruptcy.  
First, certain sections of the Bankruptcy Code
4
 (“Code” or “Bankrupt-
cy Code”) expressly incorporate state law, which is often different 
from state to state.  Second, courts in different jurisdictions interpret 
the same sections of the Code differently.  Third, bankruptcy courts 
and trustees are authorized to establish many of their own separate 
rules and policies, resulting in wide variances in key aspects of bank-
ruptcy practice.  And while the Constitution does not require a single 
national law on all matters that affect a bankruptcy case, the substan-
tial and widespread lack of uniformity in bankruptcy is not sound pol-
icy and does not satisfy the constitutional requirement of uniformity. 
This Article will proceed as follows: Part II examines the lack of 
uniformity in contemporary bankruptcy practice and shows that 
bankruptcy remedies and outcomes are highly dependent upon the 
state and federal jurisdiction in which a bankruptcy case is filed.  Part 
III looks at uniformity as a matter of sound policy and as a constitu-
tional requirement.  As part of this analysis, I explore the meaning of 
uniformity under the taxing, naturalization, and bankruptcy clauses.  
Finally, Part IV considers how the patchwork bankruptcy system re-
vealed in Part II compares to the concept of uniformity set forth in 
Part III. 
I conclude that direct incorporation of state law in bankruptcy, 
the protracted disagreement between courts over fundamental bank-
ruptcy matters, and local rules and practices that make bankruptcy 
procedure substantially different from one jurisdiction to another, 
violate bankruptcy uniformity.  The fact that separate classes of bank-
ruptcy creditors receive different treatment in the distribution of a 
debtor’s assets does not violate bankruptcy uniformity.  However, 
constitutional bankruptcy uniformity is violated to the extent that 
parties in a bankruptcy case are subject to substantially different out-
comes due to the location where a case is filed. 
II. BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM BUT NOT 
A. Federal Bankruptcy Power 
Article I of the Constitution authorizes Congress to “establish . . . 
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
 
 4 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as 
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2006)). 
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States.”
5
  In absence of a national bankruptcy law, states may enact 
their own insolvency laws.
6
  It is the exercise of national bankruptcy 
power, not the mere existence of it that gives Congress exclusive right 
to legislate bankruptcy law.
7
  However, when Congress does exercise 
the bankruptcy power through national legislation, then, by opera-
tion of the Supremacy Clause,
8
 any state laws that have the effect of 
supplementing or supplanting federal bankruptcy law are preempt-
ed.
9
 
Congress exercised its bankruptcy powers sparingly in the first 
hundred years following ratification of the Constitution.  Short-term 
federal bankruptcy laws included the Bankruptcy Act of 1800,
10
 the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1841,
11
 and the Bankruptcy Act of 1867.
12
  Each of 
these laws was enacted as a response to specific economic crises, and 
when the crisis passed, the law was repealed.
13
  The first permanent 
federal bankruptcy law was the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
14
  The Act in-
troduced procedures for corporate reorganization
15
 and an adversari-
al system in which bankruptcy referees played an adjudicative func-
tion, with the actual process of reorganization left mostly to the 
 
 5 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 6 Brown v. Smart, 145 U.S. 454, 457 (1892) (“So long as there is no national 
bankrupt act, each state has full authority to pass insolvent laws binding persons and 
property within its jurisdiction, provided it does not impair the obligation of existing 
contracts. . . .”). 
 7 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 368 (1827); Sturges v. 
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 199 (1819).   
 8 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.   
 9 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929) (“In respect of bankruptcies 
the intention of Congress is plain.  The national purpose to establish uniformity nec-
essarily excludes state regulation . . . .  States may not pass or enforce laws to interfere 
with or compliment the Bankruptcy Act or to provide additional or auxiliary regula-
tions.”). 
 10 ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). 
 11 ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843). 
 12 ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, amended by Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, § 17, 18 Stat. 
178.  
 13 See, e.g., Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United 
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 18 (1995) (noting that the 1841 Act was repealed 
in early 1843 after the mass of debtors impoverished by the Panic of 1837 had ob-
tained discharges). 
 14 ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amended by Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 
(repealed 1978).  
 15 DAVID J. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 
58–60 (2001).   
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parties.
16
  A later amendment
17
 allowed for consumer repayment 
plans and gave referees authority to grant discharges.
18
 
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code replaced the Bankruptcy Act, and is 
the current national bankruptcy law.
19
  Unlike many federal statutes, 
the Code is administered by bankruptcy judges
20
 rather than by fed-
eral agencies acting through regulations.
21
  The Code contains provi-
sions for individual, business, farm, railroad, and municipal bank-
ruptcy.
22
  It has been modified many times to address changing 
political and economic circumstances.
23
  Procedures under the Code 
are governed by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which 
contain provisions for deadlines, filing requirements, motions and 
hearings, adversary proceedings, etc.
24
 
 
 16 Id. at 43. 
 17 Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.   
 18 SKEEL, supra note 15, at 131. 
 19 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–
1532 (2006)). 
 20 28 U.S.C. § 152 (2006).  Bankruptcy judges are appointed by the circuit court 
of appeals that have jurisdiction over the particular bankruptcy court.  They are not 
Article III judges and serve fourteen-year terms.  They may be reappointed for subse-
quent terms, but they do not have lifetime tenure.  Id.  See generally Angela Littwin, 
The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy’s Greatest Weakness May Account for 
Its Surprising Success, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1933 (2011) (examining at length the 
administration of the Bankruptcy Code by judicial process rather than through an 
agency). 
 21 For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 
745 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code), is administered by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission through extensive regulations at 17 C.F.R. §§ 228–
229, 249 (2012).  In addition, the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 
(2006), is regulated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve through Regu-
lation E, 12 C.F.R. § 205 (2012).   
 22 Individual debtors may file under Chapter 7, liquidation, 11 U.S.C. § 109(B) 
(2006), Chapter 13, adjustment of debts of an individual with regular income, id. § 
109(e), and reorganization under Chapter 11, § 109(d).  Businesses may file under 
Chapter 7, § 109(B); Chapter 11, § 109(d), and cross-border bankruptcies under 
Chapter 15, id. § 1501.  Chapter 12, id. § 109(f), provides bankruptcy procedures for 
family farmers and family fishermen, while railroads may file under a special sub-
chapter of Chapter 11, § 109(d).  Chapter 9, § 109(c), is for municipal bankruptcies. 
 23 For example, § 1113 was added in 1984 to place restrictions on the ability of 
business debtors to modify collective bargaining agreements after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984) (holding that the 
decision by a Chapter 11 debtor to reject a collective bargaining agreement was sub-
ject to the same standards as rejection of an executory contract).  Similarly, § 1114 
was added in 1988 to impose procedures and restrictions upon the ability of a debtor 
to terminate retiree benefits after the LTV Corporation terminated the health and 
life insurance benefits of 78,000 retirees immediately upon filing bankruptcy.  See S. 
REP. NO. 119 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N 683.  
 24 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007, 9001, 7001.  
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The essence of contemporary bankruptcy practice is the adjust-
ment of the debtor-creditor relationship.  For consumer bankruptcy, 
the purpose of bankruptcy is a “fresh start,” which means that the 
debtor’s unsecured debts and obligations are completely or partially 
discharged.
25
  The purpose of business bankruptcy has traditionally 
been to reduce and restructure debt to allow the business to contin-
ue,
26
 but liquidation of assets and cessation of the entity is increasing-
ly common. 
B. Structural Cause of Nonuniformity in Bankruptcy 
The state in which a bankruptcy petition is filed can be the most 
significant variable in determining the rights available to parties in 
the case.  There are three reasons for this.  First, a number of sections 
in the Code incorporate state law, particularly with respect to proper-
ty rights.  These laws often vary from state to state.  Second, bank-
ruptcy and appellate courts in different jurisdictions interpret the 
Code differently.  Third, in order to allow bankruptcy law to adapt to 
local circumstances, bankruptcy courts and trustees are authorized to 
establish many of their own rules and policies.  As a result, contem-
porary bankruptcy practice is a patchwork of inconsistent and con-
tradictory practices in which the state in which a case is filed makes a 
significant difference in the rights available to the parties. 
1. State Law Incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code 
Bankruptcy law is not intended to be an original source of prop-
erty rights.  Rather, bankruptcy is intended to provide for the modifi-
cation of property rights that exist under nonbankruptcy law prior to 
the bankruptcy.
27
  Thus, many sections of the Code incorporate 
nonbankruptcy law, which means state or other federal law.
28
  For ex-
 
 25 See, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt (In re Hunt), 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“One 
of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to ‘relieve the honest but unfortu-
nate debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start 
afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business mis-
fortunes.’” (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 
(1915))).  
 26 See, e.g., In re Great Am. Pyramid Joint Venture, 144 B.R. 780, 788 (Bankr. W.D. 
Tenn. 1992) (holding that the ultimate purpose of a Chapter 11 filing is to “enable[] 
the debtor to restructure its pre-bankruptcy debts, pay its creditors, and return to ac-
tive operation as a viable enterprise”). 
 27 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979) (“Property rights are creat-
ed and defined by state law.”). 
 28 HSBC Bank USA v. Branch (In re Bank of New England Corp.), 364 F.3d 355, 
363 (1st Cir. 2004) (“The phrase ‘applicable nonbankruptcy law’ can refer to either 
federal or state law.”).   
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ample, under § 522, the terms of a pre-petition security agreement 
apply post-petition “to the extent provided by . . . applicable 
nonbankruptcy law.”
29
  Section 541(c)(2) provides that a restriction 
on transfers of beneficial estates “that is enforceable under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.”
30
  Under 
§ 365(c), state law is used to determine if a breach of contract oc-
curred pre-petition, which may remove the contract as property of 
the estate and terminate a debtor’s rights in the contract.
31
  Even if 
the Code does not expressly incorporate nonbankruptcy law, state law 
can still play a role in bankruptcy.  For example, consumer bankrupt-
cy rates tend to be higher in states that give creditors greater power to 
garnish wages.
32
 
 2. Differences in Case Law Precedent 
For many federal statutes, Congress appoints an agency to make 
regulations and administer the statute.  As noted, Congress has not 
done so with the Bankruptcy Code, but has instead “outsourced” this 
task to bankruptcy courts.  Therefore, case precedent is a major vari-
able in how the Bankruptcy Code works.  And this depends upon the 
federal jurisdiction in which the state where the case is filed is locat-
ed. 
In most circuits, an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision is 
heard by the district court.
33
  However, as authorized by the Judiciary 
Act, some circuits have established bankruptcy appellate panels 
(BAPs) to hear bankruptcy appeals instead of the district courts.
34
  An 
appeal from a district court or a BAP goes to the circuit court. 
 
 29 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2006). 
 30 Id. § 541(c)(2). 
 31 Id. § 365(c). 
 32 See Lars Lefgren & Frank McIntrye, Explaining the Puzzle of Cross-State Differences 
in Bankruptcy Rates, 52 J.L. & ECON. 367, 380 (2009).  Data suggests that higher rates 
of bankruptcy filing in Utah and Tennessee are due in part to those states’ more 
creditor-friendly garnishment laws.  Id. at 377 tbl.2; see also Michelle M. Miller, Who 
Files for Bankruptcy? State Laws and the Characteristics of Bankrupt Households 36–
37 tbl. 2, 39 tbl.3 (Dec. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1983503  
 33 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2006). 
 34 BAPs are currently in use in the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.  
Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/CourtofA
ppeals/BankruptcyAppellatePanels.aspx (last visited Apr. 27, 2012).  However, not all 
districts within those circuits have authorized appeals to the panels, which is required 
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6).  Laura B. Bartell, The Appeal of Direct Appeal—Use of the 
New 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2), 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 145, 146–47 & 146 n.14 (2010).  The 
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Rulings from a circuit court are binding upon all lower courts in 
the circuit.
35
  However, precedent from a circuit court is not binding 
upon any court outside that circuit.
36
  Additionally, precedent from a 
district is not binding on any other district court.  Indeed, the rulings 
of district or bankruptcy court judges are not even binding on other 
judges sitting on the same court.
37
 
Because of the decentralized nature of the federal court system, 
the same Code section can be interpreted differently by different 
courts.  Therefore, bankruptcy outcomes can be highly dependent 
upon the state in which the case is filed and even upon the federal 
district within the state where the case is filed. 
3. Local Rules and Policies by Courts and Trustees 
Bankruptcy courts are authorized to promulgate “local bank-
ruptcy rules,” “local bankruptcy forms,” and “standing orders.”
38
  
Judges can also require attorneys to follow specific rules in their 
courtroom.  At the same time, Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 trustees may 
establish many of their own policies in administering bankruptcy cas-
es. 
i. Local Bankruptcy Rules, Forms, and Standing Orders 
Local bankruptcy rules are district-wide rules that apply to bank-
ruptcy proceedings generally.
39
  They are proposed by a majority of 
 
Second Circuit eliminated its BAP in 1999.  Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wig-
gins, Alternative Structures for Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625, 644 (2002).   
 35 See Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1460–61 
(2010). 
 36 See id. at 1463. 
 37 Id.  The precedential effect of BAP decisions is unclear.  Id. at 1483–85. 
 38 Bankruptcy Rule 9029(a)(1) provides in relevant part: 
Each district court acting by a majority of its district judges may made 
and amend rules governing practice and procedure in all cases and 
proceedings within the district court’s bankruptcy jurisdiction which 
are consistent with—but not duplicative of—Act of Congress and these 
rules and which do not prohibit or limit the use of the Official Forms. 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9029(a)(1).  In addition, Bankruptcy Rule 8018(a) allows district 
courts to “make and amend rules governing practice and procedures for appeals . . . 
to the respective bankruptcy appellate panel or district court.”  FED. R. BANKR. P. 
8018(a).   
 39 FED. R. OF BANKR. P. 9029(a)(1).  The authority of a bankruptcy court to estab-
lish local rules is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 2075 by which Congress delegated to the 
Supreme Court “the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of process, writs, 
pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in cases under Title 11.”  28 
U.S.C. § 2075 (2006).  Bankruptcy Rule 9029 allows each district court to “make and 
amend rules governing practice and procedure in all cases and proceedings within 
the district court’s bankruptcy jurisdiction.”  FED. R. BANKR. P. 9029. 
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the district court judges in the district and are subject to a period of 
public review and comment.
40
  The rules are then submitted to the 
judicial council of the circuit for review
41
 and, if approved, are pub-
lished by the Office of United Courts.
42
  Local rules may supplement, 
but may not vary or contradict the Bankruptcy Rules.
43
 
There are no set guidelines as to what subjects may be treated by 
local rules or forms, and in practice they cover a wide range of mat-
ters.
44
  For example, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania’s website includes thirty pages of local rules, thirty-six  
separate local forms, dozens of general orders and separate adminis-
trative orders, and a forty-nine-page Court Procedures Manual.
45
  In 
addition, all bankruptcy judges maintains their own separate “Cham-
bers’” website giving detailed instructions for motions, hearings, fee 
applications, and other procedures in their specific courts.
46
  By con-
trast, the local bankruptcy rules for the District of Massachusetts are 
whopping 281 pages and include over a dozen standard local forms.
47
  
Local rules and forms for other jurisdictions vary just as much.
48
 
Bankruptcy courts also issue orders known as “general proce-
dure orders”
49
 or “standing orders.”
50
  Like local rules, standing orders 
govern procedures and practices in the bankruptcy court.  However, 
 
 40 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) (2006); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9029(a)(1). 
 41 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c) (2006).   
 42 § 2071(d).  Links to local rules posted on the website of each bankruptcy court 
are available at United States Bankruptcy Courts, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/LocalCourtRules/
USBankruptcyCourts.aspx (last visited Apr. 27, 2012). 
 43 FED. R. BANKR. P  9029(a)(1). 
 44 See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE U.S., REPORT AND RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES ON STANDING ORDERS IN DISTRICT 
AND BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2009) [hereinafter COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/jc09-2009/2009-09-
Appendix-F.pdf (identifying twenty-two separate matters addressed by the district 
court local rules).  
 45 The Local Rules and Forms for the Western District of Pennsylvania can be ac-
cessed at http://www.pawb.uscourts.gov/pdfs/CourtProceduresManual.pdf. 
 46 Chambers Information, U.S. BANKR. CT. FOR W. D. PA., 
http://www.pawb.uscourts.gov/chambers.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2012). 
 47  The Local Bankruptcy Rules for the District of Massachusetts can be accessed 
at http://www.mab.uscourts.gov/pdfdocuments/LR_12-09.pdf.   
 48 See infra Part.II.C.1.iii. 
 49 See, e.g,, Index to General Procedure Orders, U.S. BANKR. CT. FOR D. COLO.,  
http://www.cob.uscourts.gov/gepror.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2012). 
 50 Index of General Orders Presently in Effect, U.S. BANKR. CT. FOR W. D. PA.,   
http://www.pawb.uscourts.gov/genordere.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2012).      
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unlike local rules, standing orders are issued by bankruptcy courts 
without approval of the district court judges and without opportunity 
for public notice and comment.  Standing orders are not published 
nationally and are typically found only on the bankruptcy court’s 
website.  Standing orders’ topics may include forms, contents, and 
service requirements for motions for relief, payments to secured cred-
itors, etc.
51
 
Individual judges may also issue orders to be followed only in 
their court.
52
  Such orders must be posted on the court’s website,
53
 but 
finding the rules can be difficult if they are posted only on the indi-
vidual judge’s webpage.  To the extent that individual orders are in 
PDF  format, they are not easily searchable.  Furthermore, one 
judge’s rules may be very different from those of another judge.  For 
example, each of the four bankruptcy judges in the Western District 
of Pennsylvania has different rules for how motions are scheduled as 
well as for forms of motions, briefs, and orders.
54
  A study of local 
rules and standing orders concluded that they have caused “a lack of 
uniformity in federal practice, undermining consistency in areas 
where national rules were meant to provide it.”
55
  Even the personal 
opinion of individual judges about debtors’ counsel, legal fees, or the 
 
 51 Some judges have criticized the use of standing orders on the grounds that 
their effect is essentially the same as a local bankruptcy rule but without the proce-
dural requirements of local bankruptcy rules, such as circuit court approval or op-
portunity for public comment.  In re Dorner, 343 F.3d 910, 913 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“[A]dopting local rules through the device of standing orders contravenes the Rules 
Enabling Act.”); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Johnson (In re Standing Order), 272 B.R. 
917, 923–24 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2001) (bankruptcy courts do not have authority to is-
sue standing orders).  
 52 Bankruptcy Rule 9029, which directly tracks Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
83(b), provides that “a judge may regulate practice in any manner” that is consistent 
with federal law, the Bankruptcy Rules, and the Official Bankruptcy Forms.  FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 9029.  
 53 E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–347, § 205(a), 116 Stat. 2899 (codified 
as note to 44 U.S.C. § 3501 2006)).   
 54 See Chambers Information, supra note 46.  One judge allows for self-scheduling of 
hearings in Chapter 7, 12, and 13 cases, two allow for self-scheduling of some Chap-
ter 12 and 13 actions (but not others), while the clerk for a fourth judge schedules 
all hearings regardless under which Chapter the case is filed.  One judge requires 
self-scheduling of some Chapter 7 and 11 matters but not others, while a clerk for 
another judge schedules all Chapter 7 and 11 hearings.  Id.  The rules for one judge 
set forth detailed motion and briefing requirements, including specified form or-
ders, two other judges have less detailed rules, and a fourth has no set rules on plead-
ing.  Id.   
 55 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 44, at 1.   
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number of debtors filing Chapter 7 rather than Chapter 13 can shape 
how judges apply bankruptcy law throughout an entire district.
56
 
ii. Bankruptcy Trustees 
Bankruptcy trustees include the United States Trustee, Chapter 
7 trustees, and Chapter 13 trustees.  They perform administrative 
functions and provide organization and oversight to bankruptcy cas-
es.  The United States Trustee (UST) is within the Department of Jus-
tice and a UST is appointed in all federal districts.
57
  The trustee has 
broad duties to oversee and supervise the administration of bank-
ruptcy cases, as well as Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy trus-
tees.
58
 
Chapter 7 trustees are private attorneys appointed to administer 
Chapter 7 cases on a case-by-case basis.
59
  They have considerable lee-
way in how they manage many aspects of a Chapter 7 case, including 
the type and form of documentation required for valuation of prop-
erty, administration of exemptions, accounting for property of the es-
tate, and whether to object to debtor’s discharge.
60
 
Chapter 13 trustees are standing trustees appointed by the UST 
in each district to administer Chapter 13 cases.
61
  Their duties include 
review and oversight of Chapter 13 plans, receipt of payments from 
the debtor and disbursement to creditors, accounting for property of 
the estate, and making a final report on completion of plan pay-
ments.
62
  Each Chapter 13 trustee has authority to set many of his own 
policies.
63
 
 
 56 Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of 
Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 847 (1994).   
 57 28 U.S.C. § 581 (2006).  The six federal districts in Alabama and North Caroli-
na do not have a UST, but are under the Bankruptcy Trustee program. 
 58 Id. § 586.  A detailed description of their function is set forth infra Part 
II.C.2.ii.c. 
 59 Id. § 701. 
 60 Id. § 704.  A discussion of the role and impact of Chapter 7 trustees is set forth 
infra Part II.C.1.ii.c. 
 61 11 U.S.C. § 586(b) (2006). 
 62 Id. § 1302(b).  
 63 See discussion infra Part II.C.1.iii.b. 
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C. How Bankruptcy Practice Is Not Uniform 
 1. Consumer Bankruptcy 
The objective of personal bankruptcy is to allow “the honest but 
unfortunate debtor” to receive a “fresh start,” and not be burdened 
for a lifetime with the financial consequences of misfortune and bad 
choices.
64
  A personal bankruptcy is commenced by filing a voluntary 
bankruptcy petition,
65
 schedules of assets, liabilities, income, expens-
es, and other forms.
66
  Upon filing the petition, any action to collect 
or enforce debt obligations against the debtor is automatically 
stayed.
67
  All debtor’s assets become “property of the estate”
68
 and are 
thereafter subject to court supervision and control until the case is 
closed. 
In Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a trustee is appointed from a panel of 
local attorneys.
69
  The primary duty of the trustee is to secure and sell 
the debtor’s non-exempt assets
70
 and to use the proceeds to pay 
claims of unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis.
71
  The debtor’s re-
maining unsecured debt is discharged.
72
  If a debtor is current on his 
or her secured obligations, such as a mortgage or car payment, the 
debtor may retain the collateral
73
 and continue making payments.
74
  
However, if the debtor is in default, the creditor may obtain relief 
from stay and pursue whatever remedies are allowed under state law, 
such as foreclosure or levy and sheriff sale.
75
  Some debts, such as 
domestic support orders,
76
 debt incurred by fraud,
77
 and most taxes
78
 
are not dischargeable.  Although Chapter 7 is often referred to as 
“liquidation,” exemptions under federal or state law allow most debt-
ors to keep some or all of their property.
79
 
 
 64 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 279 (1991). 
 65 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). 
 66 Id. §§ 521(a)(1)–(2). 
 67 Id. § 362(a). 
 68 Id. § 541(a). 
 69 Id. § 701. 
 70 Id. § 704. 
 71 Id. § 726. 
 72 Id. § 727. 
 73 Id. § 521(a)(2)(A). 
 74 Id. § 522(c)(1). 
 75 Id. § 362(d). 
 76 Id. § 523(a)(5). 
 77 § 523(a)(4). 
 78 § 523(a)(1). 
 79 Id. § 522(b)(1)–(3). 
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A Chapter 13 bankruptcy is also commenced by filing a petition 
and schedules of assets and liabilities.  The debtor submits a “plan of 
reorganization” under which the debtor devotes all of her monthly 
“projected disposable income” to repay a percentage of unsecured 
debt over a period of three to five years.
80
  In addition, the debtor 
must remain current on any payments for secured collateral that the 
debtor wants to retain.
81
  A standing Chapter 13 trustee is appointed 
for each bankruptcy court district to oversee all Chapter 13 cases filed 
in the district.
82
  The primary duty of a Chapter 13 trustee is to receive 
monthly payments made by debtors and to distribute the proceeds to 
creditors as provided under the plan.
83
 
In 2004, after decades of complaints by creditor interests that it 
was too easy for consumers to walk away from debt under Chapter 7,
84
 
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act  of 2005 (BAPCPA).
85
  BAPCPA’s controversial center-
piece is a complex “means testing” formula used to determine 
whether the debtor may file a Chapter 7 or if she must seek relief un-
der Chapter 13.  Simply put, if the debtor’s gross income is above the 
forum state’s median, then the debtor will be presumed to have 
abused the bankruptcy process if she files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
86
  
If the debtor files a Chapter 13, a similar means test is used to deter-
mine the amount of the debtor’s “disposable income” that must be 
paid each month to fund the Chapter 13 plan.
87
  To implement 
means testing, BAPCPA introduced new forms for use by debtors to 
calculate allowable expenses and disposable income.
88
 
The Bankruptcy Code as a statute applies to consumer bank-
ruptcy everywhere.  But in practice, consumer bankruptcy varies 
greatly from state to state.  The following will discuss how states differ. 
 
 80 Id.  §§ 1322(a)(4); 1325(b)(4)(a). 
 81 § 1322(b)(5). 
 82 Id. § 1302(b). 
 83 § 1302(b)(5); id. § 1326(a)(2). 
 84 See generally Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005) (examining the role 
of consumer lenders in enacting stricter standards for discharge of consumer debt). 
 85 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
 86 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2006).  Debtors with primarily business debts are not 
subject to means testing. 
 87 Id. § 1325(b)(2)–(3). 
 88 Form B22C for Chapter 13 debtors is online.  BANKRUPTCY FORM 22C (2010), 
available at  http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/ 
BK%20Forms%201210/B_22C_1210.pdf.  
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 i. Nonbankruptcy Law 
A number of Code sections require parties to use the law of the 
forum state.
89
  This Part will discuss how differences in state law can 
create different results depending upon where the case is filed. 
 a. Bankruptcy Exemptions 
Every state has exemption statutes under which judgment debt-
ors may shield property from creditors.  These can include personal 
property and homestead (personal residence) exemptions.  The types 
and amounts of exemptions available to state court debtors can vary 
widely.  For example, a debtor in Alabama may exempt no more than 
$5,000 of value in a homestead,
90
 while in New York the amount is 
$150,000 per individual and $300,000 for a married couple.
91
  Massa-
chusetts is far more generous at $500,000,
92
 while Florida, Iowa, Kan-
sas, Oklahoma, and Texas each have an unlimited homestead exemp-
tion.
93
  There is no homestead exemption at all in Pennsylvania, 
although that state, like many others, provides an entireties exemp-
tion.
94
 
Exemptions in personal property likewise vary by state.  Some 
states have liberal personal property exemptions, such as California 
($20,750)
95
 and Texas ($60,000 per household),
96
 but other states are 
more parsimonious.  For example, New Jersey has a $2,000 exemp-
tion,
97
 and Pennsylvania allows an exemption of $300 plus a family 
Bible and certain tools.
98
 
The Bankruptcy Code also has an exemption schedule, which is 
set forth in § 522(d).  Federal exemptions include, inter alia, $21,625 
for a homestead, $3,450 for a motor vehicle, and $11,525 for house-
hold goods, as well as a “wildcard” exemption and partial credit for 
 
 89 See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1978) (“Property rights are 
created and defined by state law.”).   
 90 ALA. CODE §§ 6-10-2, -4, -39 (2011).   
 91 N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 5206 (McKinney 2011). 
 92 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, §§ 1, 1A (2011).  
 93 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 222.01, 222.02, 222.05 (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
561.16 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.2301 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 
2(c) (2011); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 41.001, 41.002 (West 2011).  
 94 Under an entireties exemption, property jointly owned by spouses may not be 
used to satisfy a debt owed by just one spouse.  In re Gallagher’s Estate, 43 A.2d 132 
(Pa. 1945).    
 95 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 703.140, 704.020 (West 2012).  
 96 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (West 2011). 
 97 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:17-19, 2A:26-4, 38A:4-8 (West 2011). 
 98 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8123–8125, 8127 (2011). 
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an unused homestead exemption.
99
  Although the federal homestead 
exemption may not seem lavish compared to some states’, the federal 
personal property exemptions are considerably more generous than 
most states’. 
Section 522(b)(1) permits debtors to choose between state or 
federal exemptions.
100
  However, § 522(b)(2) allows states to “opt out” 
of the federal scheme, thereby limiting debtors in those states to just 
state exemptions.
101
  All but sixteen states have opted-out of the fed-
eral scheme.
102
  Accordingly, there is a substantial difference in the 
exemptions available to debtors depending on the state in which the 
debtor lives.  A well-off debtor in Texas, for example, where there is 
an unlimited homestead exemption and a $60,000 combined home-
stead exemption, will fare much better in bankruptcy than one in Al-
abama, where the exemption is limited to $5,000 for a homestead 
and $3,000 for personal property, wearing apparel, family portraits, 
and books. 
Some states have a two-tier state exemption system that provides 
one set of exemptions for civil judgment debtors and a different set 
for bankruptcy debtors.  Michigan allows debtors the choice of feder-
al or state exemptions, but then requires debtors to choose between 
state exemptions available to all judgment debtors
103
 and exemptions 
available only to bankruptcy debtors,
104
 which provide a much more 
generous homestead exemption.
105
  Michigan’s dual-exemption 
scheme has been challenged on the basis of the uniformity clause, 
with mixed results.
106
  West Virginia has opted out of federal exemp-
 
 99 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1)–(2), (4)–(5) (2006). 
 100 § 522(b)(1). 
 101 Section 522(b)(2) provides that “property listed in this paragraph is property 
that is specified under subsection (d), unless the State law that is applicable to the 
debtor . . . specifically does not so authorize.”  § 522(b)(2). 
 102 States that allow debtors to choose between federal or state exemptions in-
clude Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Ver-
mont, Washington, and Wisconsin, as well as the District of Columbia.   
 103 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6023 (2012). 
 104 Id. § 600.5451.     
 105 The bankruptcy-specific exemptions provide a homestead exemption of 
$34,500 for debtors under the age of sixty-five, and $51,650 for debtors over the age 
of sixty-five.  Id. § 600.6541(1)(n).  The state homestead exemption, on the other 
hand, is only $3,500 under § 600.6023(1)(h).   
 106 Three bankruptcy judges in the Western District of Michigan have reached dif-
ferent results.  Compare In re Wallace, 347 B.R. 626 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006) (finding 
the dual-exemption scheme unconstitutional for violating federal exclusivity), and In 
re Pontius, 421 B.R. 814 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2009) (finding the same scheme uncon-
stitutional for violating federal bankruptcy exclusivity and uniformity requirement), 
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tions, but also has an exemption statute for bankruptcy debtors and a 
separate one for civil judgment debtors.
107
  Notably, the former stat-
ute provides for a $25,000 homestead exemption for debtors in bank-
ruptcy and allows the full amount of any unused homestead amount 
to be applied towards other property.
108
  This is five times the home-
stead allowance for non-bankruptcy debtors in West Virginia and al-
most $4,000 greater than the federal homestead exemption.
109
 
The debtor’s choice of exemptions may be different if the debt-
or has moved recently.  If a debtor has lived in her state of residence 
for less than two years (730 days) before the bankruptcy filing date, 
then she must use the exemptions available in the state in which she 
resided for the better part of six months (180 days) immediately prior 
to the two-year period preceding the bankruptcy filing date.
110
  In sit-
uations in which these timing issues apply, a debtor’s exemptions 
travel with her, and are, in effect, personal and not geographic.
111
 
 b. Reaffirmation of Secured Debt 
Section 521(a)(2) requires debtors to file a statement of inten-
tion for all property subject to a security interest.
112
  The debtor must 
state whether she intends to (1) surrender the collateral to the credi-
tor, (2) “redeem” the collateral by paying the fair market value, or 
(3) enter into a reaffirmation agreement with the secured creditor to 
pay the debt.
113
  The debtor must then perform the stated intention 
within thirty days after the date first set for the meeting of creditors.
114
  
If the debtor fails to do so, then the stay terminates and the creditor 
may take whatever action is allowed under applicable state law.
115
  A 
debt that is reaffirmed is not discharged, so the debtor loses the sig-
 
with In re Jones, 428 B.R. 720 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010) (upholding dual exemption 
laws as uniformity requirement does not exclude state legislation in the area).  But 
cf., In re Sassak, 426 B.R. 680 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (Michigan debtors may select exemp-
tions from both general and bankruptcy-specific exemptions).  
 107 W. Va. CODE ANN. § 38-10-4 (West 2012). 
 108 § 38-10-4(d). 
 109 Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) and (5), debtors receive a $21,625 homestead 
exemption, and any unused portion up to $10,825 may be applied to other property.   
 110 Id. § 522(b)(3)(A). 
 111 Robert G. Drummond, The Exemption Opt-Out: Does It Violate the Constitutional 
Requirement of Uniformity?, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 68 (2007). 
 112 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(A) (2006); BANKRUPTCY FORM 8 (2008), available at 
http://www.wiwb.uscourts.gov/fillable_forms/DebtorsStatementofIntention_B8.pdf.   
 113 § 521(a)(2)(A).  
 114 § 521(a)(2)(B). 
 115 Id. §§ 362(h), 521(a)(6)(B). 
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nal benefit of bankruptcy when she enters into a reaffirmation 
agreement. 
Whether a debtor will reaffirm a debt is very much affected by 
state law.  All states permit the creditor to obtain judgment and/or 
repossess the collateral if the debtor is in default for nonpayment.  
But some states also permit a creditor to repossess for ipso facto 
(nonmonetary default).
116
  Almost all consumer credit agreements list 
insolvency or filing bankruptcy as an event of default even if the 
debtor is current on payments.  In states where a creditor may en-
force an ipso facto clause, debtors are far more likely to enter into a 
reaffirmation agreement than in states that do not permit ipso facto 
default.  Thus, in Massachusetts, which prohibits enforcement of ipso 
facto provisions,
117
 reaffirmation agreements are filed in only eight 
percent of Chapter 7 cases, whereas in Alabama, which allows repos-
session for ipso facto default,
118
 debtors file reaffirmation agreements 
in approximately forty-three percent of the cases.
119
  Overall, reaffir-
mation percentages by state correspond closely to whether a state al-
lows enforcement of ipso facto provisions.
120
 
 ii. Differing Precedent 
As noted, the Bankruptcy Code is administered by courts, not by 
federal agencies.  Because of the de-centralized federal judicial sys-
tem, the Code is often interpreted differently from one jurisdiction to 
another. 
 a. Chapter 13 and “Projected Disposable Income” 
A Chapter 13 debtor is required to devote all of his or her “pro-
jected disposable income” (PDI) to payments under a Chapter 13 
plan of reorganization.
121
  There has long been disagreement among 
 
 116 A table comparing state ipso facto laws is set forth in DANIEL A. AUSTIN & 
DONALD LASSMAN, REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENTS IN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY CASES app. F 
(2d ed. 2010). 
 117 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 255B, § 20A (2011).  
 118 See Sumlin Constr. Co. v. Taylor, 850 So. 2d 303 (Ala. 2002). 
 119 Bankruptcy statistics are compiled annually by the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts (AO).  A table showing the number of reaffirmation agree-
ments by state for 2009 is available online.  U.S. CTS., BAPCPA TABLE 4 (2009), availa-
ble at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BAPCPA/2009/T
able4.pdf. 
 120 Austin & Lassman, supra note 116, at 6–8.  For a table showing reaffirmation 
percentages for 2007 and 2008, see id. app. A.  
 121 11 U.S.C. §1325(b)(1)(2006). 
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courts over what constitutes PDI.  Some courts used the “mechanical 
application,” which calculates the debtor’s PDI using the debtor’s av-
erage monthly income for the six-month period prior to filing the 
bankruptcy petition.
122
  Essentially, this meant relying solely on stand-
ardized income and expenses calculations found in Bankruptcy Form 
22C.  Other courts favored the “forward-looking approach,” which 
calculates future disposable income based upon the debtor’s actual 
expected net income as shown by the debtor’s Schedules I (income) 
and J (expenditures).
123
  Yet another approach adopted by the Tenth 
Circuit was the  “rebuttable presumption” approach, in which the six-
month averaging based on Form 22C was presumed to apply, but 
debtors could rebut the presumption by showing the debtor’s finan-
cial situation had changed (using Schedules I and J).
124
  The method 
of calculation of PDI is vital to debtors as this governs how much they 
must pay under a Chapter 13 plan.  Due to the lack of uniformity 
among bankruptcy courts in calculating this amount, Chapter 13 
debtors could fare quite differently depending on where the case was 
filed. 
In Hamilton v. Lanning, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve 
this issue, essentially adopting the Tenth Circuit’s rule that PDI 
should be calculated using the six-month averaging as a starting 
point, but adjusting for changes in the debtor’s income that are 
“known or virtually certain” at the time of plan confirmation.
125
  How-
ever, Lanning has failed to put to rest many of the conflicts over PDI. 
First, there are still two formulae for defining PDI for a Chapter 
13 plan.  For below-median income debtors, § 1325(b)(2) defines 
“disposable income” as current monthly income less “amounts rea-
sonably necessary” for the maintenance of the debtor and depend-
ents, but there are no standardized deductions.
126
  In contrast, dispos-
able income for above-median debtors under § 1325(b)(3), and for 
Chapter 7 debtors, is calculated in accordance with § 707(b)(2) using 
standardized deductions and allowing for the deduction of secured 
 
 122 This was the rule in the Ninth Circuit.  See Maney v. Kagenveama (In re 
Kagenveama), 541 F.3d 868, 881 (9th Cir. 2008).   
 123 This was the rule in the First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, as well as in a number 
of bankruptcy courts in other circuits.  See Hildebrand v. Thomas (In re Thomas), 395 
B.R. 914, 922 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008); Coop v. Frederickson (In re Frederickson), 545 
F. 3d 652, 559 (8th Cir. 2008); In re May, 381 B.R. 498, 506, 509 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
2008); Kibbe v. Sumski (In re Kibbe), 361 B.R. 302, 307–08 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2007).  
 124 Hamilton v. Lanning (In re Lanning), 545 F.3d 1269, 1270 (10th Cir. 2008).   
 125 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2478 (2010). 
 126 11 U.S.C. §1325(b)(2) (2006). 
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arrearages, administrative expenses, and priority unsecured claims.
127
  
If these formulae are strictly applied, below-median Chapter 13 debt-
ors may not use any funds for payment of secured arrearages.  Yet 
catching up on mortgage arrearages is likely the very reason why a be-
low-median income debtor might want to file a Chapter 13, since cur-
ing mortgage arrears is not permitted in  Chapter 7.  This appears to 
produce the same types of unintended “senseless results” that con-
cerned the Supreme Court in Lanning.128  Future cases will have to re-
solve this issue. 
Second, immediately after a judgment was entered in Lanning 
on June 7, 2010, bankruptcy courts diverged on their interpretation 
of the case.  For example, is a debtor required to include social secu-
rity benefits as income in a Chapter 13 plan?  Courts in Idaho, Mis-
souri and Utah, each citing Lanning, have reached different conclu-
sions.
129
 
 b. Discharge of Unscheduled Debt 
Courts are divided over whether debts that are inadvertently 
omitted from schedules in a no-asset Chapter 7 bankruptcy can be 
discharged.  Failure to list a creditor can happen if a debtor loses or 
forgets the information.  In the First Circuit, if a debtor does not list a 
creditor on her schedules and the creditor does not have actual 
knowledge of the bankruptcy, the creditor’s claims are not dis-
charged.
130
  Other courts take a “no harm, no foul” approach and al-
low discharge of unscheduled debts in no-asset cases.
131
  Given that 
many debtors do not maintain organized records and may have for-
gotten about, or are unaware of debts, this is a significant difference 
in the relief available to consumer debtors. 
 
 127 § 1325(b)(3); id. §  707(b)(2). 
 128 Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2475–76. 
 129 In re Thompson, 439 B.R. 140, 142–43 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2010) (stating that social 
security income is not used for disposable income or to determine good faith); In re 
Cranmer, 433 B.R. 391, 400 (Bankr. D. Utah 2010) (stating that social security in-
come is used to determine disposable income and good faith); In re Westing, No. 09-
03594-TLM, 2010 WL 2774829, at *3 (Bankr. D. Idaho July 13, 2010) (stating that 
social security is not used to calculate projected disposable income, but can be used 
to determine debtor’s good faith).   
 130 Colonial Surety Co. v. Weizman, 564 F.3d 526, 530 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 131 Judd v. Wolfe, 78 F.3d 110, 111 (3d Cir. 1996); Stone v. Caplan (In re Stone), 
10 F.3d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 1994); Beezley v. Cal. Land Title Co. (In re Beezley), 994 
F.2d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993).  
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 c. Secured Lender Fees for Post-Petition Costs 
Whether a secured lender may charge the debtor for post-
petition costs, such as filing a proof of claim or other legal fees, de-
pends upon the jurisdiction in which the case is filed.  Section 
1322(e) provides that where a Chapter 13 debtor proposes to cure a 
default under a plan, “the amount necessary to cure the default, shall 
be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and 
applicable nonbankruptcy law.”
132
  At the same time, § 506(b) states 
that post-petition interest and costs may be added only if a claim is 
oversecured and such fees are allowed by the underlying contract and 
state law.  Proof of claim fees and other charges can add hundreds of 
dollars to the amount owed by the debtor.
133
  Bankruptcy courts in 
Mississippi disfavor allowing fees for claim preparation.
134
  In Massa-
chusetts and Pennsylvania, such fees are recoverable only if the lend-
er is oversecured.
135
  Courts in North Carolina and Florida take yet 
another approach, permitting fees for proof of claim preparation and 
other services if the fees are disclosed.
136
  Court policies regarding 
such fees can even differ within a state.  For example, a secured lend-
er’s proof of claim fees is permitted in the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of Texas,
137
 but not the Northern District.
138
 
 d. Dischargeability of Tax Debt for a Late-Filed Tax 
Return 
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits are split over the effect of late-
filed tax returns.  Section 523(a)(1)(B) of the Code deems taxes for 
which no return was filed, or for which a return was due and was filed 
within two years of the bankruptcy, nondischargeable.
139
  In In re 
Payne, the IRS discovered and assessed the debtor in 1995 for taxes 
 
 132 Id. § 1322(e). 
 133 See John Rao, “Proof of Claim” and Bankruptcy Fees: Are They Really Attorneys’ Fees?, 
29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 2, 12 n.6 (2010).   
 134 In re Madison, 337 B.R. 99, 105 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2006) (denying fees for 
claim preparation because “preparation and filing a proof of claim . . . is basically a 
mathematical computation”).   
 135 In re Burrell, 346 B.R. 561, 568 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006); In re McGuier, 346 B.R. 
151, 158 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006). 
 136 In re Bartch, No. 09–80623C–13D, 2009 WL 3853215, at *1–2 (Bankr. M.D. 
N.C. Nov. 16, 2009) (allowing a $350 fee); In re Palmer, 386 B.R. 875, 876 (Bankr. 
N.D. Fla. 2008) (approving a $500 fee). 
 137 See In re Rangel, 408 B.R. 650, 667 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009). 
 138 See In re Allen, 215 B.R. 503, 504–05 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997). 
 139 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
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due in 1989.
140
  The debtor filed bankruptcy in 1997, more than two 
years after the tax assessment.
141
  The court held that a tax return filed 
by the IRS for the purpose of calculating the debtor’s tax debt is not 
“an honest and genuine endeavor to satisfy the law.”
142
  Thus, it was 
not a tax return for tax discharge purposes. 
The Eighth Circuit reached a different result in In re Colsen.
143
  
The court stated that “[t]o be a return, a form is required to ‘evince 
an honest and genuine attempt to satisfy the laws.  This does not re-
quire inquiry into the circumstances under which the document was 
filed.”
144
 
 e. Chapter 13 Property Acquired Post-Filing 
Courts disagree over what constitutes “property of the estate” 
and what constitutes “property of the debtor” after a Chapter 13 plan 
is confirmed.  Upon the filing of a Chapter 13 case, all property to 
which the debtor holds legal and equitable title becomes “property of 
the estate” and subject to review and oversight by the Chapter 13 trus-
tee.
145
  Section 1306(a) expands upon this by providing that property 
acquired by the debtor subsequent to filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tion also becomes property of the estate.
146
  But the bankruptcy estate 
is not intended to last forever.  Section 1327(b) provides that 
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the plan or order confirming the 
plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all property of the estate in the 
debtor.”
147
  On its face, this section appears to return ownership of es-
tate assets back to the debtor upon plan confirmation, thus terminat-
ing the estate. 
Conflicting with this is the Code’s imposition of a number of du-
ties that the Chapter 13 trustee has with regard to property of the es-
tate after plan confirmation.  These duties include receiving, deposit-
ing, and investing estate funds and accounting for all the property of 
 
 140 In re Payne, 431 F.3d 1055, 1056 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 1057; see also Moroney v. United States (In re Moroney), 352 F.3d 902, 906 
(4th Cir. 2003) (allowing no discharge for late-filed tax return if the discharge would 
abate tax liability that the IRS has already assessed); United States v. Hindenlang (In 
re Hindenlang), 164 F.3d 1029, 1034–35 (6th Cir. 1999) (allowing no discharge 
where debtor failed to respond to IRS deficiency letters and the IRS assessed a defi-
ciency; this made a tax return useless for tax purposes).   
 143 446 F.3d 836, 840–41 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 144 Id. at 840.   
 145 11 U.S.C. §§ 1302(b)(1), 704(a) (2006). 
 146 Id. § 1306(a).  
 147 Id. § 1327(b). 
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the estate.
148
  This is the extent to which § 1327(b) vests ownership in 
the debtor.
149
 
Bankruptcy courts employ no fewer than five different ap-
proaches to this issue.  On one extreme is the “estate termination” 
rule, whereby the Chapter 13 debtor’s bankruptcy estate is deemed to 
terminate upon confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan and § 1306(a) 
simply ceases to be operative.
150
  The Ninth Circuit BAP has adopted 
this rule.
151
  The opposite extreme is the “estate preservation” model, 
under which § 1327(a) is largely ignored and all property remains in 
the Chapter 13 estate until either discharge, dismissal, or conver-
sion.
152
 
A third method is the “estate transformation” approach, which 
“holds that only property necessary for the execution of the plan re-
mains property of the estate after confirmation, and the remaining 
non-essential property becomes property of the debtor at confirma-
tion.”
153
  The Eleventh Circuit has adopted this approach.
154
 
The First and Eighth Circuits use a different rule, known as the 
“reconciliation approach.”  Under this rule, existing property vests in 
the debtor upon plan confirmation, but property acquired after con-
firmation is used to fund the Chapter 13 estate, which continues until 
the case is discharged, converted, or dismissed.
155
  The Bankruptcy 
Court for the Northern District of Texas has articulated a fifth ap-
proach, which modifies the reconciliation approach by vesting abso-
lute ownership of all estate property in the debtor immediately upon 
plan confirmation, but bars the debtor from enjoying this right until 
she has completed her obligations under the plan.
156
  Thus, the bank-
 
 148 Id. §§ 345(a), 347(a), 704(a), 1302(b)–(c).   
 149 Id. § 1327(b). 
 150 In re Jones, 420 B.R. 506, 514 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009). 
 151 Id. 
 152 In re Fisher, 198 B.R. 721, 724–25 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996), rev’d, 203 B.R. 958 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997).  
 153 In re Rodriguez, 421 B.R. 356, 376 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).   
 154 Telfair v. First Union Mortg. Corp., 216 F.3d 1333, 1340 (11th Cir. 2000).  
 155 See Barbosa v. Solomon, 235 F.3d 31, 36–37 (1st Cir. 2000); Sec. Bank of Mar-
shalltown v. Neiman, 1 F.3d 687, 689 (8th Cir. 1993).  The Eleventh Circuit may also 
be moving towards this rule.  See Waldron v. Brown (In re Waldron), 536 F.3d 1239, 
1243 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that property acquired post-confirmation remains in 
the estate with pre-confirmation assets that are essential to the plan until the case is 
closed). 
 156 Woodward v. Taco Bueno Rests., Inc., No. 4:05-CV-804-Y, 2006 WL 3542693, at 
*8–9 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2006). 
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ruptcy estate continues to exist until the debtor has made all plan 
payments and is entitled to a discharge.
157
 
f. No-Discharge Chapter 13 
While most debtors file bankruptcy in order to obtain a dis-
charge, some chapter 13 cases are filed by debtors who are neither 
seeking nor qualify for a discharge.  A debtor is ineligible for a Chap-
ter 13 discharge if she received a discharge via Chapter 7 within four 
years prior to filing or a discharge in Chapter 13 within two years pri-
or to filing.
158
  Yet the debtor may still want to file under Chapter 13 
in order to strip off a wholly unsecured residential mortgage or modi-
fy other debt, which is not allowed under Chapter 7.
159
  Bankruptcy 
courts appear split on whether to allow a debtor to file a Chapter 13 
for the sole purpose of lien modification when the debtor cannot ob-
tain a discharge.
160
  No circuit court has addressed this issue, and 
there appears to be no particular pattern indicating how courts make 
this determination. 
 iii. Local Practice Differences 
a. Local Bankruptcy Rules, Standing Orders, and 
Individual Judicial Policies 
Bankruptcy courts may supplement the Federal Bankruptcy 
Rules with their own local bankruptcy rules.  Courts do so to varying 
degrees.  The Southern District of Alabama Local Rules consist of 
eight pages, while the local bankruptcy rules for Massachusetts span 
281 pages, including procedures and forms for almost every aspect of 
bankruptcy.  For example, under the Massachusetts rules, at least sev-
en days before filing a motion for relief from stay in a Chapter 13, 
case counsel for the creditor must confer with debtor’s counsel to re-
solve or narrow any disputes at issue in the motion and must file a 
 
 157 Id. at *9. 
 158 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(1)–(2) (2006). 
 159 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 429–30 (1992). 
 160 Compare In re Fisette, 455 B.R. 177, 182 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011),  In re Waterman, 
No. 11–cv–00929–CMA, 2012 WL 872623, at *4 (D Colo. Mar. 13, 2012), In re Fair, 
450 B.R. 853, 856 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2011); In re Davis, 447 B.R. 738, 744–45 (Bankr. 
D. Md. 2011), In re Tran, 431 B.R. 230, 233–37 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010), and, In re 
Grignon, No. 10–34196–tmb13, 2010 WL 5067440, at *4 (Bankr. D. Or. Dec. 7, 
2010), with In re Gerardin, 447 B.R. 342, 347–48 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011), In re Mendo-
za, No. 09–22395 HRT, 2010 WL 736834, at *4 (Bankr. D. Colo. Jan. 21, 2010), In re 
Fenn, 428 B.R. 494, 500–01 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010), and In re Jarvis, 390 B.R. 600, 
605–06 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008). 
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certificate to this effect along with the motion.
161
  The motion must be 
accompanied by a local form “Real Estate Worksheet,”
162
 and if the 
debtor opposes the motion, she must file a local form “Schedule of 
Payments in Dispute in response to the motion.”
163
  The Southern 
District of Florida Local Bankruptcy Rules, totaling 150 pages, also 
supplement the federal bankruptcy rules on a wide range of issues, 
including detailed procedures for valuation of collateral and objec-
tions to valuation.
164
 
South Carolina’s local rules require use of a local form for lien 
avoidance in Chapter 13
165
 and form of notice for Chapter 13 plan 
modifications.
166
  Michigan local rules require, inter alia, supple-
mental information for Chapter 13 plan confirmation, including di-
rections to the trustee regarding the treatment of executory con-
tracts, details on curing deficiencies, and a plain language 
explanation of dividends to unsecured creditors.
167
  Many courts re-
quire debtors to use a local form for Chapter 13 plans.
168
  This has re-
sulted in such a multiplicity of forms that bankruptcy counsel for the 
National Association of Attorneys General has called for the adoption 
of a single national Chapter 13 form to alleviate the “glaring lack of 
uniformity within the existing [bankruptcy] system.”
169
 
In Oregon there is a Chapter 13 trustee in Portland
170
 and one in 
Eugene.
171
  Each has different requirements for plan confirmation 
which are set forth in the local rules.
172
  Wyoming’s local rules specify 
 
 161 D. MASS. LOCAL BANKR. app. 1, R. 13-16-1(a)(1), (3).  The certificate is not re-
quired if the debtor assents to the motion or surrenders the collateral in her Chapter 
13 plan.   
 162 D. MASS. LOCAL BANKR, R. 13-16-1(d); D. MASS. LOCAL BANKR, LOCAL FORM 13. 
 163 D. MASS. LOCAL BANKR., R. 13-16-1(e); D. MASS. LOCAL BANKR, LOCAL FORM 14.   
 164 S.D. FLA. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-3. 
 165 S.C. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1. 
 166 S.C. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-2(a)– (b). 
 167 MICH. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1(a)(1)–(9). 
 168 See, e.g., DEL. LOCAL BUS. FORM 103a (Chapter 13 Plan Analysis); DEL. LOCAL 
BUS. FORM 103 (Chapter 13 Plan); MASS. LOCAL BUS. FORM 3; E.D. MO. LOCAL BUS. 
FORM 13; N.J. LOCAL BUS. FORM. 8; OR. LOCAL BUS. FORM 1300. 
 169 Karen Cordry, It’s Time for Real Uniformity: The Need for a Nationwide Chapter 13 
Plan, AM. BANKR. INST., Apr. 2011, at 76.  
 170 See Welcome to Wayne Godare’s Chapter 13 Website, PORTLAND13.COM,  
http://www.portland13.com (last visited Apr. 27, 2012). 
 171 See Fred Long, Chapter 13 Trustee, 13NETWORK.COM,  
http://www.13network.com/trustees/eug/eughome.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2012). 
 172 Or. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-3(1) (requiring the debtor to submit a proposed 
confirmation order in text-based PDF format at least seven days prior to the meeting 
of creditors for cases administered in the Portland Office); id. 3015-3(2) (containing 
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that a Chapter 13 debtor may not incur new or additional debt with-
out fourteen days prior written notice to the trustee, except that if 
debt must be incurred in an emergency, the debtor must, within 
fourteen days, provide notice along with an explanation of the cir-
cumstances.
173
  The local rules for the District of Hawaii include defi-
nitions and procedures for “plan motions” in Chapter 13.  These deal 
primarily with treatment of secured collateral in Chapter 13 and re-
quire the debtor to provide additional notice to creditors if the plan 
proposes treatment “arguably contrary to the Bankruptcy Code.”
174
 
In addition to local rules, most bankruptcy courts also have 
standing orders that deal with a range of matters of special interest to 
the court.  A standing order in South Carolina, for example, provides 
for an interest rate of 5.25% for secured claims in Chapter 13.
175
  A 
Northern District of Florida standing order sets attorney compensa-
tion in “routine” Chapter 13 cases at $3,500.
176
  And a Vermont stand-
ing order requires Chapter 13 debtors to make all plan payments 
through wage withholding.
177
  An Oklahoma court has a standing or-
der regarding motions for relief by a creditor from the co-debtor stay 
under Chapter 13,
178
  and a Washington court has an order stating 
that if a Chapter 13 debtor proposes to modify the rights of a secured 
creditor the debtor must make all payments through the Chapter 13 
trustee and not directly to the creditor.
179
 
Previous studies have noted the influence of local legal culture 
on the practice of law.
180
  This effect is certainly felt in bankruptcy.  
Consider, for example, reaffirmation in consumer bankruptcy cases.  
Some judges will not approve a reaffirmation agreement for pro se 
 
detailed specialized provisions governing plan objections for cases administered in 
the Eugene Office).   
 173 WYO. LOCAL BANKR. R. 2083-1(B). 
 174 HAW. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1(e)(1).  
 175 Bankr. D. S.C., Amended Operating Order 09-02 (Nov. 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.scb.uscourts.gov/pdf/oporder/opor09-02.pdf. 
 176 Bankr. N.D. Fla., Fifth Amended Standing Order 9 (Oct. 27, 2009), available at  
http://www.flnb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/standing_orders/standing_orders_
summary.pdf. 
 177 Bankr. D. Vt., Standing Order 10-03 (Sept. 28, 2010), available at  
http://www.vtb.uscourts.gov/orders/ord10-03.pdf. 
 178 Bankr. N.D. Okla., General Order 10-GO-01, Amending Local Bankruptcy 
Rule 4001-1(D) (Feb. 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.oknb.uscourts.gov/ClerksOffice/Rules/General%20Orders/10-GO-
01.pdf. 
 179 Bankr. E.D. Wash., General Order 10-04 (Dec. 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.waeb.uscourts.gov/GeneralOrders/GO-2010.10-04.1288991798.pdf. 
 180 See, e.g., Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 56.   
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debtors or where the debtor’s expenses appear to exceed her income 
if the creditor does not offer more favorable terms in the reaffirma-
tion than those provided in the original agreement.
181
  Two Arizona 
bankruptcy judges require pro se debtors to complete a special ques-
tionnaire,
182
 and another court website includes a link to a talk given 
by a judge that counsels debtors regarding reaffirmation.
183
 
 b. Chapter 13 Trustees Procedures 
Chapter 13 cases are administered by standing Chapter 13 trus-
tees appointed in each district by the United States Trustee,
184
 except 
for Alabama and North Carolina, which are under the Bankruptcy 
Administrator Program.
185
  The duties of the Chapter 13 trustee are 
set forth in a statute.
186
  These include accounting for property re-
ceived and distributing payments to creditors, investigating the finan-
cial affairs of the debtor (including reviewing the debtor’s petition, 
schedules, and other documents
187
); convening meetings of credi-
tors;
188
 appearing in the case and filing and participating in motions, 
objections, and other proceedings; ensuring the debtor is making 
payments; and making a final report on the case for the court.
189
 
Chapter 13 trustees are not U.S. government employees, and 
each Chapter 13 office and staff is managed independently by the 
Chapter 13 trustee under the supervision of the UST or Bankruptcy 
Administrator.  As a result, rules and practices established by trustees 
can vary widely.  For example, of the ninety-four bankruptcy districts 
 
 181 Austin & Lassman, supra note 116, at 9.  Such terms may include a lower inter-
est rate, reamortization, reduction of the principal amount to reflect the current fair 
market value of a car, or elimination of late charges and penalties.  Arizona and Ore-
gon are notable for this.   
 182 Id. at app. J; see also Joseph C. McDaniel, An Explanation of Reaffirmation in Bank-
ruptcy Cases, and Why You Don’t Want the Judge to Approve the Reaffirmation Agreement on 
Your Car, ARIZ. BANKR. ATT’Y BLOG (Mar. 27, 2011, 11:01 PM),  
http://www.arizonabankruptcyblog.info/2011/03/nice-explanation-of-reaffirmation-
in.html.  
 183 The Honorable Eileen W. Hollowell Discusses Reaffirmation, U.S. BANKR. CT. FOR 
D.ARIZ., http://www.azb.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?PID=84 (last visited Apr. 27, 
2012). 
 184 28 U.S.C. § 586(b) (2006). 
 185 Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act 
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 302(d)(3)(I), 100 Stat. 3119, 3123 (codified as amend-
ed in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
 186 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK FOR CHAPTER 13 STANDING TRUSTEES 3-1 
(1998). 
 187 Id. at 4-1. 
 188 Id. at 5-1. 
 189 Id. at 3-1. 
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(including Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia), trustees in six-
ty-five districts provide a form Chapter 13 plan for use by debtors,
190
 
and many districts have other local forms for use in Chapter 13 cas-
es.
191
 
Another difference is the fees charged by the trustee.  A Chapter 
13 trustee’s office is funded by a percentage of the payments received 
from each debtor. 
192
  The fee is capped by the Code at ten percent, 
but each trustee decides how much below the cap to charge as a 
commission, subject to approval by the U.S. Attorney General.
193
  
Rates charged by Chapter 13 trustees vary by jurisdiction from three 
percent to ten percent.
194
  Unless otherwise directed by the United 
States Trustee, rates do not have to be the same even among trustees 
in the same district.  Since the commission collected by the trustee is 
deducted from the funds distributed to creditors, the rate charged by 
a trustee is an important component of how much each creditor will 
receive under the plan. 
Some debtors may wish to pay secured debt, such as a mortgage, 
outside the plan, thereby avoiding the trustee’s commission.  Wheth-
er a debtor may do so depends on the policies of individual Chapter 
13 trustees.  In Massachusetts and the Northern District of Illinois, for 
example, secured debt is typically paid outside the plan, but in the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, secured debt must be paid within 
the plan.
195
  Debtors in the Southern District of Indiana and Southern 
District of Ohio can make mortgage payments outside the plan unless 
there is an arrearage as of the petition date.
196
  In contrast, the trustee 
for the Northern District of Indiana requires debtors to pay mortgage 
debt in the plan unless the plan provides for 100% payment to unse-
cured creditors and there is no mortgage arrearage.
197
  The Southern 
 
 190 See, e.g., U.S. Bankr. Ct., S. D. of Cal. Chapter 13 Plan (Recommended Form), 
available at http://www.casb.uscourts.gov/html/csdforms/Chapter13Plan.pdf.  
 191 See, e.g., U.S. Bankr. Ct., W. D. of Ky., Local Form Q, Certification of Plan 
Completion and Request for Discharge, available at 
http://www.kywb.uscourts.gov/fpweb/pdf/local_form_q_fillable.pdf. 
 192 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
 193 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 186, at 11-1.   
 194 See SCHEDULE OF ACTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES OF ADMINISTERING A CHAPTER 
13 PLAN (2012), available at  http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/ 
20120501/bci_data/docs/ch13_exp_mult.xls  
 195 W.D. PA. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1; W.D. PA. LOCAL BUS. FORM 10. 
 196 Bankr. S.D. Ind., General Order 09-0005 (Aug. 1, 2009), available at  
http://www.insb.uscourts.gov/WebForms/genorder/090005.pdf; S.D. Ohio LOCAL 
BANKR. R. 3015-1(d)(1). 
 197 There is no written rule for this, but it is customary local practice. 
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District of Georgia and Western District of Kentucky allow debtors to 
pay the current payments outside the plan, but mortgage arrearages 
must be paid through the plan.
198
  In Oregon, the debtor is required 
to pay within the plan, but may request the trustee to waive this re-
quirement.
199
 
Clearly, the commission rate and whether payments are made in 
or outside a plan can greatly affect how much a debtor pays, how 
much creditors will receive, and, in some cases, whether a proposed 
plan is even feasible.  As for the plans themselves, some districts use 
“pool” plans and some use “percent payment” plans.  A “pool” plan 
looks to the total amount the debtor pays into the plan and deducts 
attorney fees, administrative costs, and unsecured priority payments 
from this.  Any money left over is paid to unsecured creditors.
200
  In 
contrast, courts requiring a “percentage payment” plan look to the 
percentage of payment to unsecured creditors, which must be dis-
closed in the plan.
201
  If the plan does not pay a specified percentage, 
then the plan (and the debtor’s expenses) will be subject to greater 
scrutiny by the court.
202
 
Another difference is the manner in which plan payments are 
made.  Section 1325(c) of the Code authorizes the court to order the 
debtor’s employer to deduct the amount from the debtor’s paycheck 
and forward the payments directly to the trustee.
203
  Local bankruptcy 
rules in the Western District of Pennsylvania and the Southern Dis-
trict of Ohio require the debtor to submit a wage attachment or pay-
roll deduction order along with the plan.
204
  The local rules for the 
Western District of Kentucky do not require wage attachment, but the 
Chapter 13 trustee does.
205
  In Oregon, the debtor must propose a 
 
 198 See, e.g., CHUCK SYDENSTRICKER, CHAPTER 13 RECOMMENDED PRACTICES IN THE 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY   2 (2008), available at 
http://www.louchapter13.com/Images/Chapter13Practices.pdf.  
 199 OR. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1(7). 
 200 See, e.g., E.D. KY. LOCAL BUS. FORM 2.  
 201 See, e.g., SYDENSTRICKER, supra note 198, at 4.  
 202 In the Western District of Kentucky, if the plan proposes to pay unsecured 
creditors less than seventy percent, the debtor must appear in person for a plan con-
firmation hearing.  If the plan pays more than seventy percent, it will be confirmed 
without a separate hearing.  Id. 
 203 The Chapter 13 Handbook asserts that a debtor is more likely to successfully 
complete a plan if payments are made through voluntary wage orders and encour-
ages such orders “in all cases where appropriate.”  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 
186, at 6-6.  I am unaware of any studies or evidence that actually support this.   
 204 W.D. PA. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-2; S.D. OHIO LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1(e).  
 205 See Chapter 13 Attorney Top 10 List, LOUCHAPTER13.COM, 
http://www.louchapter13.com/Top_Ten/Top_Ten.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2012).   
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payroll deduction order within seven days of the meeting of creditors, 
but at the meeting of creditors, may request the trustee to waive the 
wage attachment requirement.
206
  In contrast, neither the Northern 
District of Illinois, the District of New Jersey, nor the Middle District 
of Tennessee requires payroll deduction. 
In most districts, the Chapter 13 trustee relies upon debtors and 
attorneys to provide an appropriate valuation for personal property 
listed on Schedule B.  The Chapter 13 trustee in the Western District 
of Kentucky (Louisville Division), however, contracts with an apprais-
er to inspect the debtor’s personal property.  The appraisal is filed on 
the docket in the debtor’s case, and the cost of the appraisal is 
charged as an administrative claim against the bankruptcy estate.
207
 
Chapter 13 trustees provide online access to payment history, 
debt balances, and other information for each Chapter 13 case.  
Generally, only bankruptcy attorneys or other authorized persons 
may obtain a username and password to access this information, but 
specific rules governing access are up to the trustee.  There are at 
least four proprietary websites that host this data, and it is up to the 
trustee to select which site her office will use.
208
 
The Bankruptcy Code permits debtors to deduct charitable con-
tributions from income for determining eligibility to file a Chapter 
7
209
 and for calculating “disposable income” in Chapter 13.
210
  Chapter 
13 and Chapter 7 trustees can set their own requirements for docu-
menting charitable contributions before the trustee allows the deduc-
tion.  For example, some trustees require documentation of charita-
ble contributions for one year, while others allow proof of payments 
 
 206 Or. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1(b)(2). 
 207 See, e.g., Appraisal. (Anderson, CPA, Randall), In re O’Neal, No. 08-35278 
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. Jan. 1, 2009), ECF Nos. 12 and 13.    
 208 See Welcome to the 13Network, BANKR. SOFTWARE SPECIALISTS, 
http://www.13network.com (last visited Apr. 27, 2012); Exclusive Source of Consolidated 
Chapter 13 Case and Claims Data, NAT’L DATA CENTER, https://www.13datacenter.com 
(last visited Apr. 27, 2012); Chapter 13 Trustee Online Case Status System, 
TRUSTEE13.COM, http://www.trustee13.com (last visited Apr. 27, 2012); Home Page, 
BANKR. LINK, http://www.bankruptcylink.com (last visited Apr. 27, 2012).    
 209 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2006) (“In making a determination whether to dismiss 
[for bankruptcy abuse] the court may not take into consideration whether a debtor 
has made or continues to make, charitable contributions . . . .”). 
 210 Section 1325(b)(2)(A)(ii) allows charitable contributions up to fifteen percent 
of gross annual income to be deducted from the debtor’s “disposable income” for 
determining the amount that must be paid into a Chapter 13 plan each month.  Id. 
1325(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
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for a much shorter period.
211
  Some trustees receive statements direct-
ly from the organization, and others will accept evidence from the 
debtor, such as cancelled checks.
212
  Other trustee offices have more 
detailed policies.  In the Western District of Kentucky, if the monthly 
charitable contribution is $200 or less, no further evidence is re-
quired.
213
  If the contribution is more than $200, the trustee requires 
a copy of the debtor’s Schedule A of the prior-year tax return.
214
  But 
if the debtor claims a monthly contribution amount of over $400, the 
trustee requires an on-going quarterly statement from the organiza-
tion receiving the contribution.
215
  If the trustee does not get this 
documentation after the plan has been confirmed, then he will file a 
motion to increase the plan payment by the amount claimed as a 
charitable contribution.
216
  There are no specific rules or guidelines 
for documenting charitable contributions, and each trustee deter-
mines her own policies. 
 c. Chapter 7 Trustees 
Chapter 7 cases are administered by a Chapter 7 “panel” trustee.  
Section 701(a)(1) provides that “promptly after the order for relief, 
the United States trustee shall appoint one disinterested person that 
is a member of the panel of private trustees established under section 
586(a)(1) of title 28.”
217
  The main duty of the trustee is to collect and 
liquidate property of the estate and to distribute the proceeds to 
creditors.
218
  The trustee’s specific duties include reviewing the debt-
or’s petition, schedules, and other bankruptcy documents;
219
 conven-
ing and conducting the “meeting of creditors”;
220
 collecting and liq-
uidating non-exempt assets and accounting for the property 
received;
221
 objecting to exemptions;
222
 opposing the discharge of the 
 
 211 Email from Lydia S. Meyer, Chapter 13 Trustee, N.D. of Ill., to author (Mar. 
23, 2011, 4:03 EST) (on file with author).   
 212 Id. 
 213 SYDENSTRICKER, supra note 198, at 2. 
 214 Id.  
 215 Email from Chuck Sydenstricker, Office of Chapter 13 Trustee, W.D. of Ky, to 
author (Mar. 23, 20122, 4:55 EST)(on file with author).  
 216 Id.  
 217 11 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)(2006). 
 218 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK FOR CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEES 6-1 (2001).  
 219 Id. at 6-5, 6-8. 
 220 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) (2006).   
 221 Id. § 704(a)(1)–(2). 
 222 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b). 
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debtor when appropriate;
223
 reviewing the debtor’s attorney’s fees;
224
 
reviewing the case for “substantial abuse”;
225
 and filing a final report 
and accounting.
226
  For administering a no-asset Chapter 7 case, the 
trustee receives sixty dollars.
227
 
Chapter 7 trustees have considerable discretion in how they ad-
minister bankruptcy cases.  For example, a Chapter 7 debtor must file 
financial information such as schedules of assets, liabilities, income, 
and expenses.
228
  The trustee may determine what type of evidence, if 
any, must be provided to document these figures.  This can include 
tax returns, business financial statements, loan documents, deeds, ti-
tles, insurance policies, and wage and bank statements.
229
 
As noted, § 707(b)(1) permits a Chapter 7 debtor to claim a de-
duction for charitable contributions to a “qualified religious or chari-
table entity.”
230
  The Code does not state for how long the debtor 
must have been making the contributions prior to filing.  Some 
Chapter 7 trustees simply never question whether the debtor has 
made such contributions in the past, interpreting the purpose of the 
provision and the “fresh start” objective of Chapter 7 to allow the 
contribution.  Other trustees may insist that the payments have been 
made for a year or longer, and require documentation such as can-
celled checks, a copy of IRS Schedule A (if the debtor itemizes de-
ductions), or a letter or some other proof from the charitable organi-
zation. 
Valuation of the debtor’s property is an issue in many Chapter 7 
cases, particularly if it appears that the debtor has neared or exceed-
ed her exemptions.  The Chapter 7 Handbook states that “value can 
be determined in a variety of ways.”
231
  In a no-asset case, trustees gen-
erally accept the Schedule B valuations for smaller items of personal 
property, such as clothing, appliances, and household goods.  The 
 
 223 Id. § 704(a)(6).  Grounds for opposing discharge include, inter alia, abuse of 
the bankruptcy process and failure to disclose assets.  Id. 
 224 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 6-9. 
 225 Id. at 6-11 to 6-13.  Under section 707(b) of the Code, the bankruptcy court, 
after notice and hearing, must dismiss the debtor’s petition if it is found that grant-
ing relief would be an abuse of Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  Id. at 707(b). 
 226 Id. § 704(a)(9).   
 227 Id. § 330(b). 
 228 Id. § 521(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
 229 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 7-1. 
 230 Id. § 707(b)(1).  The deduction is listed on Schedule J, Line 10.   
 231 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 8-3.  Examples provided in the Hand-
book include the pay-off statement, price lists, physical inspections, appraisals, and 
“common sense.”  Id. 
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trustee may be more likely to require a third-party valuation for 
unique items such as antiques or original artwork, or for the debtor’s 
interest in a business.  However, there is no standard policy or meth-
od, and different trustees have different policies for whether and how 
they will obtain separate valuations for property.  For example, some 
trustees accept printed real estate valuations from Zillow.com.  Or, if 
the debtor recently purchased or refinanced the property, the trustee 
may accept the loan appraisal.  Many trustees, however, will demand 
that the debtor obtain a broker’s price opinion or even a professional 
appraisal, which may cost the debtor several hundred dollars to ob-
tain.
232
  For the valuation of motor vehicles, most Chapter 7 trustees 
accept printouts from online valuation services, such as NADA or 
Kelly Blue Book, but some trustees require the debtor to bring her 
vehicle to a designated appraiser for valuation.
233
 
 d. Bank Practices 
Section 541 provides that all “legal or equitable interests of the 
debtor” become property of the bankruptcy estate upon commence-
ment of a case.
234
  In a Chapter 7 case, this means that the debtor may 
not sell, give away, or otherwise dispose of estate property without 
approval of the bankruptcy court.
235
  Taking this to the extreme, some 
banks place a freeze on a Chapter 7 debtor’s bank accounts immedi-
ately upon receipt of notice of filing (irrespective of any right of set-
off), until requested by the trustee to release them.
236
  This may im-
pose a serious hardship upon the debtor, who can no longer get 
access to her funds for daily personal or family use.  The policy is not 
imposed uniformly,
237
 and jurisdictions differ on whether doing so vi-
olates the automatic stay.  The Ninth Circuit BAP has held that freez-
ing the debtor’s account when there is no contractual right of setoff 
violates the automatic stay.
238
  Other courts disagree and have refused 
 
 
 233 Interview with Donald R. Lassman, Chapter 7 Trustee, Dist. of Mass., Bos. Div. 
(Nov. 8, 2010) (on file with author).   
 234 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006). 
 235 All of the debtor’s interests in such property remain “property of the estate” 
until the trustee abandons the property, a creditor obtains relief from stay as to its 
collateral, or until the case is closed.  § 541(a). 
 236 Based on anecdotal information and available case law, it appears that Wells 
Fargo is the only national bank that does this. 
 237 The author’s informal survey of bankruptcy attorneys suggests that this is not 
likely in California, Montana, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, but more common in 
New Mexico, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington.   
 238 In re Mwangi, 432 B.R. 812, 822 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010). 
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to sanction a bank for freezing the debtor’s personal bank account 
upon notice of a bankruptcy filing.
239
 
 2. Business Bankruptcy 
The classic model of Chapter 11 is a business using the respite 
from creditors under the automatic stay to restructure operations and 
negotiate a plan of reorganization,
240
 often with modified debt or new 
capital.
241
  The business then emerges from Chapter 11 a more effi-
cient, on-going enterprise with its identity and operations intact. 
The traditional model is becoming increasingly atypical, with a 
variety of alternatives taking its place.  These include “pre-packaged” 
bankruptcy (“pre-packs”), in which the debtor has negotiated the key 
terms of a bankruptcy exit plan with major secured creditors prior to 
filing for bankruptcy.  Pre-packs now account for up to half of all 
large Chapter 11 bankruptcies.
242
  Other models include liquidation 
of estate assets prior to confirmation
243
 or pursuant to a confirmed 
plan.
244
  Another variant is a so-called “structured dismissal” in which 
the case is dismissed, but where the dismissal order includes provi-
sions such as releases, protocols for reconciling or paying claims, and 
other terms.
245
  Some bankruptcy courts appoint a Chief Restructur-
ing Officer in cases in which debtor’s management has resigned or is 
otherwise not capable of managing the affairs of the debtor.
246
  Bank-
ruptcy courts have responded differently to these developments, with 
some courts accepting them wholly, in part, or not at all.
247
  Whichev-
er hybrid is before the court, the location of the case can make a con-
 
 239 In re Young, 439 B.R. 211 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010); In re Phillips, 443 B.R. 63 
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2010); In re Bucchino, 439 B.R. 761 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2010). 
 240 See, e.g., In re Whitaker, 341 B.R. 336, 341 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006). 
 241 To be confirmed, a plan must comply with the requirements of 11 U.S.C. §§ 
1123 and 1129.   
 242 Survey Finds Free-Fall Bankruptcies Becoming More Rare, WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2011, 
4:47 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2011/06/15/survey-finds-free-fall-
bankruptcies-becoming-more-rare/tab/print. 
 243 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006). 
 244 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii). 
 245 See Norman L. Pernick & G. David Dean, Structured Chapter 11 Dismissals: A Via-
ble and Growing Alternative After Asset Sales, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 56–58 (2010).  For 
a highly critical view of structured dismissals, see Nan Roberts Eitel, T. Patrick Tinker 
& Lisa L. Lambert, Structured Dismissals, or Cases Dismissed Outside of Code’s Structure?, 
30 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 20 (2011).   
 246 Anthony Horvat, Defining the Role of the CRO, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 46. (2005).   
 247 See Ronit J. Berkovich et al., Prepackaged and Prenegotiated Chapter 11 Cases, in 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DISTRESSED DEBT, RESTRUCTURING & WORKOUTS 637, 
637(PLI Comm. L. & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 35267, 2012) .   
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siderable difference in a case’s outcome.  As with consumer bank-
ruptcy, these differences are due to the use of nonbankruptcy law, 
conflicting judicial precedent, and variances in court rules and pro-
cedures.
248
 
 i. Nonbankruptcy law 
As noted, many sections of the Code require the court to apply 
“nonbankruptcy law.”  Section 510(a) provides that a pre-bankruptcy 
subordination agreement is enforceable in bankruptcy “to the same 
extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law.”
249
  This requires bankruptcy courts to apply state 
law when considering such agreements.
250
  But state laws on subordi-
nation vary.  For example, subordination agreements are readily en-
forceable under Illinois law,
251
 but face far more restrictions under 
Michigan law.
252
  In Ohio, a subordination agreement can be an in-
formal “bargain of the parties as found in their language or by impli-
cation from other circumstances including course of dealing or use 
of trade or course of performance.”
253
  The Ninth Circuit has held 
that California law, which grants a purchase money deed of trust pri-
ority over all other liens, constitutes a subordination agreement with-
in the meaning of § 510(a).
254
  Similarly, a Kentucky court found that 
a clause in a lease subordinating a tenant’s leasehold interest to a 
bank’s mortgage qualified as a subordination agreement and was 
 
 248  The discussion that follows is by no means a complete treatment of all the dif-
ferences in bankruptcy between state and federal jurisdictions.  Subjects not treated 
here include, among others, whether bankruptcy courts apply conflicts of law rules 
based on federal common law or forum state law, rejection of collective bargaining 
agreements under 11 U.S.C. § 1113, payment of retiree benefits under § 1114, and 
whether a “free and clear” sale of assets under § 363(f) divests in personam claims. 
 249 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2006). 
 250 In re Bank of New Eng. Corp., 646 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that 
bankruptcy courts are to apply “general principles of state contract law when enforc-
ing subordination agreements” and may not create “bankruptcy-specific rules of con-
tract interpretation”).  
 251 In re Chi. S. Shore & S. Bend R.R., 146 B.R. 421, 425 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) 
(holding that subordination agreements are enforceable under Illinois state law).   
 252 In re Holly’s, Inc., 140 B.R. 643, 678–79 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (“Section 
510(a) does not provide carte blanche to a creditor under the guise of a subordina-
tion agreement to collect a debtor’s postpetition earnings to be applied to prepeti-
tion debt.”); In re Cliff’s Ridge Skiing Corp., 123 B.R. 753, 765 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
1991) (stating that the court will scrutinize whether subordination agreement is 
based on sufficient consideration).   
 253 In re Envtl. Aspects, Inc., 235 B.R. 378, 396 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1999) (citing 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1301.01).   
 254 In re Sunset Bay Assocs., 944 F.2d 1503, 1508 (9th Cir. 1991).   
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within the scope of § 510(a).
255
  In contrast, Pennsylvania law requires 
a formal document with specific language executed by both parties.
256
 
State law under § 510(a) can even trump the powers of a trustee 
under the Bankruptcy Code.  The Second Circuit found that under 
Vermont law, a trustee’s subrogation powers under § 544(a)(1) and § 
551 do not extend to subordination agreements protected by § 
510(a).
257
 
Even when not directly incorporated into the Code, state law 
plays a role in bankruptcy.  For example, “deepening insolvency” is a 
tort of recent vintage whereby corporate officers, directors, and audi-
tors can be subject to liability to creditors in a bankruptcy case for ar-
tificially attempting to prolong the life of an already insolvent com-
pany.
258
  To establish a cause of action, a plaintiff must prove that the 
company was in the “zone of insolvency,” and that actions by the di-
rectors and officers to continue the enterprise breached a fiduciary 
duty to creditors and the debtor itself.
259
  Whether liability exists un-
der a given set of facts depends upon state laws governing fiduciary 
duty, and some states do not even recognize the tort.
260
 
 
 255 In re Buttermillk Towne Ctr., LLC, No. 10–21162, 2010 WL 5559411, at *3 
(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Dec. 30, 2010).   
 256 In re Dan-Ver Enters., Inc., 86 B.R. 443, 447 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (determin-
ing that written but unexecuted distribution agreements are not sufficient to consti-
tute a valid subordination agreement).   
 257 In re Kors, Inc., 819 F.2d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1987) (concluding that, under Ver-
mont law, subordination agreements are enforceable only among creditors entitled 
to priority who enter into such agreements).   
 258 Kyung S. Lee et al., Deepening Insolvency Doctrine: An Emerging Remedy 
Against Contemporary Corporate Malfeasances 1 (Nov. 18–19, 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author)(“The premise underlying deepening insolvency 
theory is that even an insolvent company has value, which could be salvaged if the 
company is liquidated or restructured in a timely manner.”). 
 259 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 
347 (3d Cir. 2001) (defining the tort of deepening insolvency as “fraudulent expan-
sion of corporate debt and prolongation of corporate life”); cf. Seitz v. Detweiler, 
Hershey & Assoc., P.C. (In re CitX Corp., Inc.), 448 F.3d 672, 680 n.11 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(suggesting that the Third Circuit should reconsider the case en banc). 
 260 See, e.g., Office Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of VarTec Telecom, Inc. v. Ru-
ral Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re VarTec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 634–35 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 2005).  In that case, creditors accused VarTec’s lender of making improper 
loans to the debtor and fraudulently inducing the debtor to pay down those loans 
shortly before VarTec filed for bankruptcy.  Id.  The bankruptcy court dismissed the 
case on motion of the lender for failure to state a claim, since it determined that 
Texas courts would not recognize deepening insolvency as an independent cause of 
action.  Id. at 646; see also N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Fund, Inc. v. 
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 94 (Del. 2007) (holding that directors and officers owed no 
duties to creditors while corporation was in the “zone of insolvency”). 
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 ii. Case Precedent 
 a. Secured Creditor Right to Credit Bid 
A foreclosure creditor under state law has the right to credit-bid 
for its collateral at a foreclosure sale.  This means that the creditor 
does not have to offer actual money, but may simply bid the amount 
of its lien.
261
  This is because the creditor would be entitled to the 
proceeds of the sale, up to the amount of its lien.
262
  Section 363(k) of 
the Code preserves the right of a creditor to bid its lien in a sale of es-
tate assets held during the pendency of a bankruptcy (before a reor-
ganization plan is filed) pursuant to § 363(b) of the Code.
263
 
A “363 sale” differs from a sale of assets conducted under the 
terms of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan.  If the debtor proposes to sell 
assets as part of its plan of reorganization, and the creditor does not 
consent to the sale, the debtor has three alternatives.  First, the plan 
can provide that the creditor’s lien will be retained until the present 
value of the lien is paid in full.
264
  Second, the plan can provide “for 
the sale, subject to 363(k) . . . of any property that is subject to the 
liens.”
265
  Third, the plan can provide for the “realization by [the cred-
itor] of the indubitable equivalent” of its claim.
266
 
Given the express provision for the sale of assets set forth in op-
tion two, courts and practitioners have long assumed that a creditor 
has the inherent right to credit bid in a sale of assets under a Chapter 
11 plan.
267
  But this practice was recently rejected by the Third Circuit 
 
 261 See, e.g., In re Midway Invs., Ltd., 187 B.R. 382, 390–91 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) 
(“The right to credit bid the full amount of a secured claim is essential to the protec-
tion of a non-recourse secured creditor.”). 
 262 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 594–95 (1935) 
(“[The secured lender has] the following property rights under the law of Kentucky: 
. . . [t]he right to protect its interest in the property by bidding at such sale whenever 
held, and thus to assure having the mortgaged property devoted primarily to the sat-
isfaction of the debt, either through receipt of the proceeds of a fair competitive sale 
or by taking the property itself.”).   
 263 Code section 363(k) provides in part, “At a sale under [this section] of proper-
ty that is subject to a lien . . . if the holder of such claim purchases such property, 
such holder may offset such claim against the purchase price of such property.”  11 
U.S.C. § 363(k) (2006). 
 264 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 265 § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
 266 § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
 267 See, e.g., Ralph Brubaker, Cramdown of an Undersecured Creditor Through Sale of the 
Creditor’s Collateral: Herein of Indubitable Equivalence, the § 1111(b)(2) Election, Sub Rosa 
Sales, Credit Bidding, and Disposition of Sale Proceeds, 29 BANKR. L. LETTER No. 12, Dec. 
2009, at 1, 7–8.  
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in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC.
268
  That case held that the debtor 
could sell a secured asset under option three without allowing the 
creditor the right to credit bid.
269
  The Fifth Circuit has also held that 
a creditor has no absolute right to credit bid in a Chapter 11 sale.
270
 
This is a substantial change from past practice
271
 and favors debt-
ors and insiders at the expense of creditors.
272
  This shift particularly 
affects creditors who are undersecured because credit bidding pro-
tects against sales at the bottom of the market.  It also undermines 
the strategy of “loan-to-own” investors who buy secured debt at dis-
count prices with the intent to eventually credit bid to acquire the as-
sets if the debtor does not pay.
273
  Moreover, in an illiquid market with 
debtors and creditors seeking scarce investment funds, the ability to 
credit bid is a huge component of asset sales and restructuring.
274
 
As a Third Circuit Court of Appeals case, Philadelphia Newspapers 
is binding on the Delaware bankruptcy court.  Therefore, it is likely 
to have a disproportionate effect on business bankruptcy.  To date, 
no courts outside the Third and Fifth Circuits have embraced the 
rule.
275
  Debtors that have a choice of venue will weigh the advantages 
of filing in a circuit that allows sales pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan 
without credit bidding.  Creditors will be stuck with the consequenc-
es. 
 b. Cram-Down Interest Rates 
A Chapter 11 plan may be confirmed if it meets the require-
ments of § 1129(a)(1) to (16).  Among these is the requirement that 
all creditors whose claims are “impaired” (adversely affected) consent 
 
 268 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 269 Id. at 311. 
 270 Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pa-
cific Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 271 Michael H. Torkin & Douglas P. Bartner, Major Legal and Financial Factors Im-
pacting Chapter 11 Restructuring in 2011, 2011 WL 586140, *4 (2011).  As the authors 
state, “Until very recently, the right to credit bid has been more or less taken for 
granted.”  Id.  
 272 See, e.g., In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 337 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(Ambro, J., dissenting) (“Such a result would undermine the Bankruptcy Code by 
skewing the incentives of the debtor to maximize benefits for insiders, not credi-
tors.”). 
 273 Torkin & Bartner, supra note 271, at *4. 
 274 Id. at *3. 
 275 See, e.g., In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC, No. 09 B 30029, 2010 WL 
6634603, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2010) (refusing to allow debtor to sell assets 
under Chapter 11 plan without credit bidding and finding “Judge Ambro’s well-
reasoned dissent in Philadelphia Newspapers more persuasive”). 
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to the plan.
276
  A plan can still be confirmed under § 1129(b) if all 
other § 1129(a) conditions are met except for consent of all credi-
tors.
277
  Confirmation of a plan under § 1129(b) (referred to as a 
“cram-down”) allows the claims of secured and unsecured creditors to 
be paid over time with interest.
278
  The rate of interest is a significant 
component of the cost—and hence the feasibility—of a plan. 
The Bankruptcy Code does not specify how the cram-down rate 
of interest is to be determined, and courts have employed various 
methods including the “formula rate,”
279
 “forced loan” rate,
280
 “pre-
sumptive contract rate,”
281
 and “cost of funds rate.”
282
  In 2004, the 
Supreme Court considered the matter of cram-down interest in Till v. 
SCS Credit Corp.
283
  After examining the pros and cons of various ap-
proaches, the Court adopted the formula rate.
284
  Under this ap-
proach, the bankruptcy court starts with the prime rate and then adds 
a “plus” premium for the added risk of default by the debtor.
285
  The 
Court declined to state what the amount of the risk factor should be 
 
 276 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (2006). 
 277 § 1129(b)(1). 
 278 Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) provides that a holder of a secured claim receive 
“deferred cash payments . . . of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least 
the value of such holder’s interest.”  For unsecured creditors, § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i) 
provides that the creditor “receive or retain . . . property of a value, as of the effective 
date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of the claim.”  § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i) .  
“This ‘value’ is generally understood to be a market rate of interest, considering the 
terms, quality of the security and any risk to be borne by the affected creditor.”  In re 
Linda Vista Cinemas, L.L.C., 442 B.R. 724, 748 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2010).  
 279  The Second Circuit in In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55, 63 (2d Cir. 1997), adopted the 
formula method.  It was endorsed, but not formally adopted, by the Ninth Circuit in 
In re Fowler, 903 F.2d 694, 698 (9th Cir. 1990), and the Eighth Circuit in United States 
v. Doud, 869 F.2d 1144, 1146 (8th Cir. 1989).  
 280 Under this approach, the court projects that the creditor has foreclosed the 
loan and reinvested the proceeds in loans of equivalent duration and risk.  The Sev-
enth Circuit used this method in a Chapter 12 case.  Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs. 
of Mid-Am., ACA, 102 F.3d 874, 875 (7th Cir. 1996).     
 281 This approach is similar to the “forced loan” approach, except that the con-
tract rate is presumed to be the market rate for the “coerced loan.”   In re Till, 301 
F.3d 583, 594 (7th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 541 U.S. 465 (2004).  The rate could then be ad-
justed upward or downward if the creditor or debtor can show that the contract rate 
is lower (or higher) than the market rate.  Id.   Other courts using this approach are 
the Fifth Circuit, In re Smithwick, 121 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1997), and the Third 
Circuit, GMAC v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 66–67 (3d Cir. 1993).   
 282 This is the rate that the creditor would have to pay to borrow funds equal to 
the value of the collateral.  In re Valenti, 105 F.3d at 64.  
 283 541 U.S. 465 (2004).   
 284  Id. at 471. 
 285 Id.  
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but noted that many courts using this “formula rate” generally ap-
prove risk adjustments of one  to three percent.
286
 
The Till “formula rate” rule might have been dispositive, even 
with its ambiguous “plus” factors.  The case was decided by a plurality 
of four justices, however, and thus its precedential value is questiona-
ble.
287
  In contrast, four dissenting justices felt that the interest rate set 
forth in the contract between the parties should be the presumptive 
cram-down rate,
288
 while Justice Thomas, concurring only in the re-
sult, wrote that the interest rate should be zero.
289
  Furthermore, Till 
dealt with a cram-down claim in Chapter 13.  Although the Court as-
serted that it was “likely” that Congress intended the cram down in-
terest rate to be the same for Chapter 11 and 13,
290
 in a footnote  the 
Court suggested that cram-down interest rate in Chapter 11 was dif-
ferent from that in Chapter 13 because there is a market for Chapter 
11 debtor financing.
291
  Thus, it is unclear whether the Court intend-
ed Till to apply to Chapter 11 cram-down interest.
292
  As a result, many 
bankruptcy courts continue to apply pre-Till circuit court prece-
dent.
293
 
Since Till, courts have employed a variety of methods to calcu-
late cram-down interest rates.  These include the “efficient market 
 
 286 Id. at 480. 
 287 On the questionable precedential value of a plurality opinion, the Supreme 
Court has stated that  
an affirmance by an equally divided court is, as between the parties, a 
conclusive determination and adjudication of the matter adjudged; but 
the principles of law involved not having been agreed upon by a major-
ity of the court sitting prevents the case from becoming an authority 
for the determination of other cases either in [the Supreme Court] or 
in inferior courts.  
Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1910); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 
730, 737 (1983) (stating that reasoning not adopted by a majority of the court is not 
binding precedent).   
 288 In re Till, 541 U.S. at 494. 
 289 Id. at 491. 
 290 Id. at 474. 
 291 Id. at 477 n.15.   
 292 See In re Prussia Assocs., 322 B.R. 572, 585, 589 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005) (“Till is 
instructive, but it is not controlling, insofar as mandating the use of the ‘formula’ 
approach . . . in every Chapter 11 case.”). 
 293 In re Cook, 322 B.R. 336, 345 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio. 2005) (“It is necessary to look 
to Sixth Circuit case law for the proper rate of interest as no other Supreme Court 
case addresses the issue, and the Till plurality does not overrule the binding prece-
dent of the circuit.”); see also Combined Props./Greenbriar Ltd. P’ship v. Morrow, 58 
F. Supp. 2d 675, 680–81 (E.D. Va. 1999) (finding that since a fragmented Supreme 
Court decision was not entitled to precedential weight, Fourth Circuit case law on 
point remained controlling). 
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rate,” Till “formula rate,” the Till formula rate but only as a default, 
the “presumptive contract” approach, and more recently, a “blended 
rate” approach, when an actual market for the debt at issue does not 
exist. 
The “efficient market” rate draws on the dicta from Till that 
there is a market for Chapter 11 debtor in possession (DIP) financ-
ing, and that therefore, the court can calculate the proper cram 
down rate based on what rate a commercial lender would charge for 
a loan to the debtor for a loan equal to the value of the secured debt 
that is to be repaid under the Chapter 11 plan.
294
  Using this ap-
proach, the court considers (usually based on the testimony of ex-
perts) what a standard market rate would be for a loan that is equal to 
the amount of the creditor’s claim, assuming that the debtor had a 
normal capital structure.
295
  This is the preferred method of calculat-
ing cram down interest rates for courts in the Third and Sixth Cir-
cuits.
296
 
The formula method, endorsed by the plurality in Till, requires 
the court to start with a risk-free market rate, such as the prime rate 
of a U.S. Treasury instrument with a maturity corresponding to the 
debtor’s repayment schedule, and then add a risk premium based on 
the risk of repayment under the plan.  This is the favored approach 
in the Tenth Circuit.
297
  Risk factors identified in Till include “the cir-
cumstances of the estate, the nature of the security, and the duration 
and feasibility of the reorganization plan.”
298
  Some courts will add 
additional risk factors such as the debt service coverage ratio, loan to 
value ratio, and the quality of any guarantors.
299
  While Till indicated 
that the increase over the prime rate due to risk factors might be 
from one to three percent, other courts have observed that this 
amount may be unrealistically low and have allowed for higher 
 
 294 In re Am. HomePatient, Inc., 420 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 295 Id. at 569. 
 296 See In re Cantwell, 336 B.R. 688 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2006); In re Seaspan Dev. Corp. 
Nos. 04-21339, 04-21340, 2:05-CV-315, 2006 WL 2672298 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 18, 2006); 
In re Prussia Assocs., 322 B.R. at 585.  
 297 In re Inv. Co. of the S.W., 341 B.R. 298, 326 (B.A.P. 10th Cir.  2006). 
 298 In re Till, 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004). 
 299 In re Griswold Bldg., LLC, 420 B.R. 666, 693 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2009); see In re 
Deep River Warehouse, No. 04-52749, 2005 WL 2319201, at *11 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 
Sept. 22, 2005) (“Risk is increased significantly when the loan to value ratio is 100%, 
but a high grade tenant positively affects that risk.”); In re Gramercy Twins Assocs., 
187 B.R. 112, 124 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[T]he relatively high loan to value ratio 
in this case, which is approximately 85%, increases the risk factor.”). 
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amounts.
300
  In short, even under the Supreme Court case of Till, 
there is no uniform or set criteria for calculating cram-down interest 
rates.  Perhaps for this reason, many courts in the First, Fifth, Sixth 
and Seventh Circuits use Till only if they determine that no applica-
ble market interest rate exists.
301
 
In seeking to establish a market rate, some courts use a “blended 
rate” approach.  This involves a more creative analysis to consider if 
hypothetical cram-down financing for the debtor could exist.
302
  Un-
der this approach, the court attempts to determine if the debtor 
could obtain a loan through a combination of different tranches of 
financing.  The interest rates of the tranches would then be blended 
to determine an appropriate rate.
303
  Thus, in In re 20 Bayard Views, 
LLC, the debtor’s secured creditor proposed a three-tier hypothetical 
structure including a $13.65-million loan secured by a first mortgage 
at 7.5% interest, a $3.15-million mezzanine loan secured by a second 
mortgage at 13.5% interest, and an equity investment of $3.63 million 
based on a return rate of twenty-two percent.
304
  This resulted in a 
blended rate of 11.68%, compared to the debtor’s much lower pro-
posed rate of 3.9%.
305
 
 
 300 See, e.g., In re Griswold Bldg., 420 B.R. at 696 (applying a five-percent risk ad-
justment); In re N.W. Timberline Enters., 348 B.R. 412, 434 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006). 
 301 See, e.g., In re 20 Bayard Views, LLC, 445 B.R. 83, 111 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(“Since there is no applicable market interest rate, it is appropriate to consider the 
formula approach set forth in Till.”); In re Bryant, 439 B.R. 724, 741–42 (Bankr. E.D. 
Ark. 2010); Mercury Capital Corp. v. Millford Conn. Assocs., L.P., 354 B.R. 1, 11–13 
(Bankr. D. Conn. 2006); In re N.W. Timberline Enters., Inc., 348 B.R. at 434; Bank of 
Montreal v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am. HomePatient, Inc.), 
420 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2005); In re Greenwood Point, LP, 445 B.R. 885, 918 
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2011) (“[W]here there is no efficient marketplace to establish the 
rate of interest in a cramdown, the Court will use the current Prime Rate and add 
basis points thereto to the extent that the loan is determined to be risky, and in a 
number sufficient to compensate for the unusual risk.”). 
 302 “The blended rate approach . . . is not an attempt to mirror an actual market 
that exists.  Rather, it is an attempt by principled approach to create a proxy for a 
market extrapolated from current data such that the court can reach the ultimate 
question of ‘present value.’”  In re N. Valley Mall, LLC, 432 B.R. 825, 835 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 303 See, e.g., Pac. First Bank v. Boulders on the River, Inc. (In re Boulders on the 
River, Inc.), 164 B.R. 99, 103, 107 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the bankruptcy 
court applied blended rate of nine percent); In re N. Valley Mall, LLC, 432 B.R. at 
832–36 (applying blended rate of 8.5%); In re Cellular Info. Sys., 171 B.R. 926, 944 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying plan confirmation because cram down interest rate 
was lower than the blended rate). 
 304 In re 20 Bayard Views, 445 B.R. 83. 
 305 Id. at 110, 112 (denying plan confirmation where debtor’s proposed cram 
down rate was not an appropriate risk adjustment). 
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Still another approach is the presumptive contract approach.  
Under this approach, the interest rate is the contract rate between 
the parties under their pre-bankruptcy agreement.
306
  The Sixth Cir-
cuit has ruled that the contract rate of interest must be used if the 
debtor is solvent.
307
  Drawing on this authority, a Texas district court 
held that the contract rate of fifteen percent was an appropriate 
cram-down rate where the creditor is oversecured.
308
  This resulted in 
an interest rate that was likely far higher than if the court had utilized 
the Till “prime rate plus” formula.  Other courts likewise have found 
the contract rate to be appropriate, even where the debtor was insol-
vent.
309
 
The Nebraska Bankruptcy Court has promulgated a local bank-
ruptcy rule to govern interest rates in Chapter 11 cases.
310
  This 
Wichmann formula creates a presumption that the interest rate shall 
be two percentage points higher than the national average of the 
prime rate published in The Wall Street Journal on the day prior to the 
confirmation hearing.
311
 
Courts have acknowledged the difficulty in obtaining certainty 
and consistency in finding a market rate even where an efficient mar-
ket may exist, and thus the last resort for establishing a rate may be 
simply to employ the court’s equity power and whatever factors the 
court may consider to be important in a particular instance.
312
 
 c. Class Gifting and the Absolute Priority Rule 
A recent development in bankruptcy is the practice of asset real-
location, commonly known as “gifting.”  Gifting refers to the process 
in which a secured creditor will contribute — “gift”—a portion of es-
tate property that is fully encumbered  by the creditor’s security  to a 
lower-priority class upon plan confirmation, bypassing the intermedi-
 
 306 In re Del-A-Rae, Inc., 448 B.R. 303, 305 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011). 
 307 In re Dow Corning Corp., 456 F.3d 668, 679 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 308 Good v. RMR Inv., Inc., 428 B.R. 249, 256 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2010). 
 309 In re T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship, 116 F.3d 790, 800 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming 
the rate set by the bankruptcy court). 
 310 NEB. R. BANKR. P. 3023-1. 
 311 NEB. R. BANKR. P. 3023-1(b).  This formula approach was adopted following In 
re Wichmann, 77 B.R. 718 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994), and was approved by the Supreme 
Court in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004).  The rule also applies to interest 
rates in Chapter 9, 12, and 13.   
 312 In re SJT Ventures, LLC, 441 B.R. 248, 255 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010) (“[A]n at-
tempt to poll the local market for a consistent rate may yield unworkable results. . . .  
A court of equity must seek out the approach that will most fairly and accurately ac-
count for the characteristics of the debtor and the market value of the creditor’s 
claim.”).  
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ate class of creditors.
313
  The secured creditor, it might agree to a gift-
ing plan in order to resolve litigation which attacks its security inter-
est.  Many reorganization professionals view gifting as a powerful tool 
in resolving litigation and achieving consensus among diverse inter-
ests in plan confirmation.
314
 
The Bankruptcy Code sets up priorities in the allocation and dis-
tribution of assets to creditors of the estate.  As a general premise, se-
cured creditors have recourse to their collateral.
315
  Unsecured credi-
tors receive a distribution of any unencumbered assets based on the 
priority of their claim.
316
  Chapter 11 permits a bankruptcy debtor to 
establish classes of creditors consistent with the Code’s priority 
scheme.
317
  Claims within a class must be substantially similar to each 
other,
318
 and many plans have a graduated order of senior and junior 
claims, consistent with the claims priority scheme set forth in § 507.
319
 
Section 1129(b) of the Code lists the requirements to confirm a 
plan of reorganization over the objection of creditors.
320
  Among the-
se is the “absolute priority rule” in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
321
  The abso-
lute priority rule provides that junior creditors may not receive any 
property on account of their claims if the claims of any senior class 
have not been paid in full (unless the senior class consents to less-
than-full payment).
322
  Since equity interests are the lowest priority 
claim in bankruptcy,
323
 this rule has traditionally been applied to pre-
vent equity holders from retaining their interests if all other classes of 
claims are not paid in full, unless the senior creditors have consented 
to less-than-full payment.
324
 
A question arises whether gifting violates the absolute priority 
rule because it allows junior creditors to receive a distribution for 
their claims when the claims of an intermediate-creditor class have 
 
 313 Leah M. Eisenberg, Gifting and Asset Reallocation in Chapter 11 Proceedings: A Syn-
thesized Approach, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 50, 54–55 (2010). 
 314 Id..   
 315 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2006). 
 316 Id. § 507. 
 317 Id. § 1122. 
 318 Id. 
 319 Id. § 507. 
 320 Id. § 1129(b). 
 321 § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).   
 322 § 1129(b)(2)(B). 
 323 This is based on nonbankruptcy law, which historically provides that creditors 
of a firm are entitled to be paid in full before the equity owners of a firm.  CHARLES 
JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 11.33 (2009).   
 324 Id. 
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not been paid in full—even though the distribution comes from a 
class senior to the intermediate class and even though the distribu-
tion to the intermediate class is not changed as a result of the gifting.  
The answer depends on how strictly the court applies the absolute 
priority rule. 
The Third Circuit in In re Armstrong World Industries refused to 
confirm a plan under which one class of unsecured creditors would 
grant part of its distribution in the form of stock warrants to the equi-
ty class while a second class of unsecured creditors had not been paid 
in full.
325
  Such a plan, the court held, would “read the § 1129(b) re-
quirements out of the Code.”
326
  The Second Circuit likewise rejected 
plans with gifting provisions in In re DBSD North America, where the 
court reversed the district court’s ruling which allowed a plan that 
proposed to give unsecured creditors shares in the reorganized com-
pany (worth no more than forty-six percent of their claims) while at 
the same time providing shares and warrants to the lower priority eq-
uity class.
327
  The court found this to be a “fatal” violation of the abso-
lute priority rule, which does not permit a junior class to receive any 
property on account of its interest if a class with higher priority is not 
paid in full.
328
 
Even after the ruling in In re Armstrong, however, bankruptcy 
courts in the District of Delaware, which is in the Third Circuit, have 
approved gifting plans if the gift comes solely from the collateral of a 
secured lender
329
 or from a third party.
330
  Such decisions suggest that 
judges in this court will construe In re Armstrong as narrowly as possi-
ble.  These types of plans would not be permissible in the First Cir-
cuit.
331
 
 
 325 320 B.R. 523, 525–26 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005), aff’d, 432 F.3d 50 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 326 Id. at 540 (citing In re Sentry Operating Co. of Tex., 264 B.R. 850, 865 (Bankr. 
S.D. Tex. 2001)).    
 327 634 F.3d 79, 108 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 328 Id. at 97–98. 
 329 See, e.g., In re Wash. Mutual, Inc., 442 B.R. 314 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011); In re 
World Health Alternatives, Inc., 344 B.R. 291 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (approving carve-
out of secured creditor’s collateral as fund for unsecured creditors to investigate and 
pursuit of claims against other parties). 
 330 In re TSIC, Inc., 393 B.R. 71 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (stalking horse bidder 
providing value to unsecured creditors in exchange for agreement to not object to 
withdrawal of a bid). 
 331 For example, in In re CGE Shattuck, LLC, 254 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000), the 
bankruptcy court denied confirmation of a plan where there was a separate agree-
ment (not in the plan) between secured lender and unsecured lenders, finding that 
“[t]he economic substance and effect of the [gifting] would be to sanction a distribu-
tion scheme that discriminates between creditors in the same class.”  Id. at 19. 
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The response to gifting plans by courts in other circuits has been 
mixed.  Courts in the First Circuit are consistently favorable to gifting 
plans,
332
 while courts in Texas
333
 and Ohio have ruled both ways.
334
  
Results from other bankruptcy courts are likewise mixed, with courts 
in Missouri
335
 and California
336
 approving gifting, while courts in Loui-
siana
337
 and Virginia rejecting them.
338
  As these cases show, whether 
gifting will be permitted in a Chapter 11 case depends on the forum 
in which the case is filed. 
 d. Enforcement of Pre-Petition Intercreditor Agreements 
Pre-bankruptcy intercreditor agreements are agreements be-
tween junior and senior lenders when the debtor incurs multiple tiers 
of debt.  Such agreements provide for subordination of one creditor’s 
 
 332 Official, Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Stern (In re SPM Mfg. Corp.), 984 
F.2d 1305, 1313 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that secured creditor in Chapter 7 case is 
permitted to share sale proceeds with unsecured creditors while IRS priority unse-
cured claim was unpaid on the grounds that sale proceeds belonged to secured cred-
itor).  
 333 Compare In re MCorp. Fin., Inc., 160 B.R. 941 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (affirming a plan 
under which senior bondholder gifted a portion of its claim to fund settlement be-
tween debtor and FDIC over junior bondholders), and In re IDEARC, Inc., 423 B.R. 
138 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009) (noting that a gift from lender’s collateral to general 
unsecured creditors over unsecured note holders was only minor discrimination be-
tween classes), with In re Sentry Operating Co. of Tex., 264 B.R. 850 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
2001) (rejecting a plan which provided for gift of 100% recovery to trade creditors 
but only one percent recovery to non-trade creditors because trade creditors were 
not essential to reorganization). 
 334 Compare In re Schwab Indus., Inc., No. 10-60702-rk, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 5970 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2010) (affirming a plan under which there was a gift 
from prepetition lenders to unsecured creditors of $850,000 plus fifteen percent of 
net sale proceeds), with In re Synders Drug Stores, Inc., 307 B.R. 889 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 2004) (disallowing debtor’s gift of proceeds of avoidance actions to unsecured 
trade creditors over unsecured non-trade creditors because avoidance proceeds are 
property of the estate for all creditors and because debtor failed to prove critical 
vendor status for favored class). 
 335 In re Union Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 303 B.R. 390 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2003) (ap-
proving a gift from secured lender’s collateral to unsecured trade creditors over un-
secured non-trade creditors where the favored class was necessary to the reorganiza-
tion). 
 336 In re Fanita Ranch, L.P., No. 10-05750-MM11, 2010 WL 4955892 (Bankr. S.D. 
Cal. Nov. 5, 2010) (approving a gift of bankruptcy dividends from secured lender to 
certain unsecured creditors and to the exclusion of other unsecured creditors). 
 337 In re OCA, Inc., 357 B.R. 72 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2006) (disallowing a gift of right 
to a percentage of new common stock from secured lender to equity holders after 
objections of general unsecured creditors). 
 338 In re On-Site Sourcing, Inc., 412 B.R. 817 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009) (denying DIP 
lender’s gift to general unsecured creditors pursuant to § 363 asset sale after the ob-
jections of priority creditors as an attempt to evade Chapter 11 plan confirmation 
process). 
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security interest to the other creditor, and are presumed to be en-
forceable under § 510(a) of the Code.
339
  But these agreements can 
also include “stay-silent” or “no-contest” provisions whereby the jun-
ior or subordinated creditor agrees not to challenge the senior credi-
tor’s priority of its interest in collateral, promises to vote in favor of a 
bankruptcy plan approved by the secured lender, to waive rights to 
enforce subordinated obligations, or to waive rights to a post-petition 
financing DIP agreement.
340
  These are common elements of multi-
tier financing, but they are inconsistent with the rights granted to the 
parties under the Bankruptcy Code.  Are such terms enforceable un-
der § 510(a)?  Courts are split. 
One of the first cases to address this issue was In re Hart Ski Man-
ufacturing Co., in which a Minnesota bankruptcy court refused to en-
force an intercreditor agreement that, the senior creditor alleged, 
prohibited the junior creditor from seeking adequate protection or 
termination of the automatic stay.
341
  Finding such terms to be at odds 
with the rights granted under the Bankruptcy Code, the court stated 
that “[t]here is no indication that Congress intended to allow credi-
tors to alter, by a subordination agreement, the bankruptcy laws un-
related to distribution of assets.”
342
 
More recently in In re Ion Media Networks, the debtor issued $850 
million of first-lien debt in addition to second-lien debt, both secured 
by substantially all assets of the company, which the court valued be-
tween $310 and $445 million.
343
  An intercreditor agreement set forth 
the priorities of the parties to the collateral and provided that 
nonperfection of any lien would not affect those priorities.
344
  After 
the bankruptcy was filed, the junior lien creditors sought to challenge 
whether the senior lender’s liens over certain FCC licenses had been 
duly perfected.
345
  The court refused to allow the challenge, holding 
that it would “not disturb the bargained-for rights . . . governing the 
second lien debt.”
346
 
 
 339 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2006). 
 340 See Mark N. Berman & Jo Ann Brighton, An Update on Second-Lien Financings 
and Intercreditor Agreements: Part I, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 40–41, 95–96 (2011). 
 341 5 B.R. 734, 735 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980). 
 342 Id. 
 343 419 B.R. 585, 592 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).   
 344 Id. at 594. 
 345 Id. at 593–94. 
 346 Id. at 595. 
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In contrast, the court in In re TCI 2 Holdings, LLC ruled the op-
posite.
347
  In that case, there was a $488 million first lien debt and 
$1.25 billion in second lien notes.
348
  The intercreditor agreement 
provided that the second lien creditor could not receive any pay-
ments until the first lien was paid in full.
349
  After the bankruptcy was 
filed, both creditors submitted competing plans of reorganization.
350
  
The second lien creditor’s plan, which was supported by the debtor, 
provided for distributions and subscription rights in favor of the se-
cond creditor equal to seventy percent of the reorganized debtor, 
while the first lien creditor would receive partial payment of its debt 
in cash and a note for the remainder.
351
  The senior lienholder ob-
jected to the plan on the basis that it breached the intercreditor 
agreement.
352
  The court confirmed the plan notwithstanding the ob-
jection, finding that all the requirements for plan confirmation un-
der § 1129(a) and (b) of the Code were satisfied.
353
 
Results in other courts are likewise mixed.  A Texas court denied 
a motion by subordinated creditors to appoint a bankruptcy examin-
er where the intercreditor agreement prohibited such action.
354
  Alt-
hough the Code clearly allows for such appointment, the court de-
termined that “[i]t is well-settled that rights under statute may be 
contractually waived.”
355
  An Illinois court reached the exact opposite 
conclusion in declining to uphold a provision in an intercreditor 
agreement pursuant to which the subordinated creditor assigned its 
right to vote in plan confirmation to the senior creditor.
356
  The court 
held that “[i]t is generally understood that prebankruptcy agree-
ments do not override contrary provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.”
357
  
Other courts limit intercreditor agreements to enforcement of pay-
 
 347 428 B.R. 117 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010). 
 348 Id. at 129. 
 349 Id. at 138. 
 350 Id.  at 128. 
 351 Id. at 130–31. 
 352 Id. at 139. 
 353 In re TCI 2 Holdings, 428 B.R. at 140–41. 
 354 In re Erickson Ret. Cmtys., 425 B.R. 309 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010). 
 355 Id. at 316. 
 356 Bank of Am., Nat’l  Ass’n. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship (In re 203 N. LaSalle St. 
P’ship), 246 B.R. 325 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 357 Id. at 331; see also In re SW Bos. Hotel Venture, LLC, 460 B.R. 38, 51 (Bankr. 
Mass. 2011) (holding that junior lender’s pre-petition assignment of bankruptcy plan 
voting rights to senior lender was not enforceable). 
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ment priorities only,
358
 while some uphold other provisions, such as 
assignment of the junior creditor’s voting rights to the senior credi-
tor,
359
 or waiver of rights by a lienholder to adequate protection of 
collateral.
360
 
 e. Assumption of Executory Contracts and Unexpired 
Leases 
Section 365(a) of the Code permits a debtor to assume or reject 
an “executory contract or unexpired lease.”
361
  Once the debtor has 
assumed the contract or lease, the debtor may then “assign” (transfer 
or sell) the contract or lease to a third party, even if the contract itself 
prohibits such assignment without consent of each party.
362
  The pow-
er to assume or reject a contract or lease can be of great benefit to 
the debtor by allowing it to get rid of unprofitable obligations, con-
tinue beneficial ones, and even sell a lease or contract that may not 
be beneficial to it, but that nevertheless has market value and can be 
sold for cash. 
The authority to assign a contract or lease is qualified by § 
365(c)(1), which provides that the debtor “may not assume or assign” 
the contract or lease if “applicable [nonbankruptcy] law excuses a 
party . . . from accepting performance from or rendering perfor-
mance to an entity other than the debtor . . .” and the non-debtor 
“party does not consent to the assumption or assignment.”
363
  This 
provision recognizes traditional state law doctrine that contracts such 
as personal-services contracts cannot be assigned without the non-
assignor’s permission,
364
 as well as federal law, which prohibits the as-
signment of non-exclusive intellectual property rights
365
 and govern-
ment contracts.
366
 
 
 358 In re Ocean Blue Leasehold Prop., LLC, 414 B.R. 798, 804 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
2009). 
 359 In re Aerosol Packaging, LLC, 362 B.R. 43, 46 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006); In re 
Curtis Ctr. Ltd. P’ship, 192 B.R. 648, 660 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).    
 360 Aurelius Capital Master, Ltd. v. Tousa, Inc., Nos. 08-61317-CIV, 08-61335, 2009 
WL 6453077, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2009); In re Metaldyne Corp., No. 09-13412 MG, 
2009 WL 2883045, at *6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2009).   
 361 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006).  If a contract or lease is not assumed, then by opera-
tion of statute it becomes automatically rejected (terminated) and is no longer of any 
force or effect. 
 362 § 365(f). 
 363 § 365(c)(1)(a), (b). 
 364 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317 (1981). 
 365 See, e.g., In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 242–43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1997). 
 366 41 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). 
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Yet § 365(c)(1) appears to address more than just the assignment 
of contract rights.  If read strictly, the statute bars the debtor from 
even assuming the contract if forum-state law allows the non-debtor 
party to refuse to accept the contract or render performance.  For 
example, an exclusive software or patent (IP) license is freely trans-
ferable and so can be assumed or assigned by the debtor in bank-
ruptcy whether or not the licensor consents.
367
  However, a non-
exclusive IP license is not assignable over the objection of the licen-
sor, and thus could not be assumed by a debtor even if the debtor has 
no intention of assigning the license.
368
  This can be a major issue in a 
bankruptcy case where the debtor has significant IP licenses. 
While a restriction on the assignment of certain contracts is logi-
cal, extending the prohibition to allow the non-debtor party to veto 
the debtor’s assumption of a contract is not.  Without the right to as-
sume such contracts, “some debtors-in-possession may be unable to 
effect the successful reorganization that Chapter 11 was designed to 
promote.”
369
  Additionally, the restriction could give a windfall to the 
nondebtor, who does not have the right to renege on its agreement 
outside of bankruptcy.
370
  “[B]ut if the debtor seeks bankruptcy pro-
tection, then the nondebtor obtains the power to reclaim—and resell 
at the prevailing, potentially higher market rate—the rights it sold to 
the debtor.”
371
 
It is not surprising that courts are split over the effect of § 
365(c).  The main fault line is between the “hypothetical test” and the 
“actual test.”  Courts adopting the hypothetical test read the statute 
literally to prohibit even the assumption of a contract when the other 
party would be excused from performance if the contract was as-
signed.
372
  Courts adopting this test include the Third,
373
 Fourth,
374
 
Ninth,
375
 and Eleventh
376
 circuits, and an Illinois district court.
377
 
 
 367 In re Gold Books Family Entm’t, Inc., 269 B.R. 311, 314 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001). 
 368 Id. at 316. 
 369 N.C.P. Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577, 1577 (2009) 
(denying petition for certiorari). 
 370 Id. 
 371 Id. 
 372 In re Jackson, 465 B.R. 102, 105 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2011) (declining to apply 
the hypothetical test). 
 373 In re West Elecs., Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[I]f non-bankruptcy law 
provides that the [non-debtor party] would have to consent to an assignment of the . 
. . contract to a third party . . . then . . . the debtor in possession, cannot assume that 
contract.”); Allentown Ambassadors, Inc. v. N. E. Am. Baseball, LLC (In re Allentown 
Ambassadors, Inc.), 361 B.R. 422 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007).   
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In contrast, other courts use the “actual test,” holding that § 
365(c) should instead be read to prohibit assumption only if the 
debtor intends to assign the contract to a third party.  The First
378
 and 
Fifth
379
 Circuits have adopted this test, as have lower courts in the Se-
cond,
380
 Sixth,
381
 Eighth,
382
 and Tenth circuits.
383
  The Supreme Court 
has taken notice of the split in authority, but has not addressed the 
issue.
384
 
 f. Critical Vendors 
A core premise of bankruptcy is that all non-priority general un-
secured creditors are treated equally, which means that they each re-
ceive the same pro rata share of any distribution from the bankruptcy 
estate.
385
  Over the years, however, a doctrine has emerged known as 
the “doctrine of necessity” or, alternatively, the “critical vendor rule.”  
This rule allows a debtor to pay prepetition claims to vendors whose 
goods or services are deemed essential to the continued operation of 
the debtor if the vendor would refuse to provide the services or goods 
 
 374 RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257 (4th 
Cir. 2004); Breeden v. Catron (In re Catron), 158 B.R. 629 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff’d with-
out opinion, 25 F.3d 1038 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 375 Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747 
(9th Cir. 1999). 
 376 City of Jamestown v. James Cable Partners, L.P. (In re James Cable Partners), 27 
F.3d 534 (11th Cir. 1994); Wellington Vision, Inc. v. Pearle Vision, Inc. (In re Wel-
lington Vision, Inc.), 364 B.R. 129 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007). 
 377 In re Morgan Sangamon P’ship, 269 B.R. 652 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2001). 
 378 Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 613 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(“[W]here a debtor . . . bears the burden of performance under an executory con-
tract, the nondebtor party to whom performance is due must make an individualized 
showing that it would not receive the ‘full benefit of [its] bargain’ were an entity to 
be substituted for the debtor from whom performance is due.”) 
 379 Bonneville Power Admin. v. Mirant Corp. (In re Mirant Corp.), 440 F.3d 238, 
248 (5th Cir. 2006); In re Jacobsen, 465 B.R. 102, 106 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2011). 
 380 In re Footstar, Inc., 323 B.R. 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a trustee 
cannot assume or assign, but a DIP can assume without assigning where contract is 
non-assignable under applicable law). 
 381 In re Ohio Skill Games, Inc., No. 08-60560, 2010 WL 2710522, at *7 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio July 8, 2010). 
 382 In re GP Express Airlines, Inc., 200 B.R. 222, 232 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996). 
 383 C.O.P. Coal Dev. Co. v. C.W. Mining Co. (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 422 B.R. 746 
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2010); In re Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC, 373 B.R. 135 
(Bankr. D.N.M. 2007). 
 384 N.C.P. Mktg. Grp. V. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577, 1578 (2009) (“[T]he 
division in the courts over the meaning of § 365(c)(1) is an important one to resolve 
. . . .”). 
 385 TABB, supra note 323, § 1.23. 
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without the payment.
386
  This obviously violates the equal treatment 
principal and reduces the funds available for non-favored creditors. 
A number of courts have authorized payments to critical vendors 
based upon the equitable powers granted to a bankruptcy court un-
der § 105(a) or other sections of the Code.
387
  While there are no 
opinions from the First or Second Circuit, lower courts in these juris-
dictions generally grant critical vendor motions,
388
 as do courts in the 
Sixth,
389
 Eighth,
390
 and Tenth
391
 Circuits.  Courts in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit have allowed critical vendor payments, but only under very strict 
criteria.
392
  The Third Circuit has questioned whether § 105(b) per-
mits the court to elevate critical vendor claims,
393
 but bankruptcy 
courts in that circuit routinely allow such payments.
394
  Rulings in the 
Fourth and Fifth Circuits are mixed,
395
 but the Seventh Circuit is firm-
ly against this rule.
396
 
 
 386 Id. § 11.12. 
 387 Id.  Section 105(a) of the Code provides that “[t]he court may issue any order, 
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of 
this title.”  11 U.S.C. §105(a) (2006).  Other courts have relied on other sections of 
the Bankruptcy Code.  See, e.g., In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487, 497 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 2002) (relying on § 1107); In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 268 B.R. 543, 547 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001) (relying on § 364); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 
176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (relying on § 363(b)).   
 388 J.M. Blanco, Inc. v. PMC Mktg. Corp., No. 09-1781(GAG), 2009 WL 5184458, at 
*5–6 (D.P.R. Dec. 22, 2009).  But see In re Zenus Is Jewelry, Inc., 378 B.R. 432, 433 
(Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (stating that the doctrine of necessity restricted to railroads 
and is not applicable to critical vendors).  
 389 In re Corner Home Care, Inc., 438 B.R. 122, 127–29 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2010); In 
re Quality Interiors, Inc., 127 B.R. 391, 396–97 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991). 
 390 In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 268 B.R. 543 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001); In re 
Wehrenberg, Inc., 260 B.R. 468 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2001).   
 391 In re Rancher Energy Corp., No. 09-32943-MER, 2010 WL 6570895 (Bankr. D. 
Colo. Nov. 16, 2010). 
 392 In re Tropical Sportswear Int’l Corp., 320 B.R. 15, 20 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) 
(granting critical vendor payments pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363 only in “ap-
propriate circumstances”); In re Fultonville Metal Prods. Co., 330 B.R. 305, 313 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (“[R]equests [for critical vendor payments] should be care-
fully scrutinized, and only granted when the circumstances establish that the selected 
payments are necessary to the reorganization case and will ultimately benefit all of 
the creditors of the estate.”).  
 393 See S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 141–42 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 394 In re Motor Coach Indus. Int’l., Inc., No. 09-078-SLR, 2009 WL 330993, at *3 
(D. Del. Feb. 10, 2009); In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 171 B.R. 189, 192 (Bankr. D. 
Del.1994). 
 395 Within the Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction, compare Official Comm. of Equity 
Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that § 105 does not 
grant power to deviate from the statutory distribution scheme), with In re United Am. 
Inc., 327 B.R. 776, 781–84 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005) (setting forth three-prong test for 
the doctrine of necessity), and In re Synteen Techs., Inc., No. 00-02203-W, 2000 WL 
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 iii. Bankruptcy Trustees and Local Practice Differences 
 a. Bankruptcy Trustees 
A bankruptcy case requires both adjudicative and administrative 
action.  In order to enhance the perception of impartiality in deci-
sion-making, many of the administrative functions of bankruptcy are 
delegated to the Office of the UST.
397
  Their duties in Chapter 11 in-
clude convening the meeting of creditors, and reviewing and moni-
toring debtors and creditors (and their counsel.Since 1986, the six 
federal districts in Alabama and North Carolina have been exempt 
from the UST Program.
398
  Bankruptcy administration in those dis-
tricts is performed under the Bankruptcy Administrator Program by 
the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts.
399
  There are a number of 
differences between a UST and a Bankruptcy Administrator.  For ex-
ample, the Code directs that a UST appoints interim Chapter 7 trus-
tees,
400
 Chapter 13 trustees,
401
  and committee members in Chapter 11 
cases.
402
  Bankruptcy Administrators have no such powers.  Additional-
ly, they are appointed and governed by the circuit court and are sub-
ject to rules promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the United 
States.
403
  Furthermore, unlike the UST program, the Bankruptcy 
 
33709667, at *2 (Bankr. D.S.C. Apr. 14, 2000) (finding that § 105(a) allows payment 
of pre-petition creditor claims “when essential to the continued operation of the 
debtor”). 
     Within the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction, compare In re Oxford Mgmt., Inc., 4 F.3d 
1329, 1333–34 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding no authority under § 105(a) to use post-
petition funds to pay pre-petition claims), with In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487, 497 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) (finding that the doctrine of necessity is permissible pursu-
ant to the trustee’s duty under § 1107 to preserve on-going concern value). 
 396 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that § 105(a) 
does not allow for unequal payments to any unsecured creditors). 
 397 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 89–91 (1977); see also Richard B. Levin & Kenneth N. 
Klee, The Original Intent of the United States Trustee System, 1 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISOR, 
Jan. 1993, at 2–3.   
 398 See Dan J. Schulman, The Constitution, Interest Groups, and the Requirements of Uni-
formity: The United States Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator Programs, 74 NEB. L. 
REV. 91, 94–98 (1995). 
 399 Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act 
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–554, 100 Stat. 3088 (2006). 
 400 11 U.S.C. § 701 (2006). 
 401 Id. § 1302. 
 402 Id. § 1102. 
 403 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 601, 604 (2006).   For a 1997 study by the National Bank-
ruptcy Review Commission comparing the U.S. Trustee Program with the Bankrupt-
cy Administrator Program, see Memorandum from Lawrence P. King, Prof. of Law, 
N.Y.U. Univ. Sch. of Law and Elizabeth I. Holland, to the Nat’l Bankr. Review 
Comm’n (Aug. 6, 1997), available at 
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Administrator program is not self-funding; instead, it uses fees ap-
propriated to the judicial branch.
404
  At least one circuit has found the 
Bankruptcy Administrator program to be unconstitutional for lack of 
uniformity,
405
 but no other court has agreed.
406
 
The same 1986 statute that allowed the federal districts in Ala-
bama and North Carolina to opt out of the UST program also in-
cluded a number of amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules in order to 
further implement the UST program.  For example, Bankruptcy Rule 
9035 provides that the 1986 rule amendments do not apply to cases 
filed in or transferred to those districts.
407
  Such rules include rules for 
transmission of documents and notices, UST reporting and monitor-
ing requirements, and more importantly, the UST’s powers to ap-
point and oversee Chapter 7 and 13 trustees, and Chapter 11 com-
mittees.
408
  In districts where the bankruptcy administrator program is 
in place, the bankruptcy court performs the appointment and over-
sight functions. 
409
 
 b. Local Practice Differences 
The differences in styles and attitudes of bankruptcy judges can 
influence where business debtors file their cases.  Professor Lynn 
LoPucki has identified a number of these inherent differences.
410
  For 
example, LoPucki asserts that when the 1978 Bankruptcy Code went 
into effect, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New 
York drew a disproportionate number of large Chapter 11 cases pri-
marily because of the “pro-debtor” and “pro-reorganization” values of 
Judge Burton R. Lifland.
411
  Beginning in 1990, however, that mo-
mentum shifted to the District of Delaware bankruptcy court largely 
because of the attitudes of a particular judge, Judge Helen Balick.
412
  
 
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/Cont
entDisplay.cfm&ContentID=36526.   
 404 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-92-113, BANKRUPTCY 
ADMINISTRATION: JUSTIFICATION LACKING FOR CONTINUING TWO PARALLEL PROGRAMS 1 
(1992).  
 405 St. Angelo v. Victoria Farms, Inc., 38 F.3d 1525 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 406 See, e.g., In re Swinney, 300 B.R. 388 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2003), aff’d, 309 B.R. 638 
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2004). 
 407 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9035. 
 408 FED R. BANKR. P. 9035 advisory committee’s note. 
 409 Id. 
 410 LYNN LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS 
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005). 
 411 Id. at 45–47. 
 412 Id. at 72–75.   
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This may reflect Delaware’s focused policy of being a corporate ha-
ven.
413
  Bankruptcy judges’ policies in Delaware, therefore, would be 
intended to preserve and enhance Delaware’s status as a dominant 
forum for incorporation.
414
  Specifically, Judge Balick ruled that a 
corporation’s venue for bankruptcy purposes could be its state of in-
corporation, thereby allowing any corporation incorporated in Dela-
ware to file bankruptcy in the Delaware bankruptcy court.
415
  More 
fundamentally, Judge Balick adopted procedural innovations such as 
the “first-day motion.”
416
  These are motions made by the debtor con-
temporaneously with the filing of a case to grant such key authoriza-
tions as authority to employ counsel and other professionals,  use col-
lateral (for example, money in bank accounts subject to a creditor’s 
security interest), pay employees, and pay “critical vendors.”
417
  These 
pro-debtor policies gave immediate results.  By 1996, thirteen of the 
fifteen largest corporate bankruptcies that year were filed in Dela-
ware.
418
  But it appears that major case filings are again shifting back 
to the Southern District of New York, perhaps due to a perception of 
“cronyism” between management and judges in that district.
419
 
While the rise of Delaware and the Southern District of New 
York as prime bankruptcy forums is not disputed, the reasons for it 
are debated.  Kenneth Ayotte and David A. Skeel argue that Dela-
ware’s attraction as a corporate bankruptcy forum is due to superior 
judicial expertise, speed, and efficiency of the Delaware bankruptcy 
courts.
420
  Factors cited include fewer extensions of creditor voting 
deadlines thereby allowing less distortion and influence by credi-
tors,
421
 greater judicial experience with large, complex cases,
422
 and 
greater allowance for DIP financial control over entrenched man-
agement.
423
 
 
 413 Id. at 8.   
 414 Todd J. Zwicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 
GEO. L.J. 1141, 1160 (2006). 
 415 In re Ocean Props. of Del., Inc., 95 B.R. 304, 305 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988). 
 416 LOPUCKI, supra note 410, at 38. 
 417 Id.  
 418 Id. at 50. 
 419 William McGrane, A Creditor Strategy to Pre-Empt S.D.N.Y. Venue, 30-5 AM. BANKR. 
INST. J. 46, 46–47 (2011). 
 420 Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, An Efficiency-Based Explanation for Current Re-
organization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 454 (2006); see also David A. Skeel, Jr., 
What’s So Bad About Delaware?, 54 VAND. L. REV. 309, 325–26 (2001). 
 421 Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 420, at 457–58. 
 422 Id. at 461. 
 423 Id. at 463–64. 
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Differences in judicial attitudes may also affect the treatment of 
creditors.  One commentator asserts that unsecured creditors will get 
better results if they force debtors into involuntary bankruptcy in 
courts outside of large cities, where case precedent and judicial atti-
tudes are less favorable to large-scale debtors.
424
  This may explain the 
relatively harsh punishment meted out to a former star Wall Street 
lawyer who was convicted of fraud and sentenced to prison in a Wis-
consin bankruptcy court for practices that would have garnered no 
more than a civil fine in the Southern District of New York.
425
 
 III. UNIFORMITY AS POLICY AND AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT 
A. Uniformity as Sound Policy 
Lack of uniformity in national bankruptcy law is bad policy.  
Drawing on Madison’s belief that commerce and bankruptcy are in-
extricably linked,
426
 creating essentially ninety-four different bank-
ruptcy regimes is like creating ninety-four different commerce re-
gimes.  There are sound reasons why bankruptcy law in the United 
States should be uniform. 
 1. Efficiency in Contractual Relations 
The purpose of contract law is to shape the expectations of par-
ties in structuring their economic relations.
427
  The underlying regime 
of contract expectations outside the four corners of a contract allows 
parties to economically engage in transactions because they do not 
have to re-formulate basic expectations for every new transaction.  
While contract law in the United States is governed primarily by state 
law, it is highly uniform because of the enactment, with few varia-
tions, of the Uniform Commercial Code in every state.  To the extent 
that there are substantive differences in contract law among states, 
parties can anticipate and adjust for this by including choice-of-forum 
clauses or choice-of-law clauses.
428
  A transparent and uniform con-
tract law makes transactions more efficient and economical. 
 
 424 McGrane, supra note 419, at 47. 
 425 Ronald R. Peterson, Criminal Liability for the Bankruptcy Practitioner, in ATTORNEY 
LIABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY 316–17 (Corrine Cooper & Catherine E. Vance eds., 2006).  
Other studies have noted variations in regional practice due to local legal culture.  
See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
OF THE BAR (1982); MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION (1988). 
 426 See infra notes 552–54 and accompanying text.  
 427 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (rev. ed. 2002). 
 428 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(f) (1971).   
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Bankruptcy also shapes the expectations of parties.  Whereas 
contract law anticipates positive economic relations between parties, 
bankruptcy law is a mechanism whereby those relations can be dis-
solved or modified.
429
  Bankruptcy is a legal manifestation of the risk 
component inherent in a modern economic relationship.  Since par-
ties know at the outset of their contractual relations that a future 
bankruptcy by a party is possible, bankruptcy law forms part of the 
framework within which parties formulate their contractual interests.  
It also provides a framework for debt negotiation and resolution out-
side of bankruptcy.
430
 
While contract and bankruptcy law are both regimes that shape 
the economic expectations of parties, there is an ineluctable differ-
ence between contract and bankruptcy law.  In bankruptcy law, un-
like contract law, there is no “choice of bankruptcy law” option.  Par-
ties, anticipating that their future economic relationship might de-
volve into bankruptcy, cannot at the outset of their relations pre-
scribe which bankruptcy law will apply.  In the United States there is 
only one national bankruptcy law—the Code.  Parties do not have the 
choice of opting out of the Code, selecting an alternative bankruptcy 
law, or even specifying which federal court precedent will govern in-
terpretation of the Code.  The types of choice-of-law options that are 
common in contract law are not available to parties with respect to 
bankruptcy. 
Just as bankruptcy does not allow parties to contract for choice 
of bankruptcy law, it also does not allow the parties to specify by con-
tract which venues may or may not be permissible.  For a business 
debtor, bankruptcy venue is proper where the debtor’s domicile, 
principal place of business, or principal assets are located,
431
 or where 
there is a pending Chapter 11 case filed by an affiliate.
432
  For a busi-
ness that has assets, offices, or subsidiaries in different locations, this 
can result in a range of potential venues for filing bankruptcy.  As has 
been shown, the location of a bankruptcy case may well be dispositive 
of the rights of the parties.  But parties cannot specify by contract 
prior to a bankruptcy which bankruptcy venues are allowable and 
 
 429 United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990) (“[B]ankruptcy 
courts . . . have broad authority to modify debtor-creditor relationships.”). 
 430 See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditor’s 
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 867 (1982). 
 431 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (2006).  
 432 Id. § 1408(2). 
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which ones are not.
433
  This lack of a choice of venue for bankruptcy 
takes away bargaining power from the non-debtor party because the 
debtor can strategically select the bankruptcy forum that is most fa-
vorable to it.  This undermines the transparency that contracts pro-
vide. 
The logic of bankruptcy uniformity, therefore, is the same as the 
logic of contract uniformity: both facilitate transparency and predict-
ability in financial relations.  Uniformity increases the information 
equality of the parties and allows them to negotiate, account for risk, 
and contract efficiently.  Because bankruptcy venue can be such a 
large factor in determining bankruptcy outcomes, the efficiencies 
that would be gained from a unified bankruptcy regime are lost.  This 
result is not optimal and supports bankruptcy uniformity. 
2. Judicial Efficiency 
American law has long recognized the efficiency of a uniform 
federal court system.  Prior to 1938, pleadings and practice in federal 
courts were required to conform to those of the state in which the 
federal court was located.
434
  This made it difficult for courts to apply 
federal law.  Additionally, clients had to obtain separate counsel in 
each state, and appellate courts had to accommodate multiple pro-
cedural regimes arising under state law.
435
  To address these prob-
lems, the Supreme Court, pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act,
436
 is-
sued the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to govern the 
administration of federal courts.  There are clear efficiencies to this 
uniformity.
437
 
The efficiencies resulting from uniformity in federal courts apply 
with greater force in bankruptcy.  The Code was created to be admin-
istered by a singular judicial system—the bankruptcy courts—unlike 
most other federal statutes that are primarily administered by federal 
agencies.  The bankruptcy court system, in turn, exists to administer a 
 
 433 In re Charys Holding Co., 443 B.R. 628, 634 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) (holding 
that forum selection clauses should not be enforced in core bankruptcy matters); cf. 
Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 799 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that court-
approved forum-selection agreement between creditor and debtor prior to the bank-
ruptcy restricted where the debtor could file for bankruptcy). 
 434 Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197, superseded by Rules Ena-
bling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006).  
 435 Myron J. Bromberg & Jonathan M. Korn, Individual Judges’ Practices: An Inad-
vertent Subversion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 4 (1994). 
 436 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
 437 Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46 
MERCER L. REV. 757, 780–83 (1995). 
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single statute, the Bankruptcy Code, and in accordance with a single 
set of procedural rules, the Federal Bankruptcy Rules.  And while 
bankruptcy judges sit in every federal district and serve debtors in 
every state, the bankruptcy courts are not intended or equipped to be 
the interpreters of multiple sets of laws.  In this, they differ from the 
state courts (which deal with a broad range of laws in their forum 
state) and from federal district courts (which have jurisdiction over 
actions arising from many federal statutes and regulations).  The effi-
ciency of a bankruptcy court is that it is dedicated to adjudicating on-
ly cases arising under the Bankruptcy Code.  This efficiency is lost to 
the extent that parties, attorneys, and bankruptcy courts must process 
multiple and conflicting precedents, state-specific laws, and myriad 
systems of local rules and procedures. 
The lack of unified bankruptcy law also makes it more difficult 
for lawyers to practice.  They must learn different local rules and or-
ders, and become knowledgeable about state laws and federal prece-
dent in the jurisdictions that will affect the case.  This increases costs 
for clients and makes it more difficult for lawyers to practice national-
ly.  As a result, it shields local practitioners from the full effects of 
competition.  In practice, the current bankruptcy regime functions 
less like a single court system and more like ninety-four separate 
ones.  As such, the potential efficiencies of a unified court system are 
lost. 
 3. Fairness 
The definition of “fairness” is elusive in the law, but it in part re-
quires that courts treat similar situations in similar ways.  When courts 
treat two similar cases differently, it gives the appearance at least one 
unfair decision being produced.
438
  Thus, it is inherently unfair if the 
outcome of a bankruptcy case is based upon the accident of location 
when the facts of a case are otherwise similar.
439
  Uniform treatment 
of parties under the law, regardless of location, mitigates the percep-
tion that the law is irrational and unfair.
440
  Such equality is “a hall-
 
 438 Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal 
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 652–53 (2001). 
 439 Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 437, at 782. 
 440 Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior 
Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 39 n.146 (1994) (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 
479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987) (“[S]elective application of new rules violates the principle 
of treating similarly situated defendants the same.”)); Sandra D. O’Connor, Our Judi-
cial Federalism, 35 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 1, 4 (1985) (“[A] single sovereign’s laws 
should be applied equally to all . . . .”); Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent 
and the Common Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 244 (1987) (“[T]he state cannot 
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mark of fairness in a regime committed to the rule of law.”
441
  To be 
sure, geographical variances in the definition of legal rules might 
make sense in some contexts, such as adjustment of environmental 
regulations to local conditions.  Variances in the application of a uni-
form rule caused by geographic location and divergent judicial inter-
pretations, however, may readily be perceived as irrational and un-
fair.
442
 
As a close corollary to fairness, uniformity in bankruptcy would 
reduce the incentive of debtors (or creditors, in involuntary cases) to 
forum shop in order to place the case in a venue that favors their in-
terests to the detriment of other parties.  Forum shopping is undesir-
able because of the perception that results depend on geography and 
not the substance of the case.
443
 
The lack of uniformity in U.S. bankruptcy law is inherently un-
fair.  The biggest beneficiaries are large business debtors that have a 
range of choices where to file and can use forum selection in ways 
that other debtors cannot.
444
  These debtors can make the most of fa-
vorable case precedent and state laws.  Wealthy consumer debtors can 
also fare better in bankruptcy than other debtors if they live in states 
with unlimited homestead exemptions and/or high personal-
property exemptions.
445
  The biggest losers from the lack of uniformi-
ty are consumer debtors in states with low property exemptions or 
where case precedent or trustee policies are more favorable to credi-
tors.
446
 
 4. Coherence 
A detailed analysis of the Supreme Court’s considerations in se-
lecting cases for certiorari is beyond the scope of this Article.  A ma-
jor factor in granting certiorari, however, is uniformity in the applica-
tion of federal law.  Professor Peter Strauss writes that “[t]he premise 
of certiorari jurisdiction is that the Court will select for hearing those 
cases whose resolution is likely to make the largest contribution to 
 
justifiably permit the parties in one of its courtrooms to be treated in a manner that 
is at variance with how they (or any other set of litigants) would be treated in the 
courtroom next door.”). 
 441 Caminker, supra note 440, at 39.  
 442 Id. 
 443 Id. 
 444 See supra notes 431–32 and accompanying text.  
 445 See supra notes 90–102 and accompanying text. 
 446 See supra notes 90–102, 116–20 and accompanying text. 
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the uniformity and cohesion of national law.”
447
  Principles of justice 
and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution “all speak of an inte-
grated and coherent body of law.”
448
  According to Strauss, the telling 
symptom of lack of coherence is the “balkanization” of federal law 
where geographical factors influence the ways that courts weigh deci-
sions.
449
  As a result, parties whose activities cross circuit (or state) 
boundaries can be subject to conflicting regimes of the same federal 
law.
450
 
Professor Evan Carminker presents additional arguments in fa-
vor of uniform interpretation of federal law.  First, he notes, rules al-
low parties to structure their relationships in a socially productive 
way.
451
  Parties must be able to rely on rules in advance; therefore, the 
rules must be knowable and predictable.  In systems such as the Unit-
ed States with multiple potential legal venues for dispute resolution, 
uniformity is a prerequisite to predictability.
452
 
In addition, uniform interpretation and implementation of fed-
eral law allows for more effective administration by the executive 
branch.  Without uniform interpretation and implementation of the-
se laws, those who administer the laws in different jurisdictions face 
different options and even different duties when confronted with 
similar situations.
453
 
Finally, uniform interpretation of federal law promotes overall 
respect for judicial authority.  If the same federal law means one 
thing in one court, and another thing in another court, people may 
perceive that courts are either unprincipled, incompetent, or that the 
law is indeterminate.  Any of these undermines judicial credibility.
454
 
Not all writers concede to the virtue of uniformity.  Professor 
Amanda Frost believes that uniformity is overvalued.
455
  She argues 
 
 447 Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme 
Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 
1100–01 (1987).   
 448 Id. at 1097. 
 449 Id. at 1107. 
 450 Id. 
 451 Caminker, supra note 440, at 38. 
 452 Id. at 38–39. 
 453 Id. at 39. 
 454 Id. at 40 n.148 (“If interpretation of [the Constitution], which manifests our 
agreement on long term associational values, varies from state to state, respect for 
and confidence in the document is undermined.” (quoting Leonard G. Ratner, Ma-
joritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdic-
tion, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929, 941 (1982))).   
 455 Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008). 
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that there is no evidence that the sociological legitimacy of federal 
law is undermined by differing judicial interpretations
456
 and that the 
federalist system establishes that citizens of different states will be 
treated differently based on state law.
457
  Additionally, she finds that 
differences in judicial interpretations of federal law may be even 
more legitimate than one single interpretation because “they better 
reflect the diverse preferences of federal legislators and their constit-
uencies.”
458
  Furthermore, she observes, nowhere does Article III of 
the Constitution assign to federal courts the task of establishing uni-
form interpretations of federal law.
459
  Yet Frost acknowledges that 
uniformity may be required for some laws.  She notes that because 
Article I provides Congress with the power to establish “an uniform 
Rule of Naturalization” and “uniform Laws on the subject of Bank-
ruptcies” and requires that all duties, imposts, and excises shall be 
uniform, this shows that “the Framers were concerned about uni-
formity of federal law . . . in these narrow areas.”
460
  Thus, even a critic 
of uniformity acknowledges that congressional exercise of these pow-
ers should be uniform. 
B. Uniformity as a Constitutional Mandate 
Article I of the Constitution grants specific powers to Congress.
461
  
Of the enumerated powers, three are qualified by the requirement 
that laws or rules made pursuant thereto be “uniform.”
462
  These pow-
ers include taxation, naturalization, and bankruptcy.
463
  Article I pro-
vides as follows: 
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises . . . ; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall 
be uniform throughout the United States; 
. . . . 
To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws 
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.
464
 
The naturalization power is exercised as a “rule,” the bankruptcy 
power through “laws,”
465
 and the taxing power is described by its 
 
 456 Id. at 1593. 
 457 Id. at 1594–95. 
 458 Id. at 1589. 
 459 Id. at 1620. 
 460 Id.  
 461 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 462 Id.  
 463 Id. 
 464 Id.  
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forms—taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.  Notwithstanding the dif-
ferent manner in which these powers are manifest, they are alike in 
that each is to be “uniform.”  No other powers in the Constitution are 
qualified in this way.  The Framers considered whether “[t]o establish 
an uniform & general system of discipline for the Militia of these 
States,” but the proposal was rejected due to the perceived need for 
variety and autonomy among the states.
466
  This suggests that in the 
minds of the Framers, “uniformity” was inconsistent with state auton-
omy (i.e., a “uniform” federal power preempts state law).  In addi-
tion, uniformity was also likely intended to prevent Congress from 
discriminating in favor of one state or region—a key theme of the 
Constitutional Convention.
467
 
It can be asked whether the Framers intended the word “uni-
form” to have the same meaning for each of these three powers.  As a 
general rule of construction, the same word used in the same statute 
is considered to have the same meaning with each use.
468
  Another 
rule states that if there is no legal or technical definition of a word in 
the Constitution, the Framers intended the word to have its “plain 
meaning.”
469
  A 1828 dictionary defined the word “uniform” as “hav-
ing the same form or manner, not variable,” “consistent with itself,” 
and “conforming to one rule or mode.”
470
  Thus, applying the “plain 
meaning” rule, the uniformity requirement means just what it says: 
laws enacted pursuant to the taxing, naturalization, and bankruptcy 
 
 465 As to the reason for bankruptcy “laws,” Kurt H. Nadelmann explains that the 
plural was intended so that Congress could pass different types of laws for different 
types of debtors.  Kurt H. Nadelmann , On the Origins of the Bankruptcy Clause, 1 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 215, 227 (1957).  In contrast, as there is only one type of naturalization, 
it is logical that the power is exercised as a “rule.”  
 466 Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reexamina-
tion of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 22, 39 (1983) (quoting 2 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 386 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 467 Id. at 37–38.  Professor Koffler believes that the word “uniform” is a restriction 
on congressional power.  She describes uniformity as “circumscribing” and limiting 
congressional power so that Congress could not use these specified powers to dis-
criminate against particular states or regions.  Id. 
 468 See, e.g., Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul, 253 F.3d 982, 990 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Where a 
word is given a consistent meaning throughout the United States Code, then the 
courts assume that it has the same meaning in any particular instance of that word.”). 
 469 Anthony J. Bellia, State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. 
REV. 1501, 1532 (2006).  Professor Bellia suggests that under modes of statutory con-
struction in the early republic, in absence of specific legal, technical, or statutory evi-
dence to the contrary, the Framers would have intended their words to be interpret-
ed according to plain meaning.  See id. at 1532–33. 
 470 Webster, supra note 3. 
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powers must be consistent and not subject to substantially different 
variations in practice. 
The fact that the Framers used “uniform” three times in close 
proximity shows that they intended something consistent and particu-
lar about the exercise of these three powers, as distinct from the oth-
er powers.
471
  The following discussion will consider how uniformity 
applies to the revenue, naturalization, and bankruptcy powers. 
 1. Revenue Uniformity 
 There are relatively few decisions that address what uniform 
taxing power means.
472
  Commentators suggest that uniformity in 
connection with the taxing power was intended to prevent states from 
“ganging up” to impose discriminatory taxes on less powerful states.
473
  
This served as reassurance for centralization and “virtual abandon-
ment of ‘states’ rights’ principles.”
474
 
A leading case on tax uniformity is Knowlton v. Moore.
475
  In that 
case, the plaintiffs were beneficiaries of a decedent’s estate.
476
  While 
the estate was valued at over $2,600,000, the various beneficiaries re-
ceived amounts ranging from $1,500,000 to less than $10,000.
477
  The 
War Revenue Act of 1898 imposed a graduated tax upon legacies, be-
ginning with no tax on legacies of less than $10,000 and going up to 
2.25% on amounts over $100,000.
478
  The IRS collector fixed the tax 
rate for all distributions based on the value of the entire estate, which 
substantially increased the amount of tax paid compared to the rate 
that would have applied if the legacies were taxed separately.
479
  The 
executor paid the tax under protest and then sought recovery 
 
 471 For example, there is no requirement that the commerce powers be exercised 
in a uniform manner.  Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468–69 
(1982).  
 472 In one of the early cases, Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171, 174 (1796), the 
Court rejected a challenge by New York plaintiffs to a tax imposed on carriages on 
the grounds that there were more carriages in New York than in less populous states 
such as Virginia, finding that the uniformity clause required “geographic,” not “in-
trinsic” uniformity.   
 473 See Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on the Com-
merce Power, 91 VA. L. REV. 249, 276–77 (2005); Gale Ann Norton, The Limitless Federal 
Taxing Power, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 591, 599 (1985).  
 474 Norton, supra note 473, at 600. 
 475 178 U.S. 41 (1900). 
 476 Id. at 43. 
 477 Id. at 44. 
 478 Id. at 45. 
 479 Id. at 44–45 
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through the district court.
480
  The district court demurred, and the 
demurer was sustained by the circuit court.
481
 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the 
tax must be imposed on a graduated basis.
482
  The first issue in the 
case was whether Congress has the power to impose a “death tax.”
483
  
The Court answered in the affirmative, as it was an excise tax and not 
a direct tax.
484
  The second issue concerned whether the Act’s gradu-
ated tax rate violated the uniformity clause.
485
  The Court weighed two 
approaches.  The first approach was “intrinsic uniformity,” which 
means that wherever and however a tax is imposed, it must impose 
exactly the same burden on anyone subject to the tax.
486
  Thus, if the 
legacy tax required intrinsic uniformity, then the same burden of 
2.25% per person would  have to be imposed irrespective of the 
amount of the legacy.
487
  The other option considered by the Court 
was “geographic uniformity.”
488
  Under geographic uniformity, 
whatever plan or method Congress adopts for laying the tax in 
question, the same plan and the same method must be made op-
erative throughout the United States; that is to say, that wherever 
a subject is taxed anywhere, the same must be taxed everywhere 
throughout the United States, and at the same rate.
489
 
 The Court found that “uniformity” could not mean inherent 
uniformity, as this type of equality in taxation had never been the 
rule in England or in any of the states.
490
  Additionally, an inherent 
equality standard would effectively prevent the government from ex-
ercising any taxing power because it could not tax one type of goods 
without taxing another. 
491
  Thus, the Court adopted the rule of geo-
graphic uniformity, finding that such a rule forbids discrimination 
“between the states, by the levying of duties, imposts, or excises upon 
a particular subject in one state and a different duty, impost or excise 
 
 480 Id. at 45. 
 481 Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 45. 
 482 Id. at 110. 
 483 Id. at 43. 
 484 Id. at 83.  
 485 Id. 
 486 Id. at 84. 
 487 Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 84–85.   
 488 Id. at 85. 
 489 Id. at 84.   
 490 Id. at 88–89, 92–93. 
 491 Id.  
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on the same subject in another.”
492
  This determination was informed 
in part by the opinion in the Head Money Cases, which addressed 
whether a tax imposed on the owners of steam vessels for each pas-
senger from a foreign port landing in New York was void for violation 
of the uniformity requirement.
493
  The Court in that case held, 
The tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and ef-
fect in every place where the subject of it is found.  The tax in this 
case . . . is an excise duty on the business of bringing passengers 
from foreign countries into this [country] by ocean navigation, is 
uniform and operates precisely alike in every port of the United 
States where such passengers can be landed.
494
 
 The Court noted that opponents of the taxing clause likewise 
understood “uniformity” to mean geographic uniformity.
495
  Some 
delegates were concerned that geographic uniformity would result in 
unequal taxation because if a particular type of product was to be 
taxed, “a greater quantity of that article might be found in one state 
than in other states.”
496
  Thus, a tax that may generate greater revenue 
from one state and little or none from another state would still meet 
the uniformity requirement if it is “laid to the same amount on the 
same articles in each state.”
497
 
 Lastly, the Court addressed the argument that states’ interests 
could be accommodated by imposing the tax only on objects found 
equally throughout all the states, so that one state is not burdened by 
the federal excise more than any other state.
498
  The Court found that 
if the interest of states were to be considered in this way, it would 
“relegate the taxing power of Congress to the impotent condition in 
which it was during the confederation.”
499
 
 Congress may impose a tax that impacts different regions of 
the country in different ways.  In United States v. Ptasynski, the Court 
rejected a challenge to a federal law that exempted a separate class of 
“Alaskan oil” from a federal crude oil windfall profits tax.
500
  The tax 
exemption did not violate the uniformity clause for the reason that, 
due to its “unique climatic and geographic conditions,” Congress 
 
 492 Id. at 90. 
 493 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1984). 
 494 Id.  
 495 Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 86–87. 
 496 Id. at 98.   
 497 Id. at 106.   
 498 Id. at 107–08.   
 499 Id. at 109.   
 500 462 U.S. 74, 78 (1983).  
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could treat “Alaskan oil” as a separate class of oil.
501
  The Court ob-
served, however, that any tax treatment that appeared to frame a tax 
in geographic terms would be examined closely to ensure that there 
was a nongeographic basis for the tax.
502
 
  Courts and commentators have cautioned against analogizing 
tax uniformity too closely with bankruptcy uniformity.
503
  Yet, even the 
Supreme Court in Ptasysnki found reason to compare the two by 
drawing upon its prior discussion of bankruptcy uniformity in the Re-
gional Railroad Reorganization Act Cases, which themselves relied upon 
the Court’s discussion of tax uniformity in the Head Money Cases.
504
  
The Sixth Circuit in  In re Hood also equated uniformity in imposing 
taxes and duties with that of naturalization and bankruptcy, finding 
that state retention of power to legislate in these areas violated the 
requirement of uniformity.
505
  Therefore, lessons from the tax uni-
formity cases can be instructive in understanding uniformity in the 
context of bankruptcy. 
The tax uniformity cases suggest that where classes of taxpayers 
are created by a federal statute, different taxpayer classes can be treat-
ed differently, even if the effect of the treatment has a disparate im-
pact because of geographic location.  Thus in Knowlton, the rate of 
tax that beneficiaries pay under a death tax statute could be different 
(graduated) based upon the dollar amount received by each class.
506
  
In the Head Money Cases, the tax that each immigrant paid was the 
same wherever he or she landed.
507
  And in Ptasynski, a category of oil 
designated as “Alaskan oil” was exempt from the windfall profits tax 
that applied to other types of crude oil.
508
  But none of these cases 
holds that different taxpayers within the same class may be treated 
differently solely on the basis of geography.  This would violate the 
core principle of Knowlton: “[A] tax is uniform when it operates with the 
same force and effect in every place where the subject is found.”
509
 
 
 501 Id. at 84. 
 502 Id. at 85.   
 503 Schultz v. United States, 529 F.3d 343, 355 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he taxing pow-
er is wholly inapposite to that of the Bankruptcy Clause.”); see also Randolph J. 
Haines, The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy Is Different, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 129, 166–
67 (2003). 
 504 Ptasysnki, 462 U.S. at 83–84.   
 505 319 F.3d 755, 768(6th Cir. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 541 U.S. 440 (2004). 
 506 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 90 (1900).   
 507 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884). 
 508 Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 78. 
 509 Id. at 86 (emphasis added) (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 
594)(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The tax cases also teach that substantive deference to state law in 
determining the scope of bankruptcy rights, such as bankruptcy ex-
emptions and fundamental and prolonged differences in federal cir-
cuit precedent and local rules and practices—to the extent that these 
result in substantively different bankruptcy outcomes—violate uni-
formity.  The fact that separate classes of bankruptcy creditors may 
receive different treatment in the distribution of the debtors’ assets 
does not violate bankruptcy uniformity in the same way as allowing 
separate classes of taxpayers to be taxed differently does not violate 
uniformity of the taxing power.  Under the meaning of uniformity as 
drawn from the taxing cases, however, uniformity is violated to the 
extent that members of the same class of creditors or the same type of 
debtors are subject to substantially different outcomes in bankruptcy, 
depending upon where the case is filed. 
 2. Naturalization Uniformity 
Congress is empowered to enact a “rule” of naturalization.
510
  But 
that authority is qualified in that such rule must be uniform.
511
  And, 
as with the taxing and bankruptcy clauses, the Framers intended uni-
formity to remedy problems caused by inconsistent state laws dealing 
with immigrants.
512
  James Madison explained: 
The dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization, has long been re-
marked as a fault in our system, and as laying a foundation for in-
tricate and delicate questions . . . .  In one State, residence for a 
short term confers all the rights of citizenship; in another, qualifi-
cations of greater importance are required . . . .  The new Consti-
tution has accordingly, with great propriety, made provision 
against them, and all others proceeding from the defect of the 
Confederation on this head, by authorizing from the federal gov-
ernment to establish an uniform rule of naturalization through-
out the United States.
513
 
Similarly, Alexander Hamilton believed that uniformity meant 
that federal power regarding naturalization must be exclusive “be-
 
 510 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 511 Id. 
 512 See, e.g., James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration Con-
stitution of the Early Republic: Prospectivity, Uniformity, and Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 
359, 384–87 (2010); Iris Bennett, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigra-
tion Consequences of ‘Aggravated Felony’ Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1696, 1704–05, 
1704 n.34 (1999) (collecting authorities on the varied naturalization practices among 
the states and concluding that these inconsistencies lead to the adoption of the uni-
formity rule).   
 513 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 237 (James Madison)(Robert A. Ferguson ed., 
2006). 
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cause if each state had power to prescribe a Distinct Rule there could 
be no Uniform Rule.”
514
 
Cases dealing with uniformity and naturalization generally ad-
dress whether state criminal or domestic relations statutes will be 
used to interpret provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA).
515
  A typical case may address whether a violation of a state 
criminal statute can be grounds for deportation where the state law 
punishes the crime more harshly or differently than a corresponding 
federal statute.  Some cases have deferred to state law, but many  
courts treat the crime according to its federal definition.
516
 
In Nemetz v. INS, the Fourth Circuit considered whether a natu-
ralization petitioner could be excluded from the United States on the 
grounds of “moral turpitude” pursuant to the INA when the behavior 
at issue was consensual homosexual activity that constituted the crim-
inal act of sodomy under Virginia law.
517
  The court opined that refer-
ence to state law for federal immigration purposes might be appro-
priate if “crimes against the public are treated fairly uniformly 
throughout the country.”
518
  However, the court noted that a number 
of states had decriminalized consensual sodomy and that similar stat-
utes in several other states had been ruled unconstitutional.
519
  Thus, 
if the petitioner had lived in one of those states, his naturalization pe-
tition would not have been challenged by the INS and he would have 
already been a citizen.  The court found that a law of naturalization 
based upon “an ‘accident of geography’ . . . . [h]ardly contributes to 
any principle of uniformity and is, in fact, incongruous with common 
sense.”
520
  Indeed, the use of state law to define moral turpitude un-
 
 514 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 at 169 (Alexander Hamilton).  Accordingly, authority 
over immigration and naturalization is exclusively federal power.  United States v. 
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 701 (1898).   
 515 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1525 (2006).  Although federal naturalization power initially 
addressed conditions for naturalization and the entry and removal of foreign nation-
als, the scope of federal regulation of immigration-related matters has grown over 
the years to include the INA and other federal statutes governing the entry, removal, 
naturalization, and employment eligibility of aliens in the United States.  Yule Kim, 
The Limits of State and Local Immigration Enforcement and Regulation, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. 
REV. 242, 245 (2010).  
 516 See Bennett, supra note 512, at 1707–11; see also In re Briedis, 238 F. Supp. 149, 
150 (N.D. Ill. 1965) (holding that defining adultery according to state law “would 
lead to an absurb [sic] patchwork result, resting a petitioner’s right to United States 
citizenship upon the whims and idiosyncrasies of individual state legislatures”).  
 517 647 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 518 Id. at 436. 
 519 Id. at 435. 
 520 Id. 
AUSTIN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2012  5:40 PM 
2012] MYTH OF “UNIFORM LAWS” 1149 
der the federal act undermines a uniform rule of naturalization.  
“Such a practice would ‘permit state law to govern the creation of a 
relationship (citizenship) . . . over which Congress has exclusive au-
thority, a result that is directly contrary to the one intended by the 
framers of the naturalization clause.’”
521
  The uniformity standard is 
violated when dispositive acts “are the subject of radically different 
legislative treatment by the states.”
522
  Additionally, “[w]hen use of 
federal law defeats the uniformity requirement . . . the court must de-
vise a federal standard by other means.”
523
 
The Fifth Circuit in Nehme v. INS interpreted the uniformity 
standard similarly.
524
  In Nehme, whether the petitioner was a citizen 
depended upon whether his parents had been “legally separated,” as 
set forth in the INA, prior to petitioner’s eighteenth birthday.
525
  The 
court emphasized that because of the constitutional requirement of 
uniformity, it was inappropriate that “the law of any one state should 
govern the determination of whether an alien’s parents were ‘legally 
separated.’”
526
  Therefore, the court formulated a federal standard to 
interpret the term “legal separation” for purposes of the INA.
527
  Oth-
er courts have adopted the reasoning in Nehme.
528
 
While federal interests are paramount in the field of immigra-
tion, not every state or local enactment that affects the rights of aliens 
necessarily interferes with the federal interest.  A state law only in-
fringes upon immigration if it amounts to a determination of who 
should or should not be admitted into the country, and the condi-
tions under which a legal entrant may remain.  In DeCanas v. Bica, the 
 
 521 Id. at 435–36 (citation omitted).  
 522 Id. at 436. 
 523 Nemetz, 647 F.2d at 436. 
 524 252 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 525 Id. at 419. 
 526 Id. at 423–24. 
 527 Id. at 426.   
 528 See Brisset v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Because the Constitu-
tion gives Congress the power to ‘establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,’ natu-
ralization laws must ‘be construed according to a federal, rather than state, stand-
ard.’” (quoting Nehme, 252 F.3d at 422)); Alsol v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 
2008) (finding that conviction for controlled substance possession under state law 
was not a felony under the Controlled Substances Act for immigration purposes).   In 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, the Court rejected the use of state law 
definitions for purposes of the Indiana Child Welfare Act, since the ICWA was in-
tended to be uniform throughout the United States. 490 U.S. 30, 43–44 (1989).   
“[T]he cases in which we have found that Congress intended a state-law definition of 
a statutory term have often been those where uniformity clearly was not intended.”  
Id. at 43–44. 
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Court remanded for reconsideration a challenge to a California law 
that prohibited employment of persons unlawfully present in the 
United States, finding that states have broad authority under their 
police powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect 
workers within the state, and that the California law was “within the 
mainstream of such police power regulation.”
529
  Because the law ap-
peared to focus directly upon “local problems” and was tailored to 
combat the perceived problems, the case was remanded to determine 
whether the law was preempted by the INA.
530
 
More recently, in Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Whiting, 
the Court acknowledged federal preemption over laws affecting im-
migration, but observed that states have authority to “regulate the 
employment relationship to protect workers within the state.”
531
  In 
upholding an Arizona law that allowed suspension and revocation of 
business licenses for employing unauthorized aliens,
532
  the Court 
found that the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)
533
 ex-
pressly excepted state “licensing and similar law” from preemption.
534
  
More importantly, the Arizona law in no way impeded or supple-
mented the IRCA.  For example, the law adopted the federal defini-
tion of an unauthorized alien as well as other key definitions in the 
IRCA, prohibited state investigators from making a final determina-
tion on whether an alien is authorized to work in the United States, 
and directed that state courts “shall consider only the federal govern-
ment’s determination” when deciding whether an employee is an un-
authorized alien.
535
  Accordingly, the Court found that “there can by 
definition be no conflict between state and federal law as to worker 
authorization, either at the investigatory or adjudicatory stage.”
536
  
Therefore, the state law did not conflict with federal immigration 
law.
537
 
 
 529 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976).   
 530 Id. at 357. 
 531 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974 (2011).   
 532 The Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2007 allows Arizona courts to suspend or 
revoke the licenses necessary to do business in the state if an employer knowingly or 
intentionally employs an unauthorized alien.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211, -212, -
212.01 (2010). 
 533 Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8 U.S.C.)  The IRCA amended the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006) .    
 534 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1977.  
 535 Id. at 1981–83. 
 536 Id.  
 537 Id. at 1987. 
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Court cases dealing with naturalization establish that uniformity 
and federal exclusivity over immigration law are paramount.  Uni-
formity under the naturalization clause helps illuminate the meaning 
of “uniform” with respect to the bankruptcy power.  As one bank-
ruptcy court has stated, “Given the structure of the Constitution and 
the Framers’ decision to use the word ‘uniform’ in both cases, it ap-
pears that the Framers intended to treat the powers given to Congress 
over naturalization and bankruptcy as identical in scope.”
538
 
The Arizona state law in Whiting is analogous to the authority 
that a state court has to determine whether a debt has been dis-
charged in a bankruptcy proceeding.  As with business licensing, en-
forcing property rights is a typical state function.  Thus, it is properly 
within the authority of a state court to review a bankruptcy case dock-
et to determine if a debt has been discharged for purposes of ruling 
whether a creditor can use state law means to enforce a debt.  A state 
court does not have authority to decide whether a debt may be dis-
charged in bankruptcy, just as Arizona state courts do not have au-
thority to decide whether a worker may be authorized to work in the 
United States.  Employment authorization, as with discharge of debt, 
is exclusively under federal jurisdiction, pursuant to the uniformity 
clause.  Laws that make immigration status subject to state law violate 
the naturalization uniformity requirement.  Applying the same anal-
ogy to bankruptcy law, laws that make discharge of debt subject to 
state law violate the bankruptcy uniformity requirement. 
 3. Bankruptcy Uniformity 
 i. Background of the Bankruptcy Clause 
The history of the Bankruptcy Clause has been treated in detail 
elsewhere.
539
  What the clause was specifically intended to accomplish 
is unclear because there is very little recorded debate on the subject 
of bankruptcy during the Constitutional Convention.
540
  The clause 
was included in the Constitution on motion by Charles Pinckney fol-
lowing a discussion on conflicts in interstate commerce.
541
  Thus, it 
 
 538 Gray v. Fla. State Univ. (In re Dehon, Inc.), 327 B.R. 38, 54 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2005) (quoting In re Hood, 319 F.3d 755, 766 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
 539 See, e.g., BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF 
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2002); Nadelmann, supra note 465. 
 540 See, e.g., In re Dehon, Inc., 327 B.R. 38, 52 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (“Therefore, 
in looking to the convention debates alone, this Court can discern no clear intent of 
the Framers regarding the retention or alteration of the States’ sovereign immunity 
with respect to the bankruptcy power.”). 
 541 Nadelmann, supra note 465, at 217–20. 
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appears that the Framers believed uniform national bankruptcy laws 
were necessary for effective interstate commerce. 
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy, is so inti-
mately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will pre-
vent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie, or 
be removed into different states, that the expediency of it seems 
not likely to be drawn into question.
542
 
Among other things, the Framers were concerned about the 
patchwork of different bankruptcy laws among the states,
543
 including 
the fact that debtors who had been discharged from debts in one 
state could be imprisoned for the same debts upon travelling to an-
other state.
544
  A national bankruptcy law would help alleviate these 
impediments to commerce. 
While commentators agree that commerce was the reason be-
hind the Bankruptcy Clause, there is disagreement as to the intended 
purpose of uniformity of the bankruptcy law.  A leading theory in this 
debate is “proceduralism,” which asserts that bankruptcy is intended 
to be a procedural forum in which to adjudicate the state law rights of 
creditors.
545
  In contrast, Judge Randolph Haines argues that the word 
“uniform” in the Bankruptcy Clause was intended as a grant of power, 
not a restriction of power, and that the Framers’ purpose in using the 
word was to supersede state sovereignty in bankruptcy law (i.e., that 
 
 542 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 238 (James Madison); see James Monroe Olmstead, 
Bankruptcy: A Commercial Regulation, 15 HARV. L. REV. 829, 831 (1902) (“The Bank-
ruptcy Clause in the Constitution . . . was akin to or closely related to commerce.”). 
 543 See MANN, supra note 539, at 59–60 (noting that some states had no insolvency 
laws, while others provided for release from debtor’s prison but not for discharge of 
debt).  Pennsylvania allowed for discharge of unpaid debts but only for commercial 
debtors.  Id.; see also Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. 
L. REV. 487, 518–25 (1996) (reviewing the difference in state bankruptcy laws prior to 
the Constitution).  
 544 Nadelmann, supra note 465, at 224–25. 
 545 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 430, at 901.  Professor Jackson states that the pur-
pose of bankruptcy law is to uphold the rights that creditors negotiated with the 
debtor under state law prior to the bankruptcy.  Id. at 873 n.77.  Douglas G. Baird 
believes that bankruptcy law is a procedure through which state-created rights are 
recognized.  Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy Procedure and State-Created Rights: The Les-
sons of Gibbons and Marathon, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 25, 47.  Charles W. Mooney articu-
lates a fully developed theory of proceduralism.  Charles W. Mooney, A Normative 
Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 
944 (2004) (“[N]onbankruptcy law creates, defines, and shapes the contours of the 
legal entitlements of a debtor’s rightsholders . . . .”).  For a concise discussion of the 
“proceduralist” model, see Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Consti-
tutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 617–19 (2008). 
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states would be subject to national bankruptcy law).
546
  Professor Jona-
thon Lipson suggests that the real purpose of the Bankruptcy Clause 
was to enable Congress to preempt rogue or extreme state bankrupt-
cy laws in the event that states began to enact bankruptcy laws that 
were overly protective of their own debtors or creditors.
547
  Similarly, 
Professor Judith Schenck Koffler sees the Bankruptcy Clause as a 
grant of power to safeguard the nation’s interest in establishing and 
maintaining a single market for the extension of credit without inter-
ference from parochial action by states.
548
  Still another commentator 
concludes that the purpose of bankruptcy uniformity was to place ad-
judication of the complex disputes that arise in administering a bank-
ruptcy case in a single federal court.
549
 
Given the scant historical record left by the Framers, it is not 
surprising that there is disagreement regarding uniformity and the 
Bankruptcy Clause.  Unfortunately, court opinions on the subject are 
not very illuminating either. 
 ii. The Supreme Court on Bankruptcy Uniformity 
The list of Supreme Court cases directly relevant to uniformity in 
bankruptcy is short.  Only two cases, Hanover National Bank v. Moyses
550
 
and Central Virginia Community College v. Katz,
551
 attempt an original 
analysis of what bankruptcy uniformity requires, and those cases are 
amenable to radically different interpretations.  There are a handful 
of other decisions that color in some details and merit a brief discus-
sion. 
 a. Hanover National Bank v. Moyses 
The Moyses case  addressed a constitutional challenge to the 
1898 Bankruptcy Act.
552
  The Act provided for discharge of personal 
debts, but incorporated the state law exemptions of the state where 
the case was filed.
553
  Moyses, a citizen of Missouri, executed a promis-
sory note that was indorsed to the plaintiff, Hanover Bank, in New 
 
 546 Randolph J. Haines, The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy Is Different, 77 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 129, 171, 176 (2003). 
 547 Lipson, supra note 545, at 605, 631.   
 548 Koffler, supra note 466, at 41. 
 549 1 HAROLD REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 13, at 17 (James M. Henderson ed., 5th ed. 1950). 
 550 186 U.S. 181 (1902). 
 551 546 U.S. 356 (2006). 
 552 Moyses, 186 U.S. 181. 
 553 Id. at 189. 
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York.
554
  Moyses defaulted under the note and Hanover Bank ob-
tained judgment in a Missouri state court.
555
 Thereafter, Moyses 
moved to Tennessee and filed a petition for bankruptcy.
556
  The dis-
trict court granted a discharge of his debt, allowing him to use the 
Tennessee exemptions.
557
  Hanover Bank appealed, alleging that the 
Bankruptcy Act was unconstitutional because, inter alia, by incorpo-
rating state exemption laws, which varied from state to state, the Act 
did not establish “uniform laws” on bankruptcies.
558
  The Court re-
jected the bank’s “personal uniformity” argument and found instead 
that “uniformity is geographical,”
559
 which meant that the Act was uni-
form in the constitutional sense “when the trustee takes in each state 
whatever would have been available to the creditor if the bankruptcy 
law had not been passed.  The general operation of the law is uni-
form although it may result in certain particulars differently in differ-
ent states.”
560
 
Under this standard, bankruptcy law satisfies the uniformity re-
quirement if a creditor would be treated in the same fashion in bank-
ruptcy as he would be outside of bankruptcy under state law, even if 
the laws in different states provide for different treatment.
561
  This 
view essentially represents the “proceduralist” model cited above.
562
 
The legacy of Moyses (at least until Katz) is that “geographic uni-
formity” has been the standard for analyzing uniformity under the 
Bankruptcy Code.
563
  Under Moyses, the requirement of uniformity 
prevents Congress from enacting geographically specific bankruptcy 
laws but does not require Congress to prohibit “interstate bankruptcy 
variance.”
564
  Notwithstanding its longevity as precedent, Moyses suffers 
 
 554 Id. at 182. 
 555 Id. 
 556 Id. 
 557 Id. at 183. 
 558 Moyses, 186 U.S. at 185. 
 559 Id. at 188.   
 560 Id. at 190.  
 561 Id.  As the Court explained, “no creditor can reasonably complain if he gets his 
full share of all that the law . . . places at the disposal of creditors.”  Id. at 189. 
 562 See, e.g., Lipson, supra note 545.  
 563 See, e.g., Stellwagon v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918) (noting that a bankrupt-
cy law may be uniform and yet “recognize the laws of the state in certain particulars, 
although such recognition may lead to different results in different states”); Schultz 
v. United States, 529 F.3d 343, 351 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The Court . . . has consistently 
described the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity requirement as ‘geographical, and not 
personal.’” (quoting Moyses, 186 U.S. at 188)). 
 564 Joseph Pace, Note, Bankruptcy as Constitutional Property: Using Statutory Entitle-
ment Theory to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 119 YALE L.J. 1568, 1592 (2010). 
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from a number of flaws.  First, the Court attempted to delineate be-
tween state and federal bankruptcy powers, stating that 
“[s]o long as there is no national bankruptcy act, each state has 
full authority to pass insolvent laws binding persons and property 
within its jurisdiction, provided it does not impair the obligation 
of existing contracts; but a state cannot by such a law discharge 
one of its own citizens from his contracts with citizens of other 
States . . . .”
565
 
This part of the Moyses opinion refers to the fact that while fed-
eral laws may impair contract obligations, the states are prohibited 
from doing so.  Yet, this is exactly the effect of incorporating state ex-
emption laws into federal bankruptcy law.  By allowing the individual 
states to control the scope of assets exempt from a debtor’s bank-
ruptcy estate, the states discharge their citizens from obligations to 
creditors from other states.  Thus, the 1898 Bankruptcy Act failed the 
Court’s own definition of uniformity.  As discussed above, the current 
Bankruptcy Code gives states power to impose their exemptions in 
bankruptcy.
566
  Therefore, the present Bankruptcy Code would also 
fail the uniformity requirement cited in Moyses. 
Professor Judith Koffler has identified additional problems with 
Moyses.  As she points out, the Court adopted its geographic uniformi-
ty standard from two circuit court decisions that arose under the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1867—In re Beckerford
567
 and In re Deckert.
568
  In do-
ing so, the Court ignored its own detailed discussion of uniformity 
just two years earlier in Knowlton v. Moore.
569
  This was a shaky founda-
tion for a constitutional construct of uniformity.  First, the 1867 Act 
contained both federal exemptions and state exemptions, unlike the 
1898 Act, which used state exemptions only.
570
  More importantly, the 
Beckerford and Deckert opinions do not support the holding in Moyses. 
In Beckerford, the court reasoned that incorporation of state ex-
emptions did not violate the uniformity provision because, “[t]hough 
the states vary in the extent of their exemptions, yet, what remains 
[of] the bankruptcy law distributes equally among the creditors.”
571
  
Since no creditor could receive more from his debtor under state law 
than the unexempted part of the debtor’s assets, the court concluded 
 
 565 Moyses, 186 U.S. at 188 (quoting Brown v. Smart, 145 U.S. 454, 457 (1892)). 
 566 See discussion supra Part II.C.1.i.a. 
 567 3 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mo. 1870) (No. 1209). 
 568 7 F. Cas. 334 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1874) (No. 3728); Moyses, 186 U.S. at 189–90.  
 569 Koffler, supra note 466, at 75. 
 570 Id. at 60. 
 571 Id. at 62 (citing In re Beckerford, 3 F. Cas. at 27). 
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that the law was uniform.
572
  Put another way, the bankruptcy law is 
uniform because it uniformly incorporates the exemption law of each 
state.  Yet, as Professor Koffler points out, under this logic, a bank-
ruptcy law would be uniform even if it allowed each state to exempt 
all of a debtor’s property, none of a debtor’s property, or even to de-
termine whether to grant bankruptcy debtors a discharge at all.
573
  A 
complete exemption of all property would frustrate creditors com-
pletely and dry up credit in the state, whereas no exemptions or no 
discharge would significantly undermine the federal policy of a “fresh 
start.”
574
 
The second case cited by the Moyses Court, Deckert, dealt with an 
1873 amendment to the 1867 Act.  The Court cited dicta from Deckert 
to the effect that bankruptcy law is “uniform” if it allows “all the cred-
itors of the bankrupt [to] reach all his property subject to levy” under 
state law.
575
  But this was not the issue in the case.  In 1872, the Virgin-
ia Supreme Court ruled that the Virginia homestead and personal 
property exemptions violated the federal contract clause.
576
  In re-
sponse, Congress passed an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act stat-
ing that the exemptions under the Act should be the exemptions as 
they existed under the laws of each state in 1871.
577
  Thus, debtors fil-
ing bankruptcy in Virginia subsequent to the 1873 amendment could 
claim exemptions that were no longer available under Virginia law.
578
  
The Deckert court found the amendment to be in violation of the con-
stitutional mandate of uniformity because it provided “that there 
shall be one amount or description of exemption in Virginia and an-
other in Pennsylvania . . . .  It changes existing rights between the 
debtor and creditor.  Such changes, to be warranted by the Constitu-
tion, must be uniform in their operation.”
579
  As Professor Koffler ob-
serves, Deckert read the word “uniform” to prohibit Congress from ex-
ercising its power to impair contracts, which is clearly wrong.
580
  
Accordingly, Deckert does not lend any support for the decision in 
Moyses. 
 
 572 Id. 
 573 Id. at 63, 65–66.   
 574 Id. 
 575 Moyses, 186 U.S. at 190 (quoting In re Deckert, 7 F. Cas. 334, 336 (C.C.E.D. Va. 
1874) (No. 3728). 
 576 The Homestead Cases, 63 Va. (22 Gratt) 26 (1872).  
 577 See Koffer, supra note 481 at 69. 
 578 Id. at 62. 
 579 In re Deckert, 7 F. Cas. 334, 336 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1874) (No. 3728).  
 580 Koffler, supra note 466, at 71. 
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Finally, although both Moyses and Knowlton are based on the doc-
trine of “geographic uniformity,” each case used the term quite dif-
ferently.  Under Knowlton, geographic uniformity means that all simi-
larly situated taxpayers must pay the same rate under a federal tax law 
irrespective of their geographic location.  It does not require that dif-
ferent classes of taxpayers pay the same rate of tax.
581
  In contrast, geo-
graphic uniformity in Moyses means that the remedy that a creditor 
has against a debtor in a bankruptcy case must be the same remedy 
that the creditor would have against the same debtor in a state court 
proceeding.
582
  The theory behind this rule is to prevent vertical fo-
rum shopping between state court and bankruptcy court within the 
same state.
583
  The very act of filing for bankruptcy, however, estab-
lishes that the debtor has rights in relation to a creditor that the 
debtor would not have outside of bankruptcy; this is precisely why a 
debtor files for bankruptcy.  As a result, this type of intrastate “forum 
shopping” will occur anyway.  Additionally, differences in bankruptcy 
relief between states can and do give rise to interstate forum shop-
ping.
584
  Therefore, using uniformity as a means to alleviate intrastate 
forum shopping is misguided from the start. 
b. Central Virginia Community College v. Katz 
The central issue in that case was whether the Chapter 7 trustee 
administering the bankruptcy of a bookstore chain was barred by the 
doctrine of state sovereign immunity from bringing a preference 
complaint against a state-sponsored college pursuant to § 547 of the 
Code.
585
  The trustee brought an adversary complaint to recover an 
alleged preferential transfer against Central Virginia Community Col-
 
 581 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 105–06 (1900). 
 582 Moyses, 186 U.S. at 190. 
 583 This was the reason cited in Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) 
(“Uniform treatment of property interests by both state and federal courts within a 
State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a 
party from receiving ‘a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankrupt-
cy.’”(quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 364 U.S. 606, 609 (1961)). 
 584 Robert K. Rassmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum 
Shopping By Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1365 (2000).  
 585 Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 360 (2006).   Section 547 allows a 
trustee in bankruptcy to recover certain transfers by the debtor to a pre-petition 
creditor made within ninety days prior to filing for bankruptcy.  11 U.S.C. § 547 
(2006).  For an in-depth recitation of the facts and case law history leading up to 
Katz, see Daniel A. Austin, The Bankruptcy Clause and the Eleventh Amendment: An Uncer-
tain Boundary Between Federalism and State Sovereignty, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 383, 412–24 
(2007).  
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lege (CVCC).
586
  CVCC moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that 
§ 106 of the Code, which provides that the sovereign immunity of a 
governmental unit is abrogated with respect to certain sections of the 
Bankruptcy Code (including recovery of preferential payments under 
§ 547),
587
 was unconstitutional.
588
  The bankruptcy court denied 
CVCC’s motion to dismiss, and the district court and Sixth Circuit af-
firmed.
589
  CVCC appealed. 
The Court ruled that CVCC and any other state agencies are 
bound by bankruptcy court jurisdiction in the same way as other 
creditors.  The Court reached this decision by first finding that the 
Framers’ purpose in drafting the uniform bankruptcy clause was to 
harmonize the “patchwork of insolvency and bankruptcy laws” that 
were particular to the American divided (state) authority.
590
  Second, 
based on the historical record, the Court determined that the Fram-
ers intended the term “subject of Bankruptcies” to be broadly con-
strued and to include all aspects of  the “relations between an insol-
vent or nonpaying or fraudulent debtor and his creditors, extending 
to his and their relief.”
591
  Therefore, the bankruptcy power must in-
clude, inter alia, authority to avoid preferential transfers and recover 
property on behalf of the estate.
592
  Third, given the broad needs of 
bankruptcy jurisdiction, in ratifying the Constitution, the states had 
 
 586 Katz v. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll., 546 U.S. 356, 360 (2006). 
 587 Section 106 provides in part: 
(a) Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign 
immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth 
in this section… . 
. . . . 
(2) The court may hear and determine any issue arising with respect to 
the application of such provisions to governmental units. 
11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(2)(2006). 
 588 Katz, 546 U.S. at 360.  
 589 Id. at 356. 
 590 Id. at 366 (noting that the “uncoordinated actions of multiple sovereigns, each 
laying claim to the debtor’s body and effects” made a single discharge of a debtor 
impossible). 
 591 Id. at 371 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 
304 U.S. 502, 513–14 (1938)).  Regarding the scope of bankruptcy power, the Su-
preme Court stated as follows in In re Klein:  
[The bankruptcy power] extends to all cases where the law causes to be 
distributed the property of the debtor among his creditors; this is its 
least limit.  Its greatest, is a discharge of the debtor from his contracts.  
And all intermediate legislation, affecting substance and form, but 
tending to further the great end of the subject—distribution and dis-
charge—are in the competency and discretion of Congress. 
In re Klein, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 265, 281(1843).  
 592 Katz, 546 U.S. at 372. 
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agreed to refrain from asserting the sovereign immunity defense in 
proceedings brought pursuant to “Laws on the subject of Bankrupt-
cies.”
593
  In other words, the states agreed to subordinate their sover-
eign immunity to the extent necessary to effectuate the jurisdiction of 
the bankruptcy court.
594
  Therefore, it was within the authority of 
Congress to provide for waiver of state sovereign immunity under § 
106.
595
 
This analysis would have been sufficient to dispose of the issue 
before the Court, but the majority in Katz went further.  In a foot-
note, the Court stated that uniformity under the bankruptcy clause 
means that “Congress has the power to enact bankruptcy laws the 
purpose of which are to ensure uniformity in treatment of state and 
private creditors.”
596
  To provide support for this conclusion, the 
Court reached back 185 years to Sturges v. Crowninshield, in which the 
Court said of the uniformity clause, “Congress is not authorized 
merely to pass laws, the operation of which shall be uniform, but to 
establish uniform laws on the subject throughout the United States.”
597
  
Pushed to its logical conclusion, this would seem to require Congress 
to harmonize the bankruptcy laws so that the treatment of parties in a 
bankruptcy case is indistinguishable from the standpoint of geogra-
phy.  This is because, as the Court found, bankruptcy uniformity can-
not tolerate states-creditors being treated differently from non-state 
creditors.  If bankruptcy uniformity demands that there be no differ-
entiation between creditors based on private versus state status—
notwithstanding that state sovereign immunity is enshrined in the 
Eleventh Amendment—then it must also demand that there be no 
differentiation between creditors based on state boundaries.  This is a 
radical extension of prior uniformity jurisprudence.  Not surprisingly, 
Katz has drawn both criticism598 and praise.
599
 
 
 593 Id. at 377.   
 594 Id. at 378. 
 595 Id. at 379. 
 596 Id. at 377 n.13. 
 597 Katz, 546 U.S. at 377 n.13 (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
122, 193–94 (1819)). 
 598 See, e.g., Ralph Brubaker, Explaining Katz’s New Bankruptcy Exception to State Sov-
ereign Immunity: The Bankruptcy Power as a Federal Forum Power, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 95 (2007); Martin H. Redish & Daniel M. Greenfield, Bankruptcy, Sovereign Im-
munity and the Dilemma of Principled Decision Making: The Curious Case of Central Virgin-
ia Community College v. Katz, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 13 (2007).   
 599 See, e.g., Randolph J. Haines, Federalism Principles in Bankruptcy After Katz, 15 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 135 (2007); Susan E. Hauser, Necessary Fictions: Bankruptcy Juris-
diction After Hood and Katz, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1181, 1233 (2008). 
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c. Vanston, Butner, and the Rail Road Cases 
There are several decisions that did not attempt to formulate the 
meaning of uniformity, but assist in illuminating its application. 
The question in Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green 
was whether interest owed by the debtor on certain bonds would be 
paid at a higher rate pursuant to the law of New York, where the 
bonds were signed and payable, or at a lower rate under the law of 
Kentucky, where the bankruptcy court was located.
600
 
The Court stated as a general premise that the claims of credi-
tors and obligations of the debtor “at the time a petition in bankrupt-
cy is filed” should, in absence of an overruling federal law, be deter-
mined by reference to state law.
601
  The Court, however, would use a 
different rule once the debtor was in bankruptcy: 
In determining what claims are allowable and how a debtor’s as-
sets shall be distributed, a Bankruptcy court does not apply the 
law of the state where it sits . . . . [b]ut bankruptcy courts must . . . 
determine how and what claims shall be allowed under equitable 
principles.
602
 
In this case, the Court found that payment of interest on interest un-
der the New York law was “not consistent with equitable principles.”
603
  
But a concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter suggests that he may 
have been uncomfortable with a wholesale adoption of federal or eq-
uitable principles in construing property rights in bankruptcy.  He 
stated that “[t]he existence of a debt between the parties to an al-
leged creditor-debtor relationship is independent of bankruptcy and 
precedes it.  Parties are in a bankruptcy court with their rights and 
duties already established, except insofar as they subsequently arise 
during the course of bankruptcy administration . . . .”
604
 
While Justice Frankfurter confirms the rights and duties are “al-
ready established” before bankruptcy, he acknowledges that those 
rights can be amended in the course of “bankruptcy administra-
tion.”
605
  A later comment by Justice Frankfurter is equally ambiguous: 
“The Constitutional requirement of uniformity is a requirement of 
geographic uniformity.  It is wholly satisfied when existing obligations 
of a debtor are treated alike by the bankruptcy administration 
 
 600 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946).  New York law allowed payment of interest on inter-
est, whereas Kentucky law permitted only simple interest.  Id.   
 601 Id. at 161. 
 602 Id. at 162–63. 
 603 Id. at 166. 
 604 Id. at 169 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 605 Id. at 169.  
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throughout the country regardless of the State in which the bank-
ruptcy court sits.”
606
 
At least one interpretation of Vanston is that state law may not be 
used to differentiate between property rights of parties in bankruptcy.  
Vanston has never been vacated, but it is certainly qualified by the 
subsequent case of Butner v. United States.
607
  Furthermore, bankruptcy 
courts rarely, if ever, use their equitable powers to supersede state law 
in bankruptcy.
608
 
Butner v. United States confirmed the rule that property rights in 
bankruptcy are defined by state law.  In Butner, a business debtor at-
tempting to reorganize entered into an agreement with a secured 
creditor, Butner, to consolidate various liens against real property in 
North Carolina.
609
  The security agreement did not address rents 
earned by the property.  An agent was appointed by the court to col-
lect rents and apply them to tax, mortgage, and other obligations; 
when the reorganization proved unsuccessful, the court appointed a 
trustee to liquidate the assets.
610
  Butner was still owed money after 
the liquidation, and thus the issue was whether a secured creditor was 
entitled to rents from the collateral.
611
  North Carolina law defined a 
security interest in real property to include rents from the property.
612
  
Relying on precedent from other jurisdictions, however, the lower 
courts decided against the creditor, finding that since a bankruptcy 
court had power to deprive a mortgagee of his state law remedy, 
property rights were to be determined by federal law.
613
 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that while 
Congress clearly has power under the uniformity clause to define a 
mortgagee’s interest in rents, it “has generally left the determination 
of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt estate to state law.”
614
  
According to the Court, deference to state law in bankruptcy is a 
choice made by Congress: “Property interests are created and defined 
by state law.  Unless some federal interest requires a different result, 
 
 606 Green, 329 U.S. at 172. (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 607 440 U.S. 48 (1979). 
 608 See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. of Highland Superstores v. Strobeck Re-
al Estate (In re Highland Superstores), 154 F.3d 573, 578 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Bankrupt-
cy courts simply do not have free rein to ignore a statute in the exercise of their equi-
table powers . . . .”). 
 609 Butner, 440 U.S. at 50. 
 610 Id.  
 611 Id. at 51. 
 612 Id.  
 613 Id. at 52–53. 
 614 Id. at 54. 
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there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently 
simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.”
615
 
As Butner shows, property rights originate under state law.  Bank-
ruptcy can intervene procedurally to modify a creditor’s state-law 
rights, but bankruptcy is not intended to be substantive law that cre-
ates property rights.  The obvious qualification to Butner, however, is 
that federal bankruptcy law overtly supercedes state law by modifying 
creditor’s rights.  State law is clearly the starting point for property 
rights, but there is no basis to conclude that such rights are inviolate 
in bankruptcy. 
In Blanchette v. Connecticut General Insurance Corp. (The Regional 
Rail Reorganization Act Cases), the Court considered whether the Re-
gional Rail Reorganization Act violated the uniformity clause when 
the Act operated only within a single statutorily defined region.
616
  
The Court held that it did not because there was no other railroad 
proceeding taking place outside that region: “The Rail Act operates 
uniformly upon all bankrupt railroads then operating in the United 
States and uniformly with respect to all creditors of each of these rail-
roads.”
617
  The fact that the Act had a purely regional effect did not 
invalidate it since “the uniformity provision does not deny Congress 
power to take into account differences that exist between different 
parts of the country, and to fashion legislation to resolve geograph-
ically isolated problems.”
618
  In this sense, the rule in the Regional Rail 
Reorganization Cases was similar to the rule in Ptasynski—congressional 
exercise of the bankruptcy and taxing powers to address a strictly re-
gional matter is not nonuniform as long as a hypothetical debtor or 
creditor, wherever located, would be treated equally. 
In another case, Railway Labor Executive Ass’n v. Gibbons, the 
Court ruled that select bankruptcy relief violated the uniformity 
clause.
619
  That case dealt with a federal statute, the Rock Island Tran-
sition and Employee Assistance Act, which, by its terms, applied to 
only one regional bankrupt railroad during a time when there were 
other railroads in reorganization proceedings.
620
  The Court stated 
that the Bankruptcy Clause does not impair the ability of Congress to 
 
 615 Butner, 440 U.S. at 55. 
 616 419 U.S. 102 (1974).  
 617 Id. at 159. 
 618 Id. 
 619 455 U.S. 457 (1982). 
 620 Id. at 470.  
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define classes of debtors and to structure separate relief according-
ly.
621
  However, 
[a] law can hardly be said to be uniform throughout the country 
if it applies only to one debtor and can be enforced only by the 
one bankruptcy court having jurisdiction over the debtor. 
. . . . 
To survive scrutiny under the Bankruptcy Clause, a law must at 
least apply uniformly to a defined class of debtors.
622 
Thus, Gibbons reinforces the principle that bankruptcy law may pro-
vide for different treatment to separate classes of creditors, but that 
members within a class must be treated uniformly. 
 IV. BANKRUPTCY AND CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY 
There are ample reasons to conclude that the Framers intended 
to prevent the state-by-state patchwork of insolvency regimes that 
hindered commerce in the early republic—hence, the mandate for 
“uniform” bankruptcy laws.
623
  To the extent that bankruptcy in the 
United States still resembles a patchwork of insolvency regimes, it is 
not, in the plain sense of the word, “uniform.” 
To be sure, Congress is not affirmatively required to enact a na-
tional bankruptcy law.
624
  The bankruptcy clause provides that Con-
gress has the power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws, not that 
Congress is required to do so.  Therefore, when there is no national 
bankruptcy law, states may enact their own bankruptcy and insolvency 
laws.
625
  This shows that absolute bankruptcy equality is not a sacro-
sanct right of citizenship.  Bankruptcy discharge on equal footing for 
every person in every state is not a guaranteed component of life, lib-
erty, or the pursuit of happiness. 
The issue raised in this Article is, when Congress chooses to ex-
ercise its bankruptcy power, must the laws enacted pursuant thereto 
be uniform in their application to all classes of debtors and creditors 
everywhere?  Or, can these laws allow for variation in the treatment of 
the same classes of debtors and creditors based on geography?  The 
answer to the latter question is a hard “no” if one agrees with the ap-
parent conclusion of Katz.  The answer is a softer “no” if one analo-
 
 621 Id. at 473. 
 622 Id. at 471–73. 
 623 See supra notes 535–37 and accompanying text.  
 624 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 230 n.a (1827) (noting that holding that “it is 
the exercise of national bankruptcy power, not the mere existence of it,” that gives 
Congress exclusive right to legislate bankruptcy law).  
 625 Brown v. Smart, 145 U.S. 454, 457 (1892). 
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gizes bankruptcy uniformity with the uniformity standards of the tax-
ing and naturalization powers.  Neither of these two powers allows for 
express variation based on state law or other geographic considera-
tions,
626
 but both of them tolerate regional differences that may indi-
rectly result from the operation of the laws.
627
  In contrast, those who 
agree with the Moyses geographic uniformity doctrine, as further ex-
plicated in Butner, fully accept disproportionate geographic effects in 
the operation of national bankruptcy law.  For them, bankruptcy 
should be a procedural forum to administer state law property 
rights.
628
 
The majority in Katz seems to suggest that the Framers intended 
the Bankruptcy Clause to establish personal uniformity in bankrupt-
cy.
629
  But the Katz “personal uniformity” standard is not convincing.  
The bankruptcy clause does not state that the effect of bankruptcy laws 
must be uniform, but rather that the laws must be uniform.  A credi-
tor whose security interest under state law includes rent proceeds may 
fare better in a bankruptcy case than a creditor in a state where the 
laws do not specify that rents are a part of the security interest.  But 
allowing claims in bankruptcy to reflect property rights existing un-
der state laws at the time the bankruptcy was filed does not violate the 
requirement for uniformity in bankruptcy laws. 
The Moyses and proceduralist “geographic uniformity” standard 
is also unsatisfying.  First, there are flaws in the legal logic of the case, 
as discussed above.
630
  Second, although it is conceptually uncompli-
cated, geographic uniformity does not account for the concerns that 
motivated the Framers to create a unified system of commerce.
631
  
The rule in Moyses would fully honor state laws that discriminate in 
favor of citizens against non-citizens, or that inordinately benefit 
business or other interests unique to that state.  Third, the lack of 
uniformity due to differing property rights, procedural variances, and 
key differences in fundamental precedent results in bankruptcy ad-
 
 626 See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 84 (1900) (“[W]herever a subject is taxed 
anywhere, the same must be taxed everywhere throughout the United States, and at 
the same rate.”); Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 1981) (“While it is true 
that Congress has in the past allowed states great latitude with respect to morality, 
that latitude cannot be granted when the resulting consistencies undermine a uni-
form rule of naturalization.”).  
 627 See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 84 (1983); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 
351, 357 (1976).  
 628 Lipson, supra note 545, at 619. 
 629 See supra notes 589–91 and accompanying text. 
 630 See supra notes 560–72 and accompanying text.  
 631 See supra notes 533–38  and accompanying text.  
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ministration that is inconsistent and haphazard,
632
 and which can suf-
fer from the perception that it is unfair. 
Finally, to characterize a patchwork system of bankruptcy laws 
and procedures that allow for such significantly different outcomes 
for similarly-situated debtors and creditors based primarily on where 
the case is filed simply stretches the notion of uniformity too far.  
“Geographic uniformity” under the Bankruptcy Code is not uniform 
under any reasonable definition of that word. 
The aspiration in Katz for more robust fidelity to bankruptcy 
uniformity can be harmonized with the excessive deference to state 
law displayed in Moyses and Butner.  When a debtor files a bankruptcy 
petition, the crucial baseline for treatment of creditors is the sched-
ules of assets, liabilities, and other documents filed by the debtor.
633
  
Bankruptcy is said to create a “snapshot” of the debtor’s financial sit-
uation as of the moment of filing.
634
  Up to that point, the debtor’s as-
sets and liabilities—and hence, its relationships with creditors—have 
been established and governed under non-bankruptcy law.  There is 
no reason to disregard the rights and obligations of the parties as 
they have been fixed by non-bankruptcy law prior to filing.  In fact, to 
do so would require creating a body of federal common law of prop-
erty.  This “snapshot” is therefore the set of rights held by creditors at 
the commencement of the bankruptcy, which the debtor must ad-
dress.  This may result in non-uniformity of the rights held by parties 
in different states when the bankruptcy commences, but it is based on 
non-bankruptcy law and therefore cannot constitute “non-uniform” 
bankruptcy law. 
Once the case is filed, however, bankruptcy law comes into effect 
in that it modifies the rights and obligations of the parties post-filing.  
Some examples include the automatic stay, rejection of contracts, 
curing of defaults, modification of loan terms, modification of liens, 
priorities of distribution of assets to creditors, discharge of the debt-
or, and other powers.
635
  Post-filing, the laws passed by Congress that 
 
 632 Jackson, supra note 430, at 907. 
 633 11 U.S.C. § 521(a) (2006). 
 634 See, e.g., In re Orso, 283 F.3d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 2002) ( “[In making decisions,] 
the court must take a retrospective ‘snapshot’ of the law and the facts as they stood 
on the day the petition was filed.”). 
 635 See supra note 583 and accompanying text.  Professor Thomas E. Plank cau-
tions against over-expanding the range of issues and problems that are subject to the 
bankruptcy power.  Plank, supra note 543, at 561– 564.   Plank asserts that bankruptcy 
as understood by the Framers was meant to apply narrowly to the situations when 
debtors cannot pay their creditors.  Id. at 532.  Thus, bankruptcy cannot create det-
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address the debtor-creditor relationship, distribute assets, provide for 
discharge, or serve other bankruptcy purposes are under the bank-
ruptcy power and therefore must be uniform.  These bankruptcy laws 
cannot vary in their effect based on geography. 
V. CONCLUSION 
By distinguishing between laws that establish the debtor-creditor 
relationship up to the moment of bankruptcy, and laws that effect its 
modification after the bankruptcy case is filed, we can consider which 
laws may permissibly vary based on nonbankruptcy law, local proce-
dures, or other geographic factors, and which laws must be uniform 
in order to satisfy the uniformity criterion.
636
  It is clear that exemp-
tions in bankruptcy must be the same, regardless of where the debtor 
files.  Exemptions directly impact what the debtor may retain and 
what creditors may recover.  This is the clearest example of how a 
state can use its laws to favor its citizens to the detriment of non-
citizens.
637
  A close second is the difference in state ipso facto laws.  
Evidence conclusively shows that debtors in states that permit en-
forcement of ipso facto clauses enter into reaffirmation agreements 
at a far higher rate than debtors in states that do allow such provi-
sions.  There is no reason debtors should be channeled into forgoing 
discharge of debt because of where they live.  This does not mean 
that states have to change their ipso facto or exemption laws, only 
that these state laws cannot apply to parties in a bankruptcy case.  
 
riments or benefits for third parties just to have an impact on debtors and creditors 
in bankruptcy.  Id. at 545. 
 636 Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918) (“The Federal Constitution . . . 
gives Congress the power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy 
throughout the United States. . . . While this is true, state laws are thus suspended 
only to the extent of actual conflict with the system provided by the Bankruptcy Act 
of Congress.” (citing Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1 How.), 196 (1819))). 
 637 In 1973, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission recommended the 
adoption of uniform federal bankruptcy exemptions.  REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON THE 
BANKR. LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 2, at 125–30 (1973).  A 
number of commentators have considered the dual federal/state exemptions, and 
most are critical of it.  See William Houston Brown & Lawrence Ponoroff, A Second 
Look at the Proposed Uniform Bankruptcy Exemptions: Tennessee As an Example, 28 U. MEM. 
L. REV. 647 (1998) (stating that reasons favoring uniformity in exemptions include 
predictability, greater public respect, elimination of incentive for forum shopping 
and federal control over policy issues); William Woodward, Exemptions, Opting Out, 
and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 OHIO STATE L.J. 335 (1983) (noting unfairness to creditors 
of expansive state exemptions).  An opposite view is presented by G. Marcus Cole, 
The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 251, 273 
(2000).  Cole asserts that principles of U.S. federalism favor keeping state law exemp-
tions, and that “forum shopping” is not necessarily bad and in fact rarely happens.  
Id.  at  236, 272 –273. 
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Other state laws, such as laws on subordination of debt, are likewise 
not uniform and should not be incorporated into bankruptcy law. 
In place of the state laws now used in bankruptcy, bankruptcy 
courts can develop a body of federal common law.  Doing so would 
not offend the principle of Erie Railroad. Co. v. Tompkins.
638
  Erie held 
that courts must apply the law of the forum state in matters not gov-
erned by the federal Constitution or acts of Congress.
639
  The diversity 
action in Erie is entirely different from a bankruptcy case, which arises 
under the federal Bankruptcy Code enacted pursuant to the Bank-
ruptcy Clause.  Indeed, bankruptcy courts already use federal com-
mon law to distinguish between a non-dischargeable domestic sup-
port order and other types of dischargeable family debt, which are 
both created under state law.
640
  Because federal common law and 
state law are both “nonbankruptcy law,” the Code sections that men-
tion nonbankruptcy law will not have to be re-written.  For example, 
§510(a) provides that a subordination agreement is enforceable in 
bankruptcy to the same extent it would be under nonbankruptcy 
law.
641
  At present, state law is used to determine enforceability of a 
subordination agreement.
642
  Federal courts could establish national 
criteria as to the form, content, and other requirements for enforce-
ability of such agreements.  By doing so, creditors with an interest in 
property subject to a subordinate agreement will be treated the same 
irrespective of where the bankruptcy case is filed. 
Another key cause of nonuniformity in bankruptcy is case law 
precedent.  This is a natural consequence of the federal court system 
and is not due to a lack of uniform bankruptcy laws.  But considera-
tion for uniformity should be an active component of judicial deci-
sion-making in bankruptcy.  As noted, the lack of uniformity is the 
most common reason why the Supreme Court accepts certiorari.  
Lower courts should consider uniformity with equal reverence. 
Local rules, forms, standing orders, and trustee procedures that 
create discernible differences in how bankruptcy applies to parties 
 
 638 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 639 Id. at 78 (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of 
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.”). 
 640 See Brody v. Brody (In re Brody), 3 F.3d 35, 38 (2nd Cir. 1993) (“[T]he label 
that the parties attach to a payment is not dispositive; the court must look to the sub-
stance, and not merely the form, of the payments.”); Long v. Calhoun (In re Cal-
houn), 715 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that a domestic support obliga-
tion is a determination made in accordance with federal bankruptcy law, not state 
law).  
 641 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2006). 
 642 See supra notes 250–57. 
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undermine uniformity too because they invest local courts and offi-
cials with discretion to distinguish among parties in bankruptcy.  The 
Bankruptcy Clause allows laws that distinguish between classes of 
debtors and creditors, but it does not allow anyone other than Con-
gress to make those laws.  At the very minimum, all local Chapter 13 
plan forms should be abolished, as should local trustee practices that 
have unique requirements for establishing things such as property 
values and charitable contributions.  They should be replaced by a 
single national Chapter 13 form and national guidelines for essential 
bankruptcy functions.  In addition, it is hard to justify so many local 
Chapter 13 trustee practices and commission rates.  Chapter 13 debt-
ors should pay the same trustee commission rate, under the same 
terms, regardless of where they file.  Local standing orders, which are 
issued without the procedural requirements of local bankruptcy rules 
but have the same effect of local bankruptcy rules, should also be 
abolished.  These steps will go far in eliminating nonuniform bank-
ruptcy outcomes that are based on geography. 
 
